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Playing the Greenland Card

By | Commentary
April 17, 2018
Aerial view of a landing strip with water and mountain in the background.

Aerial view of the American Thule Air Base in Northwestern Greenland. Photo: TSGT Lee E. Schading / U.S. Air Force

Danish diplomats can play a Greenland Card in their interaction with Washington for the benefit of both Nuuk and Copenhagen. However, the Greenland Card has become a source of tensions between Denmark and Greenland that complicates their common diplomatic strategy.

When Greenland goes to the polls on April 24th, independence from Denmark and the relationship to the United States will once again have been among the main themes of the election campaign. Understanding why these issues remain a permanent feature of Greenlandic politics and why Denmark still has an interest in maintaining a presence in Greenland, requires looking at the complex dynamics of Danish-American relations and how Denmark can use the American presence in Greenland to gain influence in Washington.

Greenland has historically been an important geostrategic asset for the United States. Located between North America and Northern Asia, during the Cold War the world’s largest island was a stepping stone for operations over the North Pole and in the North Atlantic, as well as the site of sophisticated radar installations that could track planes and missiles flying over the polar region. This allowed the Danish government to ‘play the Greenland Card’ in negotiations with the Americans: Copenhagen believed it could get away with a small defense budget and a non-confrontational foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, because a continued presence in Greenland was more important than anything else Denmark could offer to the United States. As one former high-level official recently told us in an interview:

‘We used it shamelessly in NATO negotiations. … I would always tell [the American government], “you can’t just look at [raw defense spending]. You also have to look at our development aid and our block grant for Greenland. That had to be included in the calculation.” They would snicker a bit, but they also knew that it was not completely wrong.’

Historians have yet to show how important the Greenland Card was, but it definitely has an impact on how both Danish and American diplomats perceived one another.

In the past decade, Denmark has still had a Greenland Card to play, but it has changed significantly compared to the Cold War era. First, the value of the Greenland Card has diminished significantly because the value of the card depends on the severity of US-Russian tensions. During the Cold War, where East-West relations at times stood on the brink of full-scale war, the Greenland Card was considered very valuable by diplomats. Today, the value is more limited as US-Russian relations have become amicable, even as we see spats over Ukraine and the Middle East.

Second, the Greenland Card has become less important for Denmark. Without an existential threat from the east, Copenhagen has more foreign policy freedom. Furthermore, Denmark’s relatively large contributions to the American military operations in Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa have given it a more potent tool for gaining influence in Washington.

Third, climate change and globalization are opening the Arctic, creating new and more civilian-oriented areas for cooperation between Denmark and the United States. For instance, the US Coast Guard is actively seeking to develop the capacities required for the surveillance of Arctic waters, the conduct of search and rescue operations, and effective environmental protection. It has tried to gather information and experience from other Arctic nations, including Denmark, Finland, and Norway, in its effort to train officers and develop new capabilities.

The combination of decreased American security interest in Greenland and the “opening of the Arctic” also change the potential gains from the Greenland Card for Denmark and Greenland. While the Greenland Card plays less of a role in NATO negotiations, it instead opens for other types of potential gains. For instance, the Danish Armed Forces struggle to ensure adequate maritime domain awareness and operational capabilities in the Arctic. Getting access to American data from satellites, ships, and airplanes, as well as the establishment of capability sharing schemes, could alleviate some of these problems. Denmark can also use Greenland as a diplomatic tool for increasing the American interest in Danish and Greenlandic policy priorities. For instance, the Norwegian government has had some success with systematically inviting American officials and members of Congress to the Norwegian Arctic; many of the policymakers we interviewed told us that it had made them much more inclined to understanding and engaging with Norwegian policy priorities. Denmark has occasionally organized similar trips, but in a more ad hoc manner.

Many Greenlanders feel that they do not get enough out of the American presence on the Island. In 2004, a Joint Committee was established to facilitate cooperation between Greenland, Denmark, and the US in a wide range of areas, including health, science, education, trade, and tourism. Today, most Greenlandic policymakers are disappointed with the committee, which they view as a talk-shop that has produced few tangible results. Similarly, the service contract for the Thule Air Base has historically been used to give Greenland an indirect economic subsidy, as the procedure ensured that only Danish-Greenlandic companies could receive the contract. However, in 2014 changed procedures created a loophole for an American company to win the contract, much to the dismay of the Greenlandic and Danish governments.

The rise of China and the increased autonomy of the Greenlandic Self-Rule Government further exacerbate the tensions between Nuuk and Copenhagen. In its search for foreign investments, Greenland increasingly looks to Chinese investors who have bought stakes in a rare earth element mine in Kvanefjeld in Southern Greenland and the Isua iron mine close to the Arctic Circle. According to the Danish Defense Intelligence Service, these investments can potentially give China outsized influence that threatens the American position on the island. The ambiguous division of labor between Copenhagen and Nuuk further complicates the China issue. It falls within Greenland’s purview insofar as it is a resource policy issue, but Copenhagen may have the final say since the case has foreign and security policy implications.

Estimating the value of the Greenland Card can be a touchy issue as some Greenlanders believe that the Danish government will not recognize its true value publicly and instead has negotiated a secret deal with the Americans that leaves Greenland empty-handed. Some Greenlandic politicians claim that Greenland would be able to extract more gains for itself if it got the opportunity to negotiate directly with the United States.This politicization of the Greenland Card has diplomatic implications. Danish diplomats we interviewed told us that they found it difficult to have a strategic conversation about the Arctic because even a small misstep could cause a strong reaction from Greenland. In that sense, the mistrust between Denmark and Greenland comes at significant costs as potential low-hanging fruits, such as using Greenland as part of Denmark’s public diplomacy efforts, become more difficult to harvest.

Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Royal Danish Defence College. He has previously published an article via The Arctic Institute on Arctic Security: Global Dynamics Upset Stable Regional Order. This commentary builds upon a peer-reviewed research report (in Danish) published by the Center for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen and a peer-reviewed book chapter (in English) published in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook (ed. Kristian Fischer and Hans Mouritzen) by the Danish Institute for International Studies (both co-authored with Anders Henriksen from the University of Copenhagen). Text and argument are reproduced with permission from the publishers.