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Arctic Politics and the EU-Norway Fishing Dispute

By | Commentary
October 5, 2021
A fishing boat docks at a small Norwegian fishing village

Fishing is the economic lifeline of many small villages along the Norwegian coast like Gjesvær in Finnmark. Photo: Gordon Leggett

With only two years until the Norwegian chairmanship of the Arctic Council, a decades-old point of contention between Norway and the European Union––a fishing dispute––could be coming to the forefront of Arctic politics and set precedent for the future relationship between voting members and observers in the high-level intergovernmental forum.

The issue centers on access to fishing grounds around the Svalbard archipelago and the interpretation of the century old Svalbard Treaty which has come under increasing scrutiny as the region evolves due to climate change. In recent years the migration of living resources to the waters around the islands has been the source of legal disputes between the EU acting on behalf of member states and Norway which holds sovereignty over Svalbard. Norway, a permanent voting member of the Council, has called into question the EU’s adherence to the criteria for observers to recognize and respect Arctic states’ sovereignty and jurisdiction in the High North. As the EU has yet to be conferred full observer status, these developments could present a significant hurdle for the multi-national bloc’s ambitions in the Arctic.

Norway asserts that the EU has unilaterally issued fishing licenses and established catch quotas to member states for the waters around Svalbard larger than the quota set for the EU by Norway without prior consultation thereby infringing on Norway’s rights to control the resources within its 200 mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as stipulated in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The calculations for fishing quotas around Svalbard are based on historic fishing patterns prior to the establishment of the EEZ in 1977 and have shifted with the expansion of the EU, such as in 2004 when Poland joined the bloc and Norway increased the allocated quota for the EU based on the addition of Poland’s pre-EU quota; this system of calculations came into question with the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU on January 1, 2021.

The EU’s internal calculations for fishing quotas continued to use pre-Brexit allocations which amount to a discrepancy of over 4,000 tons of fish, which Oslo contends the UK took with it when it left the Union. In a letter to the EU’s Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the European Association of Fish Producers Organizations (EAPO) president Pim Visser claims that the decision by Norway could cost the EU fishing industry €800 million over the next 20 years if unchallenged by Brussels. This takes place during ongoing negotiations between the UK and the EU over post-Brexit fishing rights which have thus far only reached an agreement lasting until the end of 2021. In tandem, both issues could present a significant challenge for the EU’s fishing industry in the near future if common ground cannot be reached.

Norway’s decision to include the EU’s tentative status in the Arctic Council as part of this dispute is a significant, and arguably uncharacteristic escalation in what is normally a cooperative relationship. The escalation presents the possibility of new precedent for the relationship between the eight permanent voting members of the Arctic Council and the thirteen observers in the forum. While observers have no agency in rulemaking, debate, or schedule setting in the Council, their ability to attend meetings and work through permanent members has been seen as an important avenue for non-Arctic states to have their concerns voiced in the High North’s foremost governance organization.

The EU has yet to receive full observer status due to opposition from Russia but has still been allowed to attend meetings with other observers, Norway’s signaling of the fragility of this arrangement could produce a culture within the organization in which disagreements with permanent members come at the risk of expulsion. Expulsion would however have to come with the consensus of other Council members who could take exception to bilateral issues interfering with multilateral governance within the council. With the EU’s unique status as a quasi-observer, its fate could come down to the unilateral decision of Norway once it begins its chairmanship, should it choose to interpret the Council’s 38th rule as giving the chair such authority. This could discourage other states and organizations from seeking observer status and participation within the forum, perhaps prompting the foundation of a competing multilateral organization, something former Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide forewarned about in 2019 when he said “it’s better to have these people join our club than to allow them to form another club to our detriment.”

The Arctic’s evolution is greatly affected by climate change and these changes move it closer to the forefront of global politics and international relations as the region’s historical identity is upended by 21st century realities. What has since the Cold War been a region of remarkable cooperation could shift to a theater of exclusivity as Arctic states close ranks to protect a revealing bounty of resources. Norway’s decision to potentially tie this dispute over fishing rights to the EU’s status within the Arctic Council could be a harbinger of the tone the Council may take as non-Arctic actors increasingly claim the region as a common heritage for mankind and challenge the idea of Arctic states’ primacy over Arctic affairs. This gambit could also backfire on Oslo as the Council, which runs on consensus, could challenge the chair’s interpretation of unilateral power in the organization, though the EU would still have to overcome the original objections to its full observer status. Finally, this dispute must be viewed within the wider scope of Norwegian-EU relations which are otherwise amicable, bringing observers to wonder if the potential fallouts of this game of diplomatic chicken are worth the perceived rewards.

Zachary Lavengood is a PhD candidate at Charles University’s Institute of International Studies, Department of North American Studies in Prague, Czechia. His research focuses include Arctic geopolitics, international development, and world-systems analysis. He can be reached at 46827707@fsv.cuni.cz.