Finland, Japan, South Korea, and Sweden: A Middle Power Partnership for Enhanced Maritime Capacity in the Arctic
As the Arctic experiences warmer temperatures, the irregular movement of scattered ice sheets poses a significant hurdle to safe passage of vassals passing through the regional waterways. Photo: Patrick Kelley
Although no stranger to great power competition, the Arctic has been commonly described as a zone of peace and cooperation since the end of the Cold War.1) Such characterisation, in turn, has allowed for a broader conceptualisation of security when discussing regional affairs; that is, more attention has been paid to human security and the effects of climate change on the region. However, as climate change makes Arctic waterways navigable for longer periods of time,2) and as great power competition becomes the dominant strategic narrative of this decade, states seem to have begun to adopt zero sum views on each other’s activities in the Arctic.
To this end, both Russia3) and the US4) have started to increase their military presence in the region, and NATO is being encouraged to follow suit.5) Meanwhile, regional and non-Arctic nations have begun to take measures and initiatives with the simple goal of extending their commercial presence in the Arctic. Yet, the Arctic’s non-binding and/or soft regulatory framework has remained unchanged, and disagreement on the rules of the road and responsible behaviour have been, and will continue to be, on the rise. This will be most prominent in the maritime areas where opening of the sea routes and the region’s vast resources have incentivised states to both develop their so-called ice-compatible maritime assets and also try to play a direct role in the formation of a framework for regulating maritime activities.
With these developments in mind, this article makes the case for increased maritime cooperation between the four middle powers of Finland, Japan, South Korea, and Sweden all of which have, according to their official Arctic strategy documents, critical national interests in the region’s maritime affairs in spite of their common lack of Arctic coastline. Thanks to the importance of the maritime sector in their respective economies, put differently, it is argued that these trade-dependent democracies can immensely benefit from developing a coordinated maritime cooperation framework underlined by a logic of capacity building via capacity sharing. They can utilize their formidable expertise and knowhow in shipbuilding, sustainability, and the development of AI powered autonomous and smart systems in order to contribute to the emergence of a safer and expanded maritime and navigational zones in a cost-effective way. In this way, maritime cooperation can go a long way in enabling them to maintain a rule-based order in the region’s maritime domain while further safeguard their own commercial and strategic interests in the Arctic.
The Bonding Factors
Calling for a maritime-focused partnership between Helsinki, Seoul, Stockholm, and Tokyo can be justified on three separate yet intertwined grounds. First, they all display the key characteristics which are commonly associated with middle powers including their reliance on, and vulnerability to, external trade and developments in the global market, their active participation in regional and global forums as a substitute for their limited resources,6) and their tendency to develop niche capabilities that are complementary to those of their main allies.7)
Added to these are their strong bilateral relations as well as their similar domestic politics and foreign policy orientations all of which are underpinned by their adherence to democratic norms and values, an unequivocal preference for open and rule-based global trading arrangements, and a firmly consolidated strategic anchoring with the United States. Put together, their partnership in the Arctic could be both an extension of Joe Biden’s proposal for the formation of a democratic alliance8) and, perhaps even more importantly, the cornerstone of a future cooperative framework amongst middle power democracies9) for upholding a rule-based system both in the Arctic and beyond.
Owing to their middle power status, secondly, there is an interesting convergence of their commercial priorities in the Arctic. According to their most recently released Arctic strategy documents, they all attach importance to environmental protection, scientific cooperation, science-based collective decision making, and the applicability of international law to the region’s maritime domain.10) Hence,while they all recognise the sovereign jurisdiction of the five costal states over their territorial water and exclusive economic zones (EEZ), they nonetheless call for the strict application of international law and law of the sea to the waters outside EEZs.
Moreover, Seoul and Tokyo justify their demand for greater say in Arctic governance by highlighting the transnational nature of climate change thereby refuting the notion of exclusivity based on geography and/or geographical proximity that the eight Arctic states, albeit to varying extent, insist on.11) For their parts, and in spite of their desire for preserving the Arctic states privileged role in managing regional affairs, Finland and Sweden’s call for expanded cooperation with non-Arctic states has its root in their realisation that environmentally-induced threats and/or challenges in the Arctic are global in nature, and that addressing them requires international collaboration with like-minded nations.12)
Since shipping is likely to be a major contributor to increased levels of environmental distress and pollution, second only to the extractive industry, it would only be natural for the quartet to collaborate on the development of green and smart shipping solutions as part of their wider environmental and scientific agendas. Finland and Sweden have committed themselves to reducing and/or minimising pollution caused by increased maritime activity13) while Japan and South Korea attach significant importance to environmental protection and development of clean fuels and technologies as part of their anticipated increased presence in the Arctic.14) In this context, it is interesting to note that South Korea has in fact sought to shore up its cooperation with Nordic states in implementing its Green New Deal.15)
Finally, these four democracies are commonly described as leading innovation countries16) with a traditionally strong maritime sector. Given the high cost of building icebreakers,17) the Arctic’s challenging and/or hard-to-navigate maritime environment and the dire lack of adequate maritime infrastructure in the region,18) they can utilize their knowhow and pull their resources together in order to expand the region’s overall maritime capacity for safer passage of vessels and personnel as well as faster response rates to incidents. By enhancing the region’s maritime capacity, in other words, the quartet can gain a commanding foothold in the Arctic’s maritime affairs and play an active role in establishing both legal and technical frameworks for acceptable and/or responsible conduct in Arctic waterways.
The Quartet’s Maritime Capabilities
Both Finland and Sweden are eyeing to become key players in the Arctic maritime sector by banking on their navigation expertise in icy conditions as well as investing in, and promoting, their world class icebreaker and shipbuilding capabilities. By being the main supplier of icebreakers to, among others, both China and Russia, one could argue, Finland is in fact already a key player in the Arctic maritime affairs.19) Moreover, Finnish icebreakers cost considerably less than the US built ones even though they are technologically in par with, if not superior to, their American counterparts.20) Sweden too can be a key contributor to search and rescue missions in the Arctic since its current fleet of icebreakers can be re-equipped and/or modified for rescue, firefighting, and oil spill cleanup operations albeit only in summer months when they are off duty.21)
However, neither countries have the resources to be able to unilaterally satisfy increased demands for icebreakers as either a service or product, and thus it ought not to be surprising that Helsinki and Stockholm have already formed a partnership to “design and develop the next generation icebreakers”.22) Capitalizing on their expertise in sustainability, communication, and ice navigation, the new fleets are set to be equipped with state-of-the-art communication technology, AI powered navigational systems capable of monitoring and predicting ice sheet movements, and autonomous movement.23)
As a leader in shipbuilding, smart city technologies, and AI, South Korean government, similar to its Finnish and Swedish counterparts, has made it a national priority to maintain and strengthen the country’s position in these sectors by helping local private entities to develop autonomous, smart, eco-friendly maritime ecosystem.24) As part of its national strategy to create economic growth via the development of technologies commonly associated with the fourth industrial revolution, “Korea is focusing on technologies such as autonomous ships, smart ports and improved navigation systems that raise efficiency and productivity through higher speed, quality of service and a reduction in accidents caused by human error”.25) To this end, Seoul has plans to complete the construction of 12 smart ports by 2040 while work on autonomous ships and navigation systems has been underway since 2009 involving the country’s major shipbuilders including Hyundai Heavy Industries, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering, and Samsung Heavy Industries.26)
Aware of the strategic importance of the sector as both a driver of economic growth and technological innovation, Japanese government too has been consistent in increasing its support for the industry.27) Tokyo has already put in place a well thought out plan for its shipbuilding industry with the goal of ensuring its competitiveness both regionally and globally. Developed by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), which is in charge of the sector, Japan’s vision is to “maintain a domestic building capacity equivalent to one third of world market demand and establish technical capabilities to lead the world shipping and shipbuilding industries”.28) In so doing, Japanese government has committed itself to providing generous grants for R&D, especially with regard to autonomous shipping and AI powered navigational systems, as well as assistance in terms of international marketing and provision of export credits and export credit insurance.
Concluding Remarks
It appears that beside important policy and/or doctrinal compatibilities between Finland, Japan, South Korea, and Sweden, there also exist critical sectoral and technical synergies which could be tapped into in order to boost and/or accelerate the emergence of a cooperative maritime framework. Should they seek to do so, their efforts would benefit from their widely acknowledged charecterisation as middle powers29) which in turn make their initiatives and/or partnership less susceptible to other states geopolitical scrutiny;30) that is, their status as middle powers would allow them to ‘operate under the radar’ and build on their already strong bilateral commercial and scientific ties to establish a quadrilateral framework for maritime cooperation in the Arctic.
Given their respective expertise in AI research and smart city technologies, icebreaker building, and sustainable development, as well as a common track record of scientific research and monitoring in the region, these states are best advised to concentrate the bulk of their efforts on the development of smart ports, autonomous ships, AI powered navigational systems capable of mapping ice sheet movement, and autonomous maritime ecosystems. Their underlying goal ought to be safer, faster, and cleaner Arctic shipping. Doing so would go a long way in both strengthening their footprint in Arctic maritime affairs and fending off any potential efforts by the Arctic literal states to limit the participation of non-coastal and non-Arctic nations in Arctic maritime security discussions.31)
In the context of the unique Arctic environment as well as these countries’ own stated concerns with environmental degradation,32) moreover, the two Nordic and Asian neighbours will be serving their own respective Arctic agendas if they collaborate in decarbonising Arctic shipping. And the good news here is that the foundations for such undertaking are already in place as evident in the case of MIRAI 2.0 between Japan and Sweden as well as the newly signed agreement on Green Economy cooperation between Finland and South Korea.33)
Notwithstanding the diminishing ice, furthermore, navigation in the Arctic still remains a challenging endeavor thanks to the unpredictability of ice sheet movements.34) One way of overcoming this challenge is to develop AI powered navigational systems cable of both mapping and predicting ice sheet movements with greater accuracy.35) Not only do these countries have the expertise, the political will, and commercial incentives for such undertaking but doing so would also enable them to collectively make a positive contribution to improvement of the regional system of meteorological observations which suffers from numerous gaps and deficiencies.36)
Last but certainly not least, they can cooperate in both building modern icebreakers and development of smart maritime ecosystems similar to the One Sea Project thereby contributing to not just safer passage but also round the clock incident response capabilities. While having access to modern icebreakers is a prerequisite to any state’s ability to benefit from the opening of Arctic’s maritime passages, developing autonomous maritime ecosystems could increase surveillance, reduce operational costs, and therefore expand region-wide search and rescue capacity.
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