Geopolitical Implications of New Arctic Shipping Lanes
The increasing accessibility of newly open Arctic shipping lanes and ports bring with them troubling geopolitical implications. Photo: NOAA
The advent of climate change has brought about a number of different changes in the Arctic, including increased accessibility to Arctic ports as well as the opening of new Arctic shipping lanes. With new trans-Arctic routes, including the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest Passage (NWP), as well as newly built and refurbished ports from Russia, political and military interests are reevaluating the region as one of geopolitical competition. While the Arctic traditionally was characterized by cooperation and low tensions, that is changing. A report from the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) on the Arctic notes that although there is still important cooperation in the region, the Arctic is increasingly seen as an area for geopolitical competition amongst the US, China, and Russia.1) The article will discuss the geopolitical ramifications of the NSR and NWP as well as the building and refurbishing of ports in the Arctic.
With the emergence of new possible shipping lanes such as the NSR and the NWP, states are changing their behavior in the Arctic. As the ice diminishes, these shorter maritime routes, their respective ports and natural resources are causing a renewal of interest in what was once considered an impassable region. States have expressed interest in using new shipping lanes for shorter transit times, strategic resource extraction, military activity as well as regional shipping, fishing and tourism.2) However, with its unpredictable seas, severe climate conditions, high costs, and lack of developed infrastructure in the northern territories – the Arctic has many obstacles for socio-economic and maritime development.3)
Despite these obstacles, this renewed regional interest may lead to increased geopolitical tensions. Increasing traffic brings the possibility of unknown ships close to many of these country’s coasts in a way that they are not familiar with. States then must determine how to control their northern borders in harsh climates and territories that, until recently, were impassable. Without some kind of vigilance over their borders, Arctic states may also run the risk of facilitating or falling victim to increased transnational crime. For example, unknown ships also bring with them unknown purposes, of which many could be illegal fishing or even illicit trafficking. Further, the development of the NSR and NWP also presents possible issues. Unresolved disputes about the sovereignty of these new sea routes may be problematic when shipping does eventually become an option. China and Russia’s cooperation on the development of the NSR also brings with it concerns about Chinese influence in the Arctic as well as American hand-wringing about a closer relationship between Russia and China.
The Northern Sea Route
Although the Northern Sea Route (NSR) was first opened by the Soviet Union in the 1930s, it has not been a reliable transit route for many decades due to ice coverage.4) However, with the increasing melting of the polar ice caps, the NSR is looking more and more like a potential transit route. However, there are geopolitical implications concerning the NSR that raise interesting questions. Perhaps the most basic geopolitical consideration is who has power over the NSR. Russia has claimed that the NSR lies within its territorial waters, giving it exclusive rights to develop the area and to patrol ships.5) The United States and other powers have disputed this claim, which has led to an interesting paradox where neither side recognizes the veracity of who can control this passageway. Interestingly, Canada does recognize Russia’s claim over the NSR as Russia recognizes Canada’s claim over the NWP (See below).
Another geopolitical concern is the development of the NSR. While the United States has failed for many years to express interest, not all states have taken such an approach. China, for example, is working with Russia to develop the NSR as China sees the route as important for its national economic interests. Although the investment is hugely expensive and time consuming, China clearly sees the development of the NSR as playing the long game.6) While the route may not be usable now, in a few decades, that could easily change. Geopolitically, this has huge implications as it brings China and Russia closer together as allies and encourages both states to develop more icebreakers – a necessary tool to navigate the region.
The Northwest Passage
While much of the headlines tend to highlight the importance of the NSR, the Northwest passage (NWP) also raises its own concerns, mirroring those of Russia. Canada claims that the NWP is located in internal Canadian waters and therefore any ship is subject to Canadian law and sovereignty.7) With the opening of the NWP, Canadian analysts have also raised concerns about potential environmental disasters, military security, and the security of people. However, the question also comes down to sovereignty as with the NSR.8) The United States and the European Union have quibbled with Canada’s claim of sovereignty, claiming that the NWP is an international strait and that there is a non suspendable right of transit. As noted above, Russia and Canada recognize each other’s claim over their respective Arctic passages.
Geopolitically, the opening of the NWP has similar implications as the NSR. While there is less development with other nations, international legal questions still remain unanswered about who has control over the strait. Given the slow rate of change, there is still time to find a compromise to this important geopolitical question before the route is completely free of ice. The second geopolitical concern is of potential disasters and military security in the region. Analysts have pointed to the possibility of terrorists entering Canada from the lightly populated Arctic region – making the opening of this route concerning for Canadian national security. While that seems unlikely due to the high costs of entering Canada in this way, it presents states with new security problems to deal with.
New Ports
One of the more interesting developments in the Arctic has been the development of new ports, both hydrocarbon and military-oriented, throughout the region. Russia is the main mover behind this trend, with Russian militarization of the Arctic a growing concern for many policymakers, particularly in the United States. This buildup can be explained in a few different ways: defense and survivability of second-strike assets, protection of Russia’s commercial interests, and addressing economic challenges in its polar region.9) While there may be different reasons for this buildup, there is no question that it is happening. In recent years, Russia has reopened more than 50 Soviet bases in the Arctic, both providing themselves more strategic ports throughout the region as well as sending a message to other countries.10) No other state has as solid a presence in the Arctic as Russia does. Opening these ports, no matter how practical, send the signal that Russia wants to retain what it sees as a historic domination of the region.
It is tempting to see these new ports as the first step of a geopolitical contest between great powers. The construction of these ports is akin, according to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, to Chinese actions in the South China Sea, presenting an aggressive pattern of behaviour.11) Whether or not that is true, Pompeo’s speech indicates that the US perceives it as such and will react as it sees fit. While it is certainly sending a message, I would argue that it is not done so with the intent to be purely provocative. With the opening of the NSR and increasing hydrocarbon extraction and research, Russia needs more bases to keep track of its growing activity. It is not feasible to expect economic development without subsequent government support in the form of bases. However, this narrative of geopolitical competition is certainly present in both Russia and in Western countries.
Geopolitical Analysis
The opening of new shipping lanes and construction of new ports do not inherently indicate increased geopolitical tensions in the Arctic. However, their consequences do. Increased activity in the NSR and NWP comes with a few geopolitical concerns. As discussed above, the first is that of sovereignty. There is no clarity in either of these shipping lanes as to who actually has power over who can pass and what standards they must adhere to in order to do so. Without this information, there will be increased uncertainty and therefore more possibilities for misunderstandings between states. The second concern is the possibility of transnational crime. With increased traffic in these waterways, Arctic states will have to find some way of monitoring unknown ships and activity. If not, the Arctic may see an increase in illegal fishing and trafficking. This indicates that Arctic states, particularly Canada and Russia, must determine better ways of controlling their northern borders. Imposing more border control measures may imply that there will be increased military and security presence. While an increased security presence might indicate stability, generally it may also lead to rising tensions between powers. A final geopolitical concern is that of the relationship between Russia and China. The development of the NSR has started the beginning of a potential alliance between Russia and China where China provides funding and technology for NSR development and Russia provides both access and future benefits for China who may wish to utilize the NSR. From an American perspective, a Russia-Chinese alliance is concerning as it increases the possibility of Chinese influence in the Arctic as well as brings together two countries who both have poor relationships with the US. Whether or not American stress turns out to be warranted, the US will still act according to this fear and may begin to build up military strength in the Arctic just in case.
While it may seem as though change is happening very quickly in the Arctic, there is still time to prepare for geographic changes up North. States will not have to decide on the fly what new policies will be without coordinating with other Arctic counterparts. In short, geopolitical tensions may be at risk of rising but there is no rush to make decisions without thoroughly considering all of the ways to avoid geopolitical conflict.
Gabriella Gricius is PhD Student at Colorado State University focusing on Arctic politics, Russian studies, and critical security & decolonial theory. She is also a Graduate Fellow with the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network.
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