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The Arctic This Week Take Five: Week of March 1, 2021

By | Take Five
March 5, 2021
Logo of The Arctic Institute's Take Five

Russia Launches a Satellite to Monitor Arctic Weather

On February 28, Russia launched Arktika-M from Kazakhstan’s Baikonur cosmodrome. It is the first in a pair of sister satellites, and the second is scheduled for launch in 2023. According to Roscosmos, the tandem satellites will provide 24-7 weather monitoring of the Arctic Ocean and take images of the Arctic every 15-30 seconds when at the correct orbit. In addition to providing better data for forecasting weather and sea ice conditions, they will support search and rescue capabilities by amplifying distress signals from ships, aircraft and people. (Arctic.ru, Reuters)

Take 1: Russia’s high investment in the Arctic is driving its development of unique shipping and infrastructure technologies. This launch demonstrates that it may also pioneer Arctic-relevant space technology. Satellite monitoring of the Arctic is uniquely tricky, and advancement could have global benefits. Due to the slow rotation of the earth near the poles, satellites are unable to operate in “geostationary orbit” – that is, traveling at the same speed as the rotation of the earth – above 81°3’ latitude. A recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) notes that this “leaves the northernmost part of the Arctic without (satellite) coverage.” The satellite operates in a highly elliptical orbit (HEO) in order to allow for long residence time over the Arctic, and the Russian Geographical Society’s article about the launch emphasises the unique technologies that are employed. Increased coverage and improved technology can benefit international Arctic research, safety and development, and the international community should celebrate Russia’s advancements while pushing for the data and technology to be shared transparently.

United States Affirms “Unshakeable” Commitment to NATO with Norway-based US Bomber Flights Over Baltic Capitals

On Wednesday March 3, Reuters reported that the U.S. Air Force deployed one of its Arctic nuclear-capable bombers to fly over the capitals of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. General Jeff Harrington, U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa commander, stated that “this mission sends a clear message that our commitment to our NATO allies is unshakeable.” (Reuters)

Take 2: While this mission to the three Baltic states was not an Arctic specific mission, the four U.S. Air Force nuclear-capable bombers were placed in Norway to operate in the Arctic region. The deployment clearly demonstrates that the U.S. is re-establishing its NATO alliances and using them to create “credible Arctic deterrence” boundaries, which Russia is naturally testing. Last week, two of the other bombers recently stationed in Norway conducted a mission in and around the Barents Sea, which was followed by a Russian announcement of missile testing in the international waters of the “Bear Gap” between Northern Norway and Svalbard. Although this back-and-forth posturing dynamic underlines a sobering renewed appearance of the Arctic on the stage of global security, it is also strangely hopeful. International dialogue in the Arctic cannot remain limited to environmental cooperation through the Arctic Council in the context of rapidly retreating sea ice and increasing accessibility. It is refreshing to see affirmation of the U.S. commitment to NATO and its application in the Arctic in hopes that pursuit of common good, i.e. search-and-rescue and scientific cooperation, can better flourish within defined security boundaries. Still, military posturing is a blunt tool with its own dangerous potential for mistakes and misinterpretation. This exchange also underlines the need for a comprehensive push to establish more international diplomatic and security dialogue in the Arctic, which could offer lower-risk space for similar negotiations. 

Glacial Retreat May Impact Iron Cycling, With Implications for Coastal Ecosystems and Ocean Carbon Storage

On March 1, a group of scientists from Denmark, Germany, United Kingdom and the United States published their research findings in Nature Communications on the topic of iron in the glaciated fjords of Svalbard. By monitoring the amount of two types of potentially bioavailable iron, ascorbate-extractable iron (FeA) and microbially reducible iron (FeM) in three glacial sources, and in the glacial sediments in the fjords extending from those sources, the team found that the amount and reducibility of bioavailable iron from glaciers is relatively low directly at the source, but increases in the fjord sediment with distance from the fjord head. Their main conclusions were that biogeochemical cycling of glacially-sourced iron in Arctic fjord sediment over time increases the iron’s bioavailability as much as 9-fold, and that the total contribution of iron to the water column is reduced when a glacier retreats out of the water and onto land. (Nature Communications)

Take 3: These findings indicate that 1. changes in the glacial contribution of iron to Arctic ecosystems could have larger ecological impacts than previously thought, due to its higher bioavailability, and 2. a significant reduction in the amount of glacially-sourced iron in the Arctic is likely to follow the retreat and grounding of the tidewater glaciers which presently dominate much of the Arctic coast. Iron is a vital micronutrient for phytoplankton, which are the primary moderators of carbon exchange between the ocean and atmosphere in marine ecosystems. Therefore, changes in bioavailable iron can also impact ocean carbon uptake, with implications for global climate change. Although Arctic coastal ecosystems are not considered iron-limited, other research published in Nature Communications suggests that iron limits primary productivity on 30-40% of the ocean’s surface. Impacts of changing glacial iron output depend on if and how that iron is transported out of the Arctic, and if loss of iron could push Arctic marine ecosystems into an iron-limited regime with consequences for its primary productivity. While this research suggests that major changes in the Arctic coastal ecological regime may be implied by the retreat and grounding of tidewater glaciers on the basis of iron availability, more research is necessary to clarify potential impacts. 

Ice Lens Formation Threatens Russian Reindeer Populations

On March 3, The Barents Observer reported that by local estimation, 60,000-80,000 reindeer might have already starved in Northern Russia this winter due to a thick ice lens which has formed on parts of the Yamal tundra. The ice lens makes it impossible for the reindeer to access the lichen that sustains them throughout the winter. A rescue operation dependent on local oil companies’ infrastructure is underway. (Barents Observer)

Take 4: Throughout the Arctic there is tension between the development of sustainable, local economies and centralized resource economies. The Yamal Peninsula is no exception, and controversy over this event’s causes and management showcases the simmering tensions between the growing extractive and herding economies. Russian researchers indicate that ice lenses are naturally occurring in permafrost and may be affected by climate change, and similar ice lenses have recently impacted reindeer in Northern Norway. Some herders claim the ice lens was formed as a result of steam generated by waters kept ice-free by increased ship traffic associated with oil and gas development. No matter what the cause is, and the fact that many herders oppose infrastructural development in the region due to its impacts on reindeer migration, it is important to also point out that that Yamal LNG’s infrastructure has been vital to relief efforts so far, with 40 tonnes of feed flown into its Sabetta port and distributed on roads built by the company. Although herders remain skeptical of oil companies, this event shows that a tenuous alliance has developed and may in fact be vital for local populations as they adapt to rapid geophysical change. 

Only Seven Companies Bid to Drill Norwegian Shelf, Down from Thirty-Six in 2012

On February 25, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate announced that only seven companies have applied for production licenses in the 25th round of licensing on the Norwegian shelf – A/S Norske Shell, Equinor Energy AS, Idemitsu Petroleum Norge AS, Ineos E&P Norge AS, Lundin Norway AS, OMV (Norge) AS, and Vår Energi AS. The current round of licenses offered are in some of Norway’s least explored areas, including the north. (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate)

Take 5: This round of bidding continues a pattern of fewer bids in each successive round hosted by the Norwegian Government, which has persisted for nearly a decade: There were 36 bidders in 2012, 26 bidders in 2015, 11 bidders in 2019 and now just seven this year. While some companies may be motivated by environmental concerns, it is also likely that the costs of development outweigh the benefits as perceived by most companies given the remoteness of the exploration areas and lack of prior exploration success. No matter what the reason is, it is for sure a big win for the environment and the Arctic.