The Arctic This Week Take Five: Week of 2 March, 2026

Japan Considers Participation in Canadian Arctic Naval Exercises 

As reported by The Globe and Mail on March 6, Canada and Japan signed a new strategic partnership that includes expanded defense cooperation and the possibility of joint military training in the Canadian Arctic. During a visit to Tokyo, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi agreed to increase naval collaboration and joint exercises, including the possibility for full participation in Canada’s Operation NANOOK, the country’s primary Arctic sovereignty and military training exercise. The partnership also includes memoranda on Coast Guard cooperation, emergency response, and action against illegal fishing in the North Pacific. (The Globe and Mail)

Take 1: Since becoming an Arctic Council observer in 2013, Japan has gradually built anArctic presence centered on research, international cooperation, and sustainability. At the same time, its approach is becoming more concrete and capacity-based. Japan is currently constructing its first icebreaking vessel dedicated entirely to Arctic research, the Mirai II, scheduled for delivery in November 2026. At the same time, Japanese diplomats have remained active in Arctic fora, reinforcing the country’s reputation as a committed non-Arctic stakeholder. Japan has also repeatedly participated as an observer in Canada’s Operation NANOOK exercises but is now considering fuller involvement, signaling a more practical security presence in the region. This evolution is notable given Japan’s longstanding pacifist security posture and limited military engagement. Increased participation in Arctic training exercises therefore suggests a cautious but meaningful broadening of Japan’s traditionally non-military international approach. While Japan’s Arctic engagement is still predominantly centered around scientific exploration, its closer defense cooperation with Canada illustrates how Arctic governance and security discussions are increasingly intersecting. A wider consideration, in turn, is whether a stronger Japanese presence in the region could also sharpen China’s focus on the Arctic. Given the complex historical and political relationship between Japan and China, a more visible Japanese presence in Arctic security exercises could encourage China to maintain or expand its own involvement to avoid strategic disadvantage, illustrating the potential for global geopolitical rivalries gradually extending northward. (Arctic Today, The Arctic Institute, The Globe and Mail)

Canada and Norway Strengthen Shipping Emission Rules in Arctic Waters

On 2 March, High North News reported that new Emission Control Areas in the Canadian Arctic and Norwegian Sea entered into force on 1 March, extending stricter emission standards to shipping in the region. Adopted by the International Maritime Organization in October 2024, the measures will introduce tighter regional limits on sulphur oxides, nitrogen oxides and particulate matter from ships. The new sulphur limit will apply to all ships from 1 March 2027, while stricter engine requirements for nitrogen oxides will apply only to newly built vessels. (High North News)

Take 2: By applying stricter sulfur and nitrogen oxide standards, the new emission control areas (ECAs) bring parts of the Arctic in line with other maritime regions subject to enhanced emission controls, like the North Sea. Nevertheless, their practical impact on Arctic shipping operations will remain limited in the near term. When stricter sulphur limits take effect in March 2027 they will apply to all ships transiting these areas, but nitrogen oxide requirements will apply only to newly constructed vessels. As a result, much of the existing fleet operating in the Arctic will continue under existing engine standards for years to come. Environmental improvements will therefore only unfold gradually. This highlights the persistent difficulty in reaching concrete and impactful agreements on stricter environmental standards for Arctic shipping. Another recent example emerged during discussions at the International Maritime Organization where member states were unable to reach agreement on proposals related to so-called “polar fuels.” These proposals aimed to promote fuels considered more suitable for Arctic shipping by encouraging the use of cleaner distillate fuels that would reduce emissions of black carbon. Black carbon remains one of the most pressing unresolved issues in Arctic shipping governance. Resulting from incomplete combustion of fossil fuels, this short-lived pollutant has a disproportionately strong warming effect in the Arctic. When black carbon is deposited on snow and ice, it undermines the albedo effect by darkening surfaces and reducing their reflectivity. This, in turn, leads to faster melting and contributes to regional warming. As shipping activity increases across the Arctic, stronger regulations are needed to curb black carbon, promote cleaner fuel standards, and ensure meaningful reductions in pollution. (High North News, Safety4Sea)

Russian Bombers Fly Near Norway as NATO Prepares Arctic Exercise

As reported by The Barents Observer on March 1, Norwegian F-35 fighter jets were dispatched on two occasions to intercept Russian military aircraft spotted near Norway’s northern border, over the Barents Sea. On February 27, two Norwegian F-35s shadowed two Russian Tu-95MS strategic bombers that were being escorted by two Su-35 fighter jets flying in international airspace. On February 25, a Russian Su-24 and Su-33 were intercepted north of Finnmark. These incidents occurred during the course of Russian military exercises near the Kola Peninsula, while NATO prepares to start its Cold Response training exercise on March 9. (The Barents Observer)

Take 3: Norway’s interception of Russian military aircraft over the Barents Sea was partly routine. Both sides regularly test their readiness and monitor each other’s movements in the Arctic. However, the timing is telling. Russia’s flights concurred with live-fire exercises of its Northern Fleet near Norway just as NATO is expanding its own northern posture through Arctic Sentry and the upcoming Cold Response exercise. Military signaling from both sides is thus becoming more frequent and intense, more visible, and potentially more dangerous. For Russia, demonstrating its force near Norway is not just about intimidation but also about protecting a core bastion of Russian military power. For NATO, on the other hand, these patrols reinforce the argument for a stronger allied presence across its northern flank. This dynamic carries several risks. The growing presence of aircraft and ships, paired with the frequency of exercises, increase the chance of an accident or miscalculation, especially during close interceptions. Moreover, this growing military build-up may deepen a security dilemma in which each side presents its actions as defensive while the other perceives them as provocative. Compounding these dynamics, the Arctic is also increasingly exposed to hybrid threats, including espionage, sabotage, and pressure on critical infrastructure. The Arctic is thus increasingly being involved in wider European tensions. Even if neither side seeks direct conflict in the High North, the steady expansion of military assets renders the region more fragile, less predictable, and harder to stabilize. (Forsvaret.no, High North News, Responsible Statecraft, The Barents Observer)

Alaska Offshore Lease Sale Receives No Bids from Oil and Gas Companies

Eye on the Arctic shared on March 5 that the Trump administration’s first offshore oil and gas lease sale in Alaska’s Cook Inlet received zero bids. The auction covered more than 400,000 hectares and was the first of six sales mandated through 2032 under President Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act. Bids were due on March 3, yet the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management confirmed that none were received. (Eye on the Arctic)

Take 4: Although the Trump administration rescinded Biden-era restrictions on oil and gas drilling in Alaska to promote greater energy independence, the lease sales continue to conclude with little to no bids. The failure of the recent Cook Inlet offshore lease sale is therefore not an isolated incident but speaks to a pattern of industry hesitancy. The previous federal offshore lease sale in the Cook Inlet, in December 2022, drew only one bid, despite nearly 1 million acres being offered. There are currently eight federal leases active in Cook Inlet, all of which are owned by Hilcorp, but none of them are currently producing gas or oil. Similarly, a second lease sale In Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in January 2025 received zero bids, following an equally underwhelming sale in 2021. High costs are a key reason: drilling in Arctic conditions requires substantial upfront investment, long timelines, and expensive infrastructure. Moreover, long-term returns are uncertain and other opportunities elsewhere in the world have become more attractive to investors. Environmental risks and reputational costs add another layer of uncertainty. Ongoing public opposition and broader climate risks surrounding Arctic economic development and fossil fuel expansion complicate efforts to finance and justify such projects. When Norway sought to initiate deep-sea mining in its Arctic waters in 2024, overwhelming public backlash halted these plans. From now until 2032, there will be five more federal lease sales in Cook Inlet, which are likely to attract little industry interest as well. (CNN, Eye on the Arctic, New York Times)

Greenland Reports Growing Investor Interest in Mining Opportunities

Reuters reported on March 2 that investor interest in the Greenlandic mining sector has increased following US President Donald Trump’s renewed threats about annexing the island. Greenland’s Minister for Business and Mineral Resources, Naaja H. Nathanielsen, stated that interest has mainly come from companies and investors based in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the European Union. (Reuters)

Take 5: Rising international interest in Greenland’s mining sector reflects the growing strategic importance of critical minerals. Yet this attention risks obscuring the reality that Greenland’s mining industry remains limited. Despite hosting large mineral deposits, the island currently has only a small number of operating mines. The gap between geological potential and actual extraction highlights the structural challenges facing resource development in Greenland and the wider Arctic. Many potential sites are located in remote regions with limited to no road coverage, ports or energy supply. Greenland, for instance, only has about 150 kilometers of road, of which around half are paved. Consequently, companies often need to build transport networks, power generation facilities, and housing for workers before any extraction work can begin. Mining projects in the High North thus require enormous upfront investments. In addition to logistical barriers, Greenland’s geology presents unique technical challenges. Unlike many rare earth deposits elsewhere in the world, where minerals often occur in phosphate or carbonate formations, Greenland’s rare earth elements are often contained in silicate minerals. These deposits tend to have lower concentrations of minerals and require more complex chemical processing, which significantly increases costs. These constraints explain why Greenland’s vast mineral potential has not yet translated into a robust mining industry. Turning the island’s resources into functioning supply chains will thus require long-term investment in infrastructure, technological innovation, and careful consideration of environmental and social impacts. (Reuters, Scientific American, Yale Environment360)