The Role of EU-Japan Collaboration in Trans-Arctic Cable Development

Ursula von der Leyen, António da Costa and Kaja Kallas paid an official visit to Japan as part of a larger EU delegation to Osaka Expo 2025 and held a number of high level meetings including one with Japan’s former Prime Minster Shigeru Ishiba. Photo: European Union

The Arctic Institute Japan Series 2026

• The Arctic Institute’s 2026 Japan Series: An Introduction
• Rising Sun in the Warming Arctic: As Great Power Competition Returns to the Polar Region, Japan Is Positioned for Prominence
• Distinctive Characteristics of Japan’s Arctic Approach and Engagement with Arctic Governance
• Japan’s Corporate Engines in the Arctic: Industrial Drivers of LNG, Shipping, and Technological Adaptation
• Beyond the Northern Sea Route: The Developmental State and Japanese Arctic Energy Policy
• The Role of Russia in Japan’s Arctic Policy
• FOIP Goes Northward: Japan’s Maritime Identity and the Defense of Rule of Law in the Arctic
• Towards a Shared Arctic Vision: Japan and the Nordic States in an Interconnected World
• Legal and Scientific Cooperation in the Context of Japan Canada Relations: Pathways for Increased Arctic Cooperation?
• The Role of EU-Japan Collaboration in Trans-Arctic Cable Development

The EU–Japan relationship has historically been anchored in trade and economic cooperation, alongside shared concerns such as energy and climate change. Connectivity has long featured in the EU’s regional integration agenda, and both sides have a track record of seeking to strengthen networks between Europe and Asia. Likewise, the Arctic has become an important venue for bilateral collaboration between Japan and several European countries, and its strategic potential has increasingly been acknowledged within the broader EU–Japan dialogue. These strands converged in the 2019 agreement between Japan and the EU on Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure – including submarine fiber-optic cables – which is itself a byproduct of the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement, negotiated in parallel with the Economic Partnership Agreement, of 2018.

Submarine fiber-optic cables constitute the critical infrastructure upon which modern societies depend. However, the existing global cable network lacks sufficient diversity and is thus vulnerable to both natural and human-made disruptions. In the Arctic, the need for new submarine fiber-optic cable infrastructure has been acknowledged by the Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic Council. Several projects have sought to develop trans-Arctic cables connecting Northern Europe with East Asia via the Arctic Ocean over the past 25 years. If implemented, such cables would increase the robustness of the insufficiently diversified global network, reduce network latency between Europe and Japan, and potentially improve connectivity in certain Arctic communities. However, none of these projects has come to fruition yet.

Commercial actors have driven the planning and construction of the international cable network, but public authorities’ interest in, and willingness to, intervene in subsea infrastructure development has also increased in recent years. Moreover, and notwithstanding the Russian Polar Express project, which is closely linked to the Russian state, all the other ongoing projects rely on international collaboration with collaboration between the EU and Japan playing a significant role in all trans-Arctic cable projects except in Quintillion.

EU−Japan collaboration in submarine cable development is backed by both the Japan−EU Digital Partnership and the Japan-EU Connectivity Partnership. The Digital Partnership is implemented through the Digital Partnerships in Action project aiming to strengthen connectivity and digital markets as well as facilitate digital trade. Both the EU and Japan have recognized the benefits of Arctic cable routes and agreed to jointly promote the development of submarine cable connectivity via the Arctic which could, in the long run, be extended to Southeast Asia and the wider Pacific region. The (geo)strategic value of these projects lie in their potential to diversify Asia-Europe network connectivity away from the increasingly unstable Suez Canal – one of the major chokepoints of the international cable network through which 90 percent of direct Asia−Europe digital traffic currently travels, and thus enhance digital resiliency between Asia and Europe.

The trans-Arctic cable initiatives are also consistent with Japanese government policies designed to promote the decentralization of highly concentrated digital infrastructure. Collaboration between the public and private sectors has been encouraged in domestic discussions, and the government has supported development through subsidies for new cable connections to North America and Europe, as well as the construction of data centers outside the greater Tokyo and Osaka areas.

Japan has also been consistently envisioned as the preferred East Asian landing point for trans-Arctic cables since the early 2000s with the launch of the Russian Optical Trans-Arctic Submarine Cable System (ROTACS) project. While most projects have identified landing sites near Tokyo, Tomakomai has been proposed as the preferred site for the Arctic Fibre project, and Hokkaido—the northernmost of Japan’s four main islands—was also strongly associated with the Arctic Connect project. This project, led by Cinia (Finland) and MegaFon (Russia), was backed by a consortium of Japanese companies headed by Sojitz Corporation, before being suspended in May 2021.

Although the merits of trans-Arctic routes have long been recognized, so have the challenges associated with their implementation. Established routes are generally faster and cheaper to develop and easier to maintain. Furthermore, utilizing old routes and landings facilitates integration of the new cable into the existing network. Recent cable breaks in Quintillion’s Alaskan system have also reminded stakeholders, including potential investors, of the technical challenges involved in Arctic projects. However, concerns over economic and/or commercial feasibility, rather than technical limitations, remain the main obstacle to project development; a challenge that is further compounded by the involvement of multiple stakeholders with divergent interests.

In December 2021, for example, Cinia and Far North Digital (US) announced a joint effort to build a cable system linking Japan and Europe through the Northwest Passage. ARTERIA Networks Corporation (now a subsidiary of the Japanese trading company Marubeni) formally joined the project in February 2022, and Far North Fiber Inc. was established. Despite support from the EU, implementation of the project has been delayed due to the stakeholders reservations about the commercial feasibility of the project. ARTERIA, in particular, has distanced itself from the initiative and no longer plays a significant role, although it remains possible that the company may seek to re-engage with the project in the future.

The Polar Connect project, on the other hand, highlights the challenges of managing a diverse set of stakeholders. Supported by the EU, the project aims to construct a cable across the Central Arctic Ocean that could also serve as an underwater observatory through the integration of SMART and DAS technologies. It is currently being developed by NORDUnet, the Swedish Polar Research Secretariat, and the Swedish Research Council (SUNET), and envisions close collaboration with Japanese partners.

However, the simultaneous existence of multiple stakeholders thinly spread across several EU-supported projects seeking engagement from Japanese industry and government actors has created confusion among Japanese stakeholders. Although this issue was partly addressed through the establishment of the Pan-Arctic Cable System (PACS) and high-level meetings between EU and Japanese government representatives, Tokyo has yet to announce any financial commitment to the trans-Arctic cable initiatives even though it has backed the creation of new international cable landings in Hokkaido and remains actively involved in negotiations concerning Arctic initiatives.

In principle, the Japanese government considers the development of submarine fiber-optic cable infrastructure as a sector primarily driven by private companies and investors. Past, ongoing, and planned submarine cable projects connecting Japan with the rest of the Asia-Pacific region have followed this model. Consequently, attempts to convince the Japanese government that trans-Arctic cable projects are of such strategic importance that greater public-sector involvement and support are both acceptable and necessary has proven challenging. Since governments are generally reluctant to “pick winners” through market intervention, it can be assumed that the emergence of a wider consortium of Japanese companies clearly committing themselves to Arctic initiatives—similar to developments already seen in Europe—would make public involvement easier.

While it is interesting to examine what, if any, references to trans-Arctic cables and connectivity appear in documents describing Japan’s Arctic strategy, it is worth noting that the most important decisions regarding potential support for any submarine cable infrastructure project are made by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, in collaboration with the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry. To date, these ministries have not been central to the formulation and implementation of Japan’s Arctic policy.

Juha Saunavaara is an Associate Professor at the Hokkaido University.