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Russia's Arctic Strategy: An Analysis of the Role of Diplomatic, Cooperative, and Domestic Policies

By | Article
November 28, 2017
Men sit on table signing a treaty with two women assisting them and two men standing behind them

Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov are signing the Russian-Norwegian Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. Photo: Russian Presidential Executive Office

Within the last decade, the Arctic has emerged as a region of increasing economic potential and strategic importance. In particular, Russia’s interest in the region is detailed in many news reports and studies that concentrate on Russia’s overt military and economic actions in the Arctic. While these works provide valuable insight into Russia’s Arctic strategy, there needs to be more attention paid to Russia’s use of diplomatic, cooperative, and domestic policies intended to extend and project influence and power in the Arctic. Scholars have noted that cooperative measures are assuming prominence in Arctic affairs.1) Yet, rarely do these studies investigate the interconnected nature of various diplomatic and cooperative measures and rarely do they note the role of domestic policies in Russia’s Arctic plans. Thus, an often overlooked aspect of Russia’s Arctic strategy is the intertwinement of specific international and domestic policies, which constitutes a significant component of Russia’s Arctic strategy.

This article examines initiatives in five areas

  1. Arctic heritage
  2. Research endeavors
  3. Diplomatic initiatives
  4. Indigenous peoples
  5. Environmental conservation

These five areas are often complementary, thereby forming a cohesive approach of fashioning a favorable impression of Russia’s Arctic activities. It explores these five measures’ immediate influence and potential and emphasizes events from 2010-2017, a period encompassing many of Russia’s endeavors to implement a comprehensive Arctic policy. Specifically, this study argues that the employment of policies in the above five areas is designed to foster broader global acceptance for increased Russian actions in the Arctic.

Celebrating Russia’s Arctic Heritage

A key aspect of Russia’s contemporary Arctic strategy is to extol its Arctic heritage. At the Third International Arctic Forum, “The Arctic-A Territory of Dialogue,” held in 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed the meeting’s location, Salekhard. Putin stated that Russian Cossacks founded the city in 1595, and Salekhard continues to be instrumental in the Arctic’s modernization. As evidence, Putin explained that Salekhard is the capital of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District, a center for industrial projects.2) Putin’s reference to Salekhard is intended to remind other leaders of Russia’s historic links to the region and intends to demonstrate that contemporary projects are a natural continuation of Russia’s centuries-old Arctic presence. The repeated use of similar examples that frame Russia’s current Arctic plans in a historical context may prompt the international community’s increased acceptance of Russia’s expanded actions in the region.

Other opportunities to showcase the Arctic’s historical significance occurred during celebrations marking the 70th anniversary of victory in World War II. In a June 2013 ceremony in London, Putin awarded British citizens the Ushakov Medal for their service in the Arctic Convoys, which kept the Soviet Union supplied.3) In 2015 and 2016, the Russian government continued to award medals to British servicemen who participated in the Arctic Convoys.4)

The Arctic Convoys celebrate the region’s strategic importance in Soviet/Russian history and evidence an occasion of Western states acknowledging the Arctic as essential to Soviet/Russian survival. This example of the Arctic Convoys reminds an international audience that in previous decades other countries have recognized the Arctic’s centrality to ensuring Soviet/Russian existence, thereby suggesting that countries should understand Russia’s current Arctic presence as an outgrowth of its vitally important historic reliance on the region. Russian leaders’ continued reference to past events that stress the Arctic’s historic significance can be understood as attempts to justify Russia’s current and increasing presence in the region.

Pursuing Educational and Scientific Projects

Along with the focus on the Arctic’s historic role, Russia’s current educational and scientific projects, which allow for international participation, are important facets of its Arctic strategy. A primary endeavor is the Arctic Floating University – a project of the M.V. Lomonosov Northern (Arctic) Federal University (NArFU), the Arkhangelsk branch of the Russian Geographical Society, and the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of Russia (Roshydromet). The Arctic Floating University is composed of the Professor Molchanov, which according to the Russian Geographical Society is “the only vessel in Europe that combines unique research laboratory and practical basis for preparation of specialist-scientists.”5) Expeditions began in 2012 and have included Russian and international students from countries such as Denmark, Norway, Spain, the United States, Brazil, and Indonesia. On board the Professor Molchanov, participants travel to northern regions and study the health of the region’s peoples and the environment.6)

The Arctic Floating University strengthens Russia’s image as a preeminent leader in creating cooperative educational initiatives for studying the Arctic. Moreover, the expeditions highlight to an international audience other aspects of Russia’s strategy: promotion of the well-being of the region’s Indigenous peoples and environmental preservation. These expeditions indicate that the various tenets of Russia’s strategy are mutually supportive, thereby providing Russia with a cohesive approach to presenting its Arctic actions as encompassing measures designed to study the region’s varied challenges.

At the same time, these expeditions stress the Arctic as central to Russia’s heritage. Specifically, the 2016 expedition’s main objective was to ensure that more people develop an appreciation for Russia’s Arctic heritage. Students joined with the Russian Military History Society in a wreath laying ceremony honoring the sailors killed while serving in the Arctic during World War II.7) This event highlighted the theme from the 2013 London ceremony that the Arctic is a historically strategic region for Russia and that Russian interest in the region is not merely a 21st century phenomenon.

Along with floating universities, international research stations afford joint opportunities. Sergei Donskoi, the Russian Minister of Natural Resources and the Environment, announced that in 2017, Russian scientists and colleagues from Monaco, the United States, Great Britain, Iceland, and Norway will participate in the international drifting research station that will function until spring 2018.8) Participation in this research initiative indicates that Russia seeks to work with other states to explore the region. Continued cooperation in educational and research projects presents a positive image of Russia’s interest in the Arctic, which may translate into acceptance for Russia’s increasing actions in the region.

Advancing Cooperative Diplomatic Efforts

As part of Russia’s Arctic strategy, work with regional and international associations serve as a possible means for extending influence in the region. Russia and seven other states (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Canada, and the United States) are members of the Arctic Council (AC). The AC, formed in 1996, is the main intergovernmental body that facilitates joint endeavors among the eight Arctic states and Indigenous Arctic peoples.9) Russia voted in favor of the two legally binding agreements negotiated under the auspices of the AC: the 2011 “Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic” (Arctic SAR Agreement) and the 2013 “Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic.”10) With regard to these agreements, Putin noted Russia’s role in the approval of and support for the first agreement and Russia’s work in drafting the second agreement.11) Moreover, Russian actions have evidenced support for these agreements. In accordance with the 2011 Arctic SAR Agreement, Russia has participated in search and rescue exercises with the other AC members, and Russia opted to support the 2013 “Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic” with a 10 million euro contribution in support of environmental endeavors. Additionally, Russia took a leadership role in the creation of the Arctic Economic Council (AEC), which promotes responsible economic development in the region. AEC projects include a 2017 initiative for introducing broadband internet to the Arctic.12) Support for the AC and the AEC portrays Russia as a leader in Arctic affairs and validates other aspects of its strategy, including promoting environmental conservation and the well-being of the Arctic’s Indigenous peoples. As a result, multiple facets of Russia’s Arctic strategy are constantly reinforced, which presents Russia as dedicated to cooperating with all interested parties.

Working with the other littoral Arctic states (Denmark, Canada, Norway, and the United States) remains a primary objective for Russian leaders as they attempt to lay claim to extensive stretches of the Arctic seabed. Below the frozen Arctic, there may be 10 billion tons of gas and oil as well as other valuable resources such as lead, nickel, manganese, gold, diamonds, and platinum. In order to exploit these metals and gems, Russia must verify that its continental shelf extends beyond its current exclusive economic zone.13) Even though it will take a very long time to access these resources, Russia is striving to have its claims recognized by the United Nations (UN). In 2015, Russia submitted a report to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) outlining its claim to approximately 460,000 million square miles (1.19 million square kilometers) of Arctic territory, an area that includes the North Pole.14) In accordance with generally recognized international law under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Russia’s submission intends to prove that specific underwater continental extensions in the claimed region indicate that in this area Russia can exert certain sovereign rights to the seabed resources.15)

In its submission to the CLCS, Russia noted its diplomatic work in the region by including evidence of successful agreements. Specifically, the “Agreement between the USSR and the USA of June 1, 1990” outlined the continental shelf and economic zones in the Bering and Chukchi Seas and the Pacific and Arctic Oceans. More recently, Russia noted that the 2010 “Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean” divided a disputed area in the Barents Sea.16)

Yet, no such agreements are mentioned in conjunction with Denmark and Canada. Russian officials recognized this and held meetings with Danish and Canadian officials. The three parties agreed that should a country submit to the CLCS, then the other two countries should submit a diplomatic note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding any competing claims. After Russia filed its submission, Denmark and Canada submitted their diplomatic notes outlining possible competing claims.17) In September 2017 Russia presented additional research that expands its claim, and a final United Nations recommendation regarding Russian claims may take 3-5 years.18)

Amid possible conflicting claims over Arctic seabed rights, Russia’s decision to pursue an established UN procedure presents Russia as desiring a non-confrontational solution. A recommendation in favor of Russia that recognizes all or parts of its extended sovereign rights could, however, alter relations and upset the current power distribution among the Arctic states. Russia is no doubt cognizant of this possibility, which partially may explain Russian officials’ specific efforts to work with their Danish and Canadian counterparts. More broadly, Russia’s continued work with the UN indicates that Russia realizes that through the CLCS’ review process, Russia can possibly gain broader international recognition of its territorial claims and thus garner broader acceptance of its expansion in the region.

Supporting Indigenous Peoples’ Cultures and Welfare

Coupled with emphasizing historic connections, research endeavors, and diplomatic initiatives, Russian efforts also focus on Arctic Indigenous peoples. Russian interactions with Indigenous peoples has left a negative legacy of tsarist colonization and Soviet collectivization.19) Moving past this legacy appears to be a goal of The Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security in the Period to 2020. Concerning Indigenous peoples, the strategy outlines the need for increased educational opportunities; enhanced medical services; and preservation of traditional cultures.20)

In 2015, educational facilities for nomadic children opened in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area, which allow students to practice their traditional ways of life. Similar projects are planned for children in the Nenets Autonomous Area and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).21) Regarding healthcare, the Nenets Autonomous Area and the Norwegian Center for Telemedicine seek to expand the telemedicine program through adding more qualified paramedics and doctors, and through concentrating on the prevention and treatment of diabetes and cardiovascular diseases.22) These innovative approaches appear to meet objectives outlined in the 2013 Strategy and reinforce another area of Russia’s strategy, educational studies on Arctic peoples’ health.

Another focus is on Indigenous peoples’ participation in policy formation. The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East (RAIPON), established in 1990, works with the Russian government to uphold Indigenous peoples’ rights and hopes to play an increased role in crafting governmental policies that directly affect the Indigenous peoples. RAIPON’s President Grigorii Ledkov is a member of the team developing a plan for implementing The Strategy for the State National Policy of the Russian Federation in the Period to 2025. Among the areas of interest is the concern regarding Indigenous peoples’ ethno-cultural and social-economic development, and RAIPON intends to be involved with the realization of this strategy.23)

An expanded role in government would grant Russia’s Indigenous peoples a stronger voice in official discourse and would align Russian policies closer to those of other Arctic states such as Norway. Sustained concrete policies toward Indigenous peoples could lead to improved working relations between Russia and other AC members, and thus bolster Russia’s image among Arctic countries.

Complementing state policies are measures that highlight Indigenous peoples’ contributions to Russian culture. The Russian State Museum of the Arctic and Antarctic (RGMAA) currently hosts the exhibition “Uelen Bone. Art of the Chukotka Masters.” This exhibition opened in January 2012 and showcases master craftsmen’s carvings and features traditional clothing. In addition, the Museum of Siberia, the North and the Far East, which opened in late 2015 features an exhibition showcasing the life of the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic. This museum’s creation can be understood as indicative of the growing recognition of the Arctic’s importance within Russia. The exhibitions at both museums recognize Indigenous peoples’ cultures and the Arctic as integral to Russia’s heritage.

Promoting Environmental Conservation

Similar to Russia’s focus on Indigenous peoples, Russia’s environmental policies aim to offset a legacy of disregard. In December 2012, the Duma approved the law “‘On Making Changes to the Federal Law ‘On the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation,’ and ‘On the Internal Seas, Territorial Sea, and Contiguous Zone of the Russian Federation.”’ These alterations, which took effect in July 2013, state that organizations or companies that are involved in the production of oil resources in the Russian Arctic must take active measures to prevent oil spills or other forms of damage to the environment or citizens’ property, health, or lives. Should an oil spill occur, these companies or organizations have the responsibility to compensate for the resultant harm.24) The passage of such laws, and should the need arise, the enforcement of such laws, may intend to offset the concern that Russia’s Arctic development plans will disregard the region’s delicate ecosystems. Instead, these laws present Russia’s commitment to balancing environmental concerns and development plans.

In addition to these legislative measures, the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment seeks legislative funds for the clean-up of “‘hotspots.’” In an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Sergei Donskoi defined “‘hotspots’” as areas being contaminated with more than 400 million tons of industrial pollution. Currently, there exist 340 of these areas within Russia, and cleanup has begun with principal consideration of the Arctic region. These “‘hotspots’” are from the Soviet era; yet, the emphasis is not to blame individuals for these polluted sites but to develop plans for these areas’ eradication.25) Donskoi does not elaborate on the exact location of these “‘hotspots’” in the Arctic region, and it is possible that the cleanup of some of these “‘hotspots’” may include regions important for military objectives. However, evidence of Russia’s commitment to clean up “‘hotspots’” in non-strategic areas will reinforce the educational components of its Arctic strategy that focus on the environment. Russia’s dedication to conservation and to the enforcement of strong environmental policies may allay fears that Russia’s intentions in the region will be reminiscent of its Soviet predecessor’s destructive actions and thus may result in states being more agreeable to Russia’s Arctic plans.

Russian environmental endeavors also include various international projects. Currently, Russia and Norway are working to reduce pollution in the Barents Sea region and to adopt forest conservation plans while Russian officials and their Swedish counterparts aim to lower levels of air pollution.26) Russian and American officials have agreed to monitor threatened Arctic wildlife populations.27) These ecological policies reveal that Russia and other regional powers share the same environmental values. These shared values and initiatives act as a common point of agreement that may result in other countries’ increased receptivity to Russia’s expanding Arctic role.

Though these environmental projects are devised at official levels, plans by the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment intend to reach a broader population. Specifically, Sergei Donskoi met with Enric Sala of National Geographic to discuss future articles detailing Russian nature preserves, which would coincide with the 2017 Year of Ecology and Protected Areas in Russia.28) In 2017, a National Geographic article appeared online entitled “Look Inside Russia’s Wildest Nature Reserves-Now Turning 100.” The article explains that Tsar Nicholas II’s desire to save the Barguzin sable from extinction inspired the creation of the first nature reserve, the Barguzinsky zapovednik, which endured during the Soviet era. Donskoi explains that in the post-Soviet period, Russia is more attentive to conservation, and underscores this commitment with a discussion of plans for 18 new nature reserves.29) This online article raises awareness among the English-speaking population about Russia’s interest in environmental protection. This article and possible future articles inform readers of Russia’s historic and current conservation plans, which aid in constructing an image of Russia as an environmental steward.

Conclusion

The five complementary themes of 1) Arctic heritage, 2) research endeavors, 3) diplomatic initiatives, 4) Indigenous peoples, and 5) environmental conservation convey Russia as dedicated to solving challenges and to forging joint endeavors. This conception of Russia seeks to create a conducive atmosphere for increased Russian actions. Consequently, assessments of the Arctic should take into account that the use of a combination of certain international and cooperative efforts along with certain aspects of domestic policies can play a crucial role in advancing a nation’s position.

Dr. Cadra Peterson McDaniel is an Assistant Professor of History (Russia) and Liberal Studies as well as the Coordinator for the Master of Science in Liberal Studies Degree at Texas A&M University-Central Texas.

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