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A Pragmatic Approach to Conceptual Divergences in Russia-China Relations: the Case of the Northern Sea Route

By | Article
November 4, 2025
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Russian and Chinese policymakers, including Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, in a meeting room with Russian and Chinese flags, Chinese art on the wall, and flowers between the two delegations

Vladimir Putin attending a meeting with Xi Jinping during the Russian delegation’s visit to China in 2024. Photo: Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation

The Arctic Institute China Series 2025

The Russian Arctic has undergone a significant transformation, emerging from the “oblivion” of the 1990s to become the second highest territorial priority in the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept.1) Today, the region holds a central role in both budgetary planning and the domestic media. While the development of the Russian Arctic requires a comprehensive and integrated approach, the enhancement of logistics and transport infrastructure remains a cornerstone of international cooperation in the region.

The Northern Sea Route (NSR) receives the greatest attention as a potentially vital maritime corridor for both domestic and international use. It features prominently in all Russian strategic documents related to the Arctic and serves as a “litmus test” for assessing both the desired and actual progress in regional development.

Although the Arctic maintained its “exceptional” status following the initial deterioration of Russia–West relations in 2014, the recent phase of the Ukrainian crisis has necessitated an urgent shift toward cooperation with non-Arctic partners. Over the past three years, Russia’s “turn to the East” has shaped a new strategic vision for regional engagement. This reorientation is frequently invoked in media narratives and official political discourse as a rationale for the ambitious trade targets set forth in the “Northern Sea Route Development Plan” prior to February 2022.

“Near-Arctic China”

China is now most frequently mentioned in a positive context in key speeches of President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.2) In 2024, the Russian-Chinese Subcommittee on Cooperation on the Northern Sea Route was established3)—an institutional mechanism for joint decision-making that has no equivalent in Russia’s relations with other countries. Additionally, on the sidelines of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) 2024, Russian Rosatom and Chinese NewNew Shipping signed an agreement, enabling Russian and Chinese shipping companies to organize year-round navigation along the NSR.4) That same year, Chinese shipping companies nearly doubled the number of their voyages along the route. According to Russia’s ambitious projections, Chinese transit through the NSR could reach up to 50 million tons annually by 2030.5) China also remains the leading investor in Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects and a key supplier of critical technological capacities.

Both Russia and China are often identified as primary security challenges in strategic documents and public statements by senior U.S. and NATO officials, including in the Biden Administration’s National Security Strategy and Arctic Strategy.6) The frequent pairing of the two countries in NATO rhetoric7) elicits a reaction from Russian domestic media,8) which reinforces the perception of a deepening Russia–China partnership in the public discourse.

China has become Russia’s principal partner in the development of freight transportation and Arctic infrastructure. This strategic alignment is evident not only in Russian domestic narratives but also in the perceptions of NATO member states.

Reality check

Despite numerous joint statements affirming the strategic importance of the Arctic for resource development and logistics, the region does not rank among Beijing’s top priorities according to its own strategic standards. China’s interests span nearly the entire globe, with its primary focus directed toward regions that offer the highest economic returns on investment. The Arctic, by contrast, is hindered by extreme climatic conditions and, despite the effects of global warming, remains a commercially unpredictable region in the near term.9)

In the first year of Russia’s isolation by Western countries, transit traffic along the Northern Sea Route declined by 90%.10) The record-high figures reached in 2023 were largely the result of Russian corporations redirecting cargo flows, rather than a surge in interest from foreign partners.11) It is noteworthy that the “NSR Development Plan until 2035” (dated August 1, 2022) remains an operative policy document with established freight transportation targets. However, from 2018 to 2024, the principal framework guiding Arctic development was the federal project “NSR Development”.12) For instance, the 2023 freight target under this project was set at 36 million tons, a goal that was successfully surpassed.13) Nevertheless, this figure was still 10.5 million tons below the forecasted 46.82 million tons outlined in the appendix to the “NSR Development Plan”.14) In 2024, the targets of neither document—both of which projected an ambitious 80 million tons—were achieved.

The evident gap between aspirational goals and actual performance is gradually being acknowledged at the official level. According to the RBC news agency, during a closed meeting held by the Rosatom State Corporation in September 2024, two scenarios were proposed.15) One of these was labeled “negative”, forecasting that cargo traffic along the NSR would reach only 117 million tons by 2031 and 150 million tons by 2035—substantially lower than the figures stipulated in official planning documents. Invoking the “China factor” to justify such ambitions cannot, on its own, substantiate these large-scale projections. Moreover, new promises and plans with China only put more pressure on the Russian government and leave no room for adjustments of its goals for the NSR.

Although the northern direction is frequently mentioned during meetings between Russian and Chinese delegations, it rarely dominates the agenda. For example, in the most recent joint statement issued following Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow, the topic is referenced in just one sentence placed at the end of the document.16) Annual consultations on Arctic cooperation are held each September, but interagency coordination during the remainder of the year remains limited. Even though the Subcommittee on Cooperation on the Northern Sea Route is an exceptional development, it took more than two years to create it. The willingness to create a joint body17) to coordinate shipping was also indicated back in 2023.

In addition, China is gradually reassessing its position in the Arctic region. According to the South China Morning Post, a source close to the Chinese government reported that “China has stopped using the term ‘Near-Arctic state,’ and there is now a significant decline in interest in the Arctic. Beijing’s cooperation with Moscow should be seen as episodic rather than strategic.”18) While the Arctic remains an internal priority for Russia, its importance to China is primarily tied to pursuing economic interests and expanding its sphere of influence. Given that Beijing’s foreign policy priorities may shift based on economic conditions, it is difficult to consider the Arctic a long-term strategic focus for China.

The legal dimension of this relationship warrants particular attention. Despite joint declarations, the two countries continue to diverge in their fundamental views on Arctic governance. Prior to February 2022, leading Russian experts maintained that all disagreements over the legal regime of the Arctic in general, and the Northern Sea Route in particular, could be resolved through “rational dialogue.”19) Since then, however, Russia has tightened and clarified navigation rules within its internal Arctic waters,20) regulated the passage of foreign warships,21) and secured approval for its application to extend the boundaries of its continental shelf.22) Furthermore, a 2021 decree issued by the Government of the Russian Federation established new baseline points for measuring the breadth of its territorial sea, thereby expanding Russia’s territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).23)

In contrast, Beijing’s stance, as outlined in its 2018 White Paper on Arctic policy, reflects a more ambiguous interpretation of international law. The document affirms China’s commitment to “protecting the interests of all countries and the international community.” According to the Chinese position, “freedom of navigation and the right of all countries to use Arctic routes should be ensured.”24) The White Paper also asserts that “non-Arctic states have the right to explore and develop resources in the international seabed area.” Without specifying particular straits or maritime zones, Beijing implicitly supports the principle of Arctic internationalization. While such statements are not inherently problematic, their inclusion in official strategic documents may give rise to tensions or questions—even among close partners.

Legal divergencies in the interpretation of UNCLOS provisions in the Arctic waters form the basis for potential conflict. Considering China’s approach to international maritime law, particularly in asserting its claims in the South China Sea, there is a possibility that Beijing may take a more assertive stance in the Arctic as well. However, for now, these disagreements remain theoretical and do not represent an actual conflict between the two countries.

A practical, not strategic partnership

China’s interest in the Arctic—particularly in the Russian sector—has grown both qualitatively and quantitatively, encompassing geopolitical as well as economic dimensions. Scientific research activities in the Arctic, along with the construction of heavy icebreakers, have been incorporated into China’s national development strategy, as outlined in its 2021–2025 plan.

This pragmatic engagement is accompanied by a tendency to defer solutions to long-term challenges. The two countries’ perspectives on the Arctic differ significantly: for Russia, the region is a strategic priority in both domestic and foreign policy, with China occupying a central role in the latter. In contrast, China regards the Arctic as a peripheral area, not expecting rapid development there over the next decade. This divergence is particularly notable given Russia’s continued ambitions to expand freight and transit operations along the Northern Sea Route, despite the constraints imposed by Western sanctions. Consequently, although bilateral cooperation has seen meaningful progress, Russia’s ambitious Arctic development plans—where China is expected to play a pivotal role—appear increasingly unrealistic.

Between 2014 and 2022, Moscow’s Arctic policy remained diverse and lacked firm institutionalization; the Arctic had yet to be established as a strategic priority in national policy documents, and regulatory frameworks for the NSR remained incomplete. By 2025, after identifying various contentious issues, Russia narrowed its Arctic partnerships to states in the “East,” which adopt distinct conceptual approaches. In the long term, Russia and China will need to clarify and coordinate their positions on Arctic development. For now, their relationship is characterized by pragmatism and situational cooperation, but not by a strategic long-term approach.

Roman Zhilin is a Junior Researcher at the Department of European Security at The Institute of Europe of The Russian Academy of Sciences.

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