Bridging the Frontiers: Why Sweden should integrate its Arctic and Indo-Pacific Strategies
The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy in the Beaufort Sea, northeast of Barrow, Alaska. Photo: NASA
As global geopolitical competition intensifies, Sweden finds itself at a strategic crossroad. Beyond the immediate concerns of the Baltic Sea region, the Arctic is becoming more contested and the Indo-Pacific is rapidly emerging as the epicentre of global power shifts. As a middle power with relatively strong scientific, industrial, and normative capital, but limited hard power, the challenge for Sweden is not just about participating in these regions but doing so strategically, efficiently, and with lasting impact. From melting ice caps to maritime chokepoints, from undersea infrastructure to dual-use satellite technologies, Arctic and Indo-Pacific regions are increasingly connected by overlapping challenges and opportunities that demand a coordinated, forward-looking approach.
To meet this challenge, Sweden would benefit from adopting a “startup mentality”: thinking lean, acting early, and leveraging strategic partnerships. Applied to foreign policy, this logic translates into focusing on agile cooperation models and developing cost-efficient diplomatic and technological platforms that enhance influence without overextending capabilities. Rather than aiming for scale, Sweden should prioritise identifying opportunities where its capabilities, partnerships, and credibility can generate outsized returns.
Why Integration Matters: Strategic Convergence Between the Arctic and Indo-Pacific
Merging Arctic and Indo-Pacific strategies is one such opportunity. It allows the Scandinavian nation to extract more value by deepening its cooperation with like-minded partners and ultimately strengthening its deterrence capabilities in a vastly complex and multipolar world. The linkage between European and Indo-Pacific security is no longer theoretical. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has had global repercussions, affecting countries beyond Europe. Similarly, the intensifying strategic rivalry between the United States and China, deepening alignment between China and Russia on an expanded portfolio of issues, and Washington’s shifting focus from Europe to Asia spotlight the need for Sweden to prepare for spillovers between the two theatres.
To an extent, this interconnectivity has been recognised by Swedish policymakers. This is best evident in the country’s (relatively) recent Indo-Pacific strategy document which calls for deeper defence and R&D ties with key Indo-Pacific partners. By strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation in areas such as defence innovation, joint exercises, and materiel development, Sweden aims to boost the resilience and competitiveness of its domestic defence industry; an all too critical endeavour as Stockholm strives to secure access to advanced technologies and sustain its industrial base. The Indo-Pacific also offers an opportunity for Sweden to diversify its strategic partnerships and ensure that it remains a credible partner to both NATO and the EU.
However, this strategic awareness is entirely absent in the country’s Arctic strategy; understandably so given that the last Arctic strategy predates Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Still, the lack of a unified policy framework linking the two regions creates inconsistencies that risk undermining Sweden’s national security posture. Debates on Arctic and Indo-Pacific security remain siloed, hindering the development of integrated responses to trans and cross regional threats. This represents a policy fragmentation that ought to be addressed in the next Arctic strategy. Simply put, if Russia, the largest Arctic state, acts as both a European and Asian power, Sweden too needs to adopt a dual-regional lens to respond effectively.
Strategic Synergies: Unlocking the Value of a Merged Approach
Far from being at odds, Sweden’s Arctic and Indo-Pacific interests are, for most part, mutually reinforcing. Collaboration with Indo-Pacific democracies can support Stockholm’s Arctic ambitions in climate resilience, environmental monitoring, infrastructural development, and autonomous technologies. Conversely, its Arctic expertise, especially in sustainable development and infrastructure, can benefit Indo-Pacific partners who are interested in building resilient supply chains across the two regions. By integrating its Arctic and Indo-Pacific strategies into a coherent, forward-looking policy, thus, Sweden can boost its ability to act globally, better protect its regional interests, and strengthen its role as a capable, adaptable, and innovative security actor.
For one, Sweden could better respond to the expanding Russia-China partnership, whose growing convergence, notwithstanding the current lack of expert consensus on the scale and durability of Sino-Russian cooperation, poses new challenges across both regions. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Japan and South Korea have cut back engagement with Russia in the Arctic aligning themselves with Western sanctions. India remains a partial outlier but it too is increasingly cautious about over-reliance on Russia. Both Indo-Pacific and Arctic nations, moreover, are alarmed by the increasing tempo of Sino-Russian cooperation in carrying out grey zone operations and, more broadly, the prospect of private Chinese assets being incorporated into the Russian state’s hybrid warfare. These developments open new pathways for Sweden to engage like-minded Indo-Pacific partners in building resilient, multilateral cooperation across both regions. Put differently, by merging its Indo-Pacific and Arctic strategies, Sweden can streamline its security engagement.
A merged Arctic-Indo-Pacific strategy also positions Sweden to deepen coordination with the United States. Keen on limiting the Arctic cooperation between China and Russia and preventing China from gaining a strategic foothold in the Arctic, there are growing calls in Washington for adding a North Pacific dimension to its Arctic strategy. In this context, a merged Arctic – Indo-Pacific strategy would allow Sweden to amplify the value of its limited resources by integrating into a broader US-led framework that is already responding to China’s ambitions. For instance, Sweden, in partnership with its Nordic neighbours, could position itself as a gateway between Indo-Pacific actors and the Arctic offering scientific, regulatory, and investment partnerships that provide alternatives to risky engagement with Russia or excessive dependence on Chinese-led infrastructure.
By creating synergies across the Arctic and Indo-Pacific, last but not least, Sweden also increases the strategic margins on its own investments: it can contribute modest resources but punch above its weight when embedded in a networked and cross regional approach. By converging strategies into one, Sweden can more effectively pool its limited resources with Japan, South Korea, and India which have multifaceted interests in the Arctic but lack direct access to the region. Joint projects in areas like environmental monitoring, resilient digital infrastructure, maritime domain awareness, or climate-adaptive technologies could be co-financed and co-developed, minimising duplication and maximising mutual benefit. The result is a tighter integration amongst like minded nations without compromising Swedish autonomy, or interests, while also reinforcing collective efforts to keep the regional order in the Arctic stable.
Conclusion
In the era of increased economic and technological interdependence and geopolitical contestation, middle powers need to gaze beyond their immediate neighbourhood in search of their strategic goals. Doing so effectively would require strategic frameworks that account for their resource constraints and encourage cross-regional thinking, maximise efficiency, and avoid duplication. In the case of Sweden, merging its Arctic and Indo-Pacific strategies would offer a more coherent, synergistic approach to foreign policy. It would enable Stockholm to stretch limited resources through burden-sharing with Indo-Pacific allies and contribute meaningfully to shaping emerging governance frameworks in both regions.
In pursuing this merger, Sweden should ultimately aim to lead a Nordic-wide initiative by capitalising on shared values and comparable capacity levels. Acting first grants Sweden a leadership role in shaping a coherent Nordic framework aimed at increased collaboration and synchronisation of the Arctic and Indo-Pacific. To this end, expanding joint training and technological cooperation, especially in satellite navigation, undersea cables, and port infrastructure, should be prioritised. Projects like the North Pole Fiber Project, ICEYE and IHI space cooperation, and HEIST offer templates for joint investment with Indo-Pacific partners. Sweden and its Nordic partners could leverage these models to engage Indo-Pacific observer states of the Arctic Council in co-financing and co-developing next-generation Arctic infrastructure. By utilising existing Nordic defence cooperation mechanisms such as NORDEFCO, moreover, Nordics could pilot a Indo-Pacific-Arctic training programme with the goal of enhancing mutual preparedness, facilitating information-sharing, and laying the groundwork for future joint missions.
Nima Khorrami is a Research Associate at The Arctic Institute.