China and its Arctic Trajectories: Final Remarks

World’s largest ice sculpture at Harbin Snow and Ice Festival. Photo: Emma Gawen

When we began to put together The Arctic Institute’s China Series 2020 in the beginning of this year, little did we know about what was about to happen due to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic. Today, it is not difficult to imagine that far-ranging consequences of the pandemic will reshape economic and political dynamics in the Arctic region. Will the pandemic constitute an exogenous shock that triggers fundamental change in international order, including the regional order in the Arctic? What kind of role will China play in the reconstruction of the Arctic economy and what are geopolitical and environmental consequences?

As the articles of our China series demonstrate, China’s regional role has grown long before the COVID-19 pandemic. Chinese investors are involved in economic projects in many parts of the region, including Greenland where Chinese investors have states in two mining projects. Beijing partakes in international frameworks, such as the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), that support its globalist view of the Arctic. What is more, China has constructed an Arctic identity and developed bilateral Arctic partnerships in general, and with Russia in particular (albeit its partnership with Russia remains complicated). It is difficult to estimate how big an amount of airborne and marine pollutants coming to the Arctic originate from China. What is clear, however, is that China’s contribution to international climate politics is highly insufficient and that Beijing has not paid enough attention to the country’s black carbon emissions. Hence, reducing black carbon emissions constitutes an important area of cooperation between China and the Arctic states.

Although China’s growing regional engagement has raised speculations and concerns among regional actors and stakeholders, there is no shared threat perception about “China threat” among the eight Arctic states. While some Arctic states are concerned about political and economic risks related to the Chinese investments in the region, the US is “prepared to go fully kinetic”. Thus, it seems that traditional security issues and great power competition are making a come-back to the Arctic security discussions, especially due to the tightening geopolitical tensions between the United States and China. Unfortunately, the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic seems to have fostered deep mistrust between the two countries. It remains to be seen whether, and how, the growing mistrust will affect Arctic cooperation and undermine the important work done by the Arctic Council, the intergovernmental regional body, on promoting sustainable development in the region.Presently, it is too early to anticipate whether or not China will emerge a stronger regional player in the Arctic in the aftermath of COVID-19. For the purposes of such anticipations, the articles of our China series offer a comprehensive account of China’s policies and interests in the Arctic – highly recommended reading if we are to enhance international cooperation and assure that the Arctic remains an international zone of peace in the future.