The Arctic This Week Take Five: Week of August 24, 2026

Norway Disregards EU Pressure on Moratorium on Arctic Oil and Gas Extraction

As reported by Reuters on August 24, Norwegian Energy Minister Terje Aasland stated that Norway will continue developing oil and gas resources in the Barents Sea, regardless of the European Union’s position on a possible renewed moratorium on Arctic hydrocarbon extraction. Norway has raised the issue in talks with EU officials and considers it a sovereign Norwegian decision. (Reuters)

Take 1: Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Norway has become central to Europe’s energy security. In 2025, it became the EU’s largest gas supplier, enabling the Union to strongly reduce its dependence on Russian gas. Norway can thus argue that stable supplies from a close, democratic partner are preferable to a renewed reliance on more volatile or authoritarian suppliers. Still, the political cost is not to be underestimated. The EU’s Arctic approach has consistently emphasised climate action, environmental protection and is in favour of keeping fossil fuels in the ground. Norway’s insistence to continue developing the Barents Sea regardless of what the EU decides during its discussions on the moratorium could strongly undermine the idea of a shared European approach to the Arctic. The timing is also difficult. Amid strong concerns over European energy security, Norway’s new Arctic energy projects will not solve immediate energy challenges. Exploration and development take years. Meanwhile, as renewables continue to expand, European gas demand is expected to decline, raising questions about whether new fields would be long-term assets or future liabilities. In any case, Norway is set to continue exploiting hydrocarbons in the region. In order to maintain political legitimacy and avoid further backlash, the key question is therefore under what conditions this exploration will take place and whether it is tied to strict environmental safeguards, spill-response capacity, credible transition planning, and crucially, Indigenous and local consultation. (Nordic Energy Research, Politico, Reuters)

Finland to Host European Arctic Summit in Rovaniemi Mid-September

Eye on the Arctic shared on August 24 that Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Oppo is set to host the European Arctic Summit on September 13-14 in Rovaniemi in Northern Finland. The goal of the Summit is to strengthen the EU’s common strategic approach to the High North while facilitating dialogue on stability, security, and sustainable Arctic development. Several EU heads of state and government are on the guest list, as well as EU High Representative Kaja Kallas and European Council President Antonio Costa. (Eye on the Arctic)

Take 2: The European Arctic Summit in Rovaniemi comes at a time when the EU is rethinking what kind of Arctic actor it wants to be. The Union’s new Arctic strategy is expected to be published later that same month. The Summit can thus be considered a political scene-setter and part of the broader efforts to build the EU’s Arctic engagement from a more strategic and political perspective. The EU’s Arctic engagement has long been rooted in a combination of climate policy, sustainable development, and research. These issues remain essential, but have become grounded in a much more difficult geopolitical environment. This is also reflected in the plethora of updated Arctic strategies and policies published since 2022. Russia’s war in Ukraine, the weakened Arctic Council, renewed tensions around Greenland, and growing concern regarding critical infrastructure have made it much harder to treat the Arctic as the region of low-tension governance it once was. The EU’s updated policy is therefore likely to place greater emphasis on security, defence, connectivity, and economic security. Similarly, the Summit signals that the Arctic is increasingly being connected to Europe’s broader security architecture. The list of participants includes Nordic and Baltic representatives, and several countries in Europe’s eastern flank. The Arctic is thus no longer being discussed as only a regional or environmental issue, but as part of the wider debate on European resilience, preparedness, and strategic autonomy. (Eye on the Arctic, Finnish Government)

Canada’s Largest Icebreaker Undertakes its Sixth Voyage to the North Pole

CBC News reported on August 26 that the Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent is carrying out its sixth mission to the North Pole, accompanied by Swedish icebreaker Oden. The vessel arrived on August 16 and is currently mapping the Arctic Ocean floor with sensors to support Canada’s submissions under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, including around the Lomonosov Ridge, an area also claimed by both Russia and Denmark (via Greenland). The expedition will conclude in early November and is intended to collect data for both legal and scientific purposes. (CBC News)

Take 3: Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal states may claim sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil beyond 200 nautical miles if they can demonstrate that the area forms part of their continental shelf. While these rights do not amount to full sovereignty, they are still important as they allow access to seabed resources, future economic opportunities, legal standing, and political presence. This is also why states attach such importance to these claims. However, they often overlap with claims of other states. In this case, part of the area claimed by Canada is also claimed by Russia and Denmark (via Greenland). The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf can assess the scientific validity of a state’s outer continental shelf submission, but it does not formally decide the boundaries. If Canada, Denmark, and Russia all establish a sound legal basis for parts of the same seabed area, the final boundary will still need to be settled through negotiation or another form of peaceful dispute settlement. Until then, there is no undisputed rights holder in the overlapping area. The UNCLOS process is therefore helpful to solidify the claims, but it remains incomplete. Importantly though, it channels competition into scientific mapping, diplomatic procedures, and legal submissions instead of outright confrontation. In addition to scientific enquiry, Canada’s mission therefore seeks to strengthen its legal position, prepare for future negotiations, and demonstrate presence in the region. (CBC News, Le Cercle Polaire)

China and Russia Embark on Fourth Joint Scientific Expedition in the Arctic

As reported by High North News on August 25, China and Russia have launched their fourth joint scientific expedition to the Arctic. The 62-day mission departed from Vladivostok, with scientists from both countries aboard the research vessel Akademik M.A. Lavrentyev. The researchers will conduct multidisciplinary research from the northwestern Pacific Ocean into the Arctic Ocean, including the Chukchi Sea, East Siberian Sea, Lomonosov Ridge, Makarov Basin, and Amundsen Basin. The expedition is organised jointly by Chinese and Russian research institutes and does not form part of China’s 16th national Arctic expedition, which is taking place in parallel. (High North News)

Take 4: Scientific research is crucial for understanding the rapidly changing Arctic. Since 2022, however, the context has changed considerably and the political trust between Russia and the other Arctic states remains severely damaged. This has created more space for bilateral forms of cooperation, like this joint expedition between Russia and China. For Russia, cooperation with China helps compensate for the loss of Western scientific, financial, and technological partnerships. Meanwhile, for China, science diplomacy provides a strong entry point into the region. It has no Arctic coastline but scientific research expeditions enable China to build expertise, gather data, and gain operational experience in Arctic waters. In July, China launched its 16th national Arctic scientific expedition, a four-month research expedition to gather insights on among others sea ice, oceanography, ecology, and atmospheric conditions, and to conduct geological research on the Gakkel Ridge. Insights gathered on these expeditions will undoubtedly also be of relevance for China’s recently announced seasonal shipping service along the Northern Sea Route. This also points to the ambiguous character of Arctic science. Much of the research may be civilian and valuable for climate science, but knowledge about sea ice, seabed conditions, ocean currents, and navigation routes can also support activities of a more commercial and strategic nature. This can also be observed with Canada’s current mission in the North Pole (see Take 3). Scientific missions should not automatically be treated as security threats, but the line between research, state presence, and strategic positioning is becoming blurrier. (Arctic Portal, High North News, National Bureau of Asian Research)

Centre for High North Logistics Warns of Imminent Shortage of Competence Across Northern Nordic Region

High North News shared on August 26 that a new report by the Centre for High North Logistics at Nord University warns that northern Norway, Sweden, and Finland lack the expertise needed to meet future transport, infrastructure, logistics, and preparedness needs. The report estimates that the region needs an additional 50,000 people with higher education qualifications to be able to develop local society at the same rate as elsewhere in the Nordic region. To address this gap the report proposes the creation of a long-term, joint Arctic Mobility Fund for the region. (High North News)

Take 5: Strategic attention to the Arctic is growing and is largely driven by defence considerations, security of supply, and commercial opportunities, all requiring substantial local infrastructure, including ports, roads, railways, and airports. The report of the Centre for High North Logistics points to a challenge that is often overlooked: this infrastructure depends on people who can plan, build, and maintain them. Yet these skilled workers are scarce in the northern Nordics. There is thus a clear need for more investment in stronger local education, training, and public services, as well as talent retention. In the North American Arctic, a lack of local services and quality education opportunities is a widely known issue. The European Arctic faces similar pressures albeit in a different socioeconomic context. Many northern municipalities are grappling with ageing populations, small labour markets, and rising demand for specialised skills, while young talent has consistently been moving south. The report’s proposed pan-northern Nordic Arctic Mobility Fund is therefore important: it shifts the focus from purely physical infrastructure to the need to foster human capacity and anchor expertise in the region itself. Local educational opportunities matter because students trained in the north understand local conditions. When paired with investment in housing, healthcare, childcare, digital connectivity, and culturally relevant services, talent retention is also more likely. Infrastructure investment should therefore not solely focus on mobility corridors and preparedness systems, but also on the people needed to make this possible. (High North News, Konnekt)