'Prepared to Go Fully Kinetic': How U.S. Leaders Conceptualize China’s Threat to Arctic Security

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivers a speech to the Arctic Council on May 6th, 2019, during which he warns of Chinese and Russian ambitions as a threat to Arctic security. Photo: U.S. Department of State

China’s Arctic engagement has increased considerably during the past decade, which has not only offered plentiful economic opportunities but also created new risks and concerns among the eight Arctic states, non-state actors, and peoples. To increase understanding of dimensions of Beijing’s Arctic activities, The Arctic Institute’s China Series 2020 probes into China’s evolving Arctic interests, policies, and strategies, and analyses their ramifications for the region (and beyond).

The Arctic Institute China Series 2020

• China and its Arctic Trajectories: The Arctic Institute’s China Series 2020
• The tortuous path of China’s win-win strategy in Greenland
• Defining the Chinese Threat in the Arctic
• Reducing China’s Black Carbon Emissions: An Arctic Dimension
• Identity and Relationship-Building in China’s Arctic Diplomacy
• A Framework for Sino-Russian Relations in the Arctic
• The Emergence of a Sino-Russian Economic Partnership in the Arctic?
• Arctic Technopolitics and China’s Reception of the Polar Code
• ‘Prepared to Go Fully Kinetic’: How U.S. Leaders Conceptualize China’s Threat to Arctic Security
• China and its Arctic Trajectories: Final Remarks

Recent U.S. defense allocations show just how concerned U.S. leaders have become regarding Chinese activities in relation to Arctic security. U.S. Senate bill 1790, The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, allocates $738 billion to national defense and clearly reflects the U.S. focus on enhancing defensive capabilities in the Arctic. It details a process to report on Chinese and Russian military activities in the Arctic and evaluate “the extent to which these activities affect or threaten the interests of the United States and its allies.” U.S. defense personnel are also instructed to closely monitor Chinese FDI in the region. The bill reflects the general tendency of U.S. leaders to stress the likelihood of a military confrontation with China in the Arctic. As a result, the U.S. stance prioritizes a build-up in military defenses. But critics argue that this approach is inadequate and too narrow, instead advocating for a more coordinated, multi-faceted approach to stemming China’s growing influence.¹⁾Rosen M (2019) Will China Freeze America Out of the Arctic? Washington Post, 14 August, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-china-freeze-america-out-arctic-73511. Accessed on 14 January 2020

While others in the region have also expressed concerns over Chinese ambitions, most perceive a threat of a different nature. China’s Arctic presence primarily involves the avid pursuit of investment opportunities, active participation in the Arctic Council, and other non-military means of involvement. Marc Lanteigne, an expert in the field, writes, “To date, China’s conservative approach to developing an Arctic strategy has been successful, as the country is now widely viewed as a significant Arctic player after only a few short years of intensive regional engagement.”²⁾Lanteigne, M (2019) China’s Emerging Strategies in the Arctic. High North News, 24 April, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/chinas-emerging-strategies-arctic. Accessed on 14 January 2020 Thus, the threat is that China, a country with an abusive, authoritarian government, has attained a disproportionately large share of power and influence in the Arctic.

The divergence of views has been increasingly clear of late. In a recent speech delivered to the Arctic Council, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned attendees of China’s interest in subverting the rule of law in the Arctic for its own nefarious purposes.³⁾Pompeo M (2019) Looking North: Sharpening America’s Focus. The Arctic Council, 6 May, https://www.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/. Accessed on 7 January 2020 His comments were met with shock and sharp criticism.⁴⁾Lanteigne M (2019) The US Throws Down the Gauntlet at the Arctic Council’s Finland Meeting. Over The Circle, 7 May, https://overthecircle.com/2019/05/07/the-us-throws-down-the-gauntlet-at-the-arctic-councils-finland-meeting/. Accessed on 14 January 2020 Many attendees considered his condemnation to be aggressive, as well as inappropriate for the Council, which intentionally excludes security matters from the agenda in order to promote an atmosphere of peace and cooperation. 

Pompeo’s behavior does reveal a lack of familiarity with the geopolitical context, institutions, and codes of conduct in the Arctic. But if his faux pas stemmed solely from ignorance, one might expect U.S. rhetoric towards China to evolve. It has not. Top U.S. officials continue to insist that Chinese activities signal military aggression. Roughly six months after Pompeo’s speech, U.S. Secretary Richard V. Spencer stated “From the Arctic to the South China Sea, we’re seeing increases in the challenges to Freedom of Navigation and Law of the Sea…aggressive behavior that remains in the grey zone just below kinetic activity.”⁵⁾Spencer R (2019) Halifax Address. Halifax International Security Forum, 23 November, https://halifaxtheforum.org/agenda/saturday-november-23/. Accessed on 7 January 2020

There is more to this than simply ignorance or myopia. The Arctic’s close geographical proximity to the United States, as well as prevalent imaginings of the Arctic as a barren wilderness, trigger the application of a U.S. narrative dating back roughly two centuries. The narrative emerged soon after the U.S. was founded and was forever enshrined in a foreign policy principle known as the “Monroe Doctrine.” Today, the doctrine involves an expectation that foreign powers will not pursue imperialist ambitions in the Western Hemisphere and that “any intervention by external powers in the policy of the Americas is a potentially hostile act against the USA”⁶⁾No Author (2019) John Quincy Adams. Oxford Reference, https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095349797. Accessed on 14 January 2020

The History of the Monroe Doctrine

Originally, this doctrine targeted European powers eyeing further conquest in the Americas. Less than fifty years prior, the U.S. had gained its independence from Britain. By 1823, many colonies throughout the Americas had gained independence from Europe and the U.S. sought to keep it that way. There was also consideration of the “northwest question,” as Russia had claimed lands in the North American Arctic, and the U.S. and Britain shared the jointly occupied Oregon territory just below it. 

Throughout his presidency, the fifth American president James Monroe contemplated a foreign policy stance that would deter intervention by foreign powers. He oscillated between a unilateral stance, singly guaranteeing protection for the entire Western Hemisphere, or a joint declaration with Britain, which had already been discussed with British minister George Canning. Given U.S. founding principles, an isolationist approach was the more appropriate choice, but the U.S. lacked the naval and military power to enforce non-intervention on its own. Assistance from Britain would be necessary for enforcement. 

Monroe favored the latter, but solicited advice from former presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Both encouraged a joint position with the British.⁷⁾Hughes C (2019) Monroe Doctrine. Encyclopædia Britannica, 2 December, https://www.britannica.com/event/Monroe-Doctrine. Accessed on 14 January 2020 Jefferson concluded in a letter to Monroe, “I am clearly of Mr. Canning’s opinion, that [a joint declaration] will prevent instead of provoking war… all Europe combined would not undertake such a war.”⁸⁾Thomas J (1823) To the President of the United States (James Monroe). Monticello: 24 October, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/thomas.htm. Accessed on 14 January 2020

But Monroe’s Secretary of State John Quincy Adams was fervently against a joint declaration. According to Dexter Perkins, a preeminent scholar on the Monroe Doctrine, Adams’ communications in the years leading up to 1823 reflect consistency in his general attitude towards colonialism, which “only needed a slight further step to produce a generalization on which a doctrine might be founded.”⁹⁾Perkins D (1927, p. 10) The Monroe Doctrine 1823-1926. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

He cites a heated exchange between Adams and British Minister Canning, as recounted by Adams in his diary. While discussing land claims in the American northwest, Adams remarked in frustration, “I do not know what you claim nor what you do not claim. You claim India; you claim Africa…We know of no right that you have here.”¹⁰⁾Perkins D (1927, p. 9) The Monroe Doctrine 1823-1926. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Adams feared what he considered British imperialist ambitions in North America, and also had expansionist dreams for the U.S. 

According to Perkins, Adams thought of the Americas as “a special preserve of the United States, from which the rest of the world ought to be excluded.”¹¹⁾Perkins D (1927, p. 9) The Monroe Doctrine 1823-1926. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Adams even stated in 1819 that, “Until Europe shall find it a settled geographical element that the United States and North America are identical, any effort on our part to reason the world out of a belief that we are ambitious will have no other effect than to convince them that we add to our ambition hypocrisy.”¹²⁾Perkins D (1927, p. 9) The Monroe Doctrine 1823-1926. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. This view was not unique to Adams; there was a widespread belief in manifest destiny, the idea that the United States was predestined by God to expand across the entirety of North America.¹³⁾History.com (2019) Manifest Destiny. History.com, 19 November, https://www.history.com/topics/19th-century/manifest-destiny. Accessed on 14 January 2020

Adams ultimately proved himself more persuasive than his contemporaries, as Monroe’s doctrine was a clear articulation of complete non-intervention. Thus, the Monroe Doctrine formally introduced unilateralism and isolationism as the status quo of U.S. foreign policy and also offered a convenient defense rationale to push competitors from the Western Hemisphere. 

As anticipated, the doctrine was rhetorically powerful but sparsely enforced when European powers eventually did resume intervention in the Americas.¹⁴⁾Hughes C (2019) Monroe Doctrine. Encyclopædia Britannica, 2 December, https://www.britannica.com/event/Monroe-Doctrine. Accessed on 14 January 2020 Still, Adams believed that in the long term, establishing this principle was more valuable than something immediately enforceable. His ideas about American identity and U.S. sovereignty over North America formed the doctrine’s ideological bedrock. 

Evidence of the Monroe Doctrine’s Enduring Narrative in the Arctic 

The Monroe Doctrine’s greatest impact was its formal articulation of an enduring narrative regarding the U.S. identity and role in the Western Hemisphere, which remains deeply embedded in the American consciousness. U.S. national security expert David Rothkopf puts it well: “[The American] system has evolved the way it has because for almost all of U.S. history, back to the days of the founders’ admonitions against foreign entanglements, the bias among America’s leaders has been the view that we are not part of the world at large, that overseas events are indeed ‘foreign,’ and that we are better off remaining apart.”¹⁵⁾Rothkopf D (2006, p. 460) Running the World: the inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power. New York: Public Affairs. While this narrative has evolved over the years to reflect shifts in international geopolitics and the status of U.S. power, it still retains five major elements: 

1. The Americas are a coveted wilderness with vast resources and untapped potential. 
2. Envious foreign nations are actively plotting to secure American riches by force, depriving the rightful owners of their freedom and wreaking havoc in the process. 
3. These inherently nefarious, subversive forces ultimately intend to overtake the United States—the only way for them to truly succeed in destroying the free world. 
4. The U.S., with its superior moral code, must protect itself and the free world by taking defensive military action. 
5. Instilling fear through demonstrations of U.S. military strength is the most effective way to drive foreign conquerors from vulnerable, impressionable American lands. 

China’s behavior suits the narrative well. It has demonstrated aggressive, imperialist ambitions in the South China Sea. It is rapidly enhancing its own military and defensive capabilities, and there is reason to believe that its worldwide influence will continue to grow. U.S. leaders are aware of this, and also suspect nefarious intentions underlying China’s Arctic engagements. This encroachment links up with fears of a direct threat of attack on the free world, and especially the United States. To drive China from the region and deter attacks, the narrative would call for threats against Chinese aggression. 

Upon closer inspection, Pompeo and Spencer’s recent statements contain the elements of this narrative structure. A longer excerpt of Pompeo’s speech reads: 

 “The world has long felt a magnetic pull towards the Arctic, but never more so than today… We’re entering a new age of strategic engagement in the Arctic, complete with new threats to the Arctic and its real estate, and to all of our interests in that region…We know from experience that free and fair competition opened by the rule of law produces the best outcomes… China has observer status at the Arctic Council, but that status is contingent upon its respect for the sovereign status of Arctic states. The U.S. wants China to meet that condition and contribute responsibly in the region. But China’s words and actions raise doubts about its intentions. Beijing claims to be a “near-Arctic state.” Yet the shortest distance between China and the Arctic is 900 miles. There are only Arctic states and non-Arctic states. No third category exists, and claiming otherwise entitles China to exactly nothing…Let’s just ask ourselves: Do we want Arctic nations broadly, or indigenous communities specifically, to go the way of former governments in Sri Lanka or Malaysia, ensnared by debt and corruption? Do we want crucial Arctic infrastructure to end up like Chinese-constructed roads in Ethiopia, crumbling and dangerous after only a few years? Do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims?”¹⁶⁾Pompeo M (2019) Looking North: Sharpening America’s Focus. The Arctic Council, 6 May, https://www.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/. Accessed on 7 January 2020

Pompeo describes the Arctic as a coveted source of resources and a vast wilderness yet to be developed, which is all the more valuable given Earth’s rising temperatures. These changes attract attention from foreign powers, which behave in ways that threaten the best interests of Arctic littoral states and create competition for resources. As a result of Chinese intervention, Pompeo foresees rule of law the Arctic devolving into “competing territorial claims,” despite the widely cited, resounding evidence that the Arctic already has a clear, largely unchallenged legal structure.¹⁷⁾Rosen M (2019) Will China Freeze America Out of the Arctic? Washington Post, 14 August, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-china-freeze-america-out-arctic-73511. Accessed on 14 January 2020 

Pompeo points to China’s self-characterization as a “near-Arctic state” as proof of this threat, meriting “doubts about [China’s] intentions.” While some may not find this particularly offensive, it suggests Pompeo’s discomfort with what he considers to be defiance of a clear binary: local versus foreign. To him, the term signals China’s refusal to acknowledge its geographical separation from the region, directly denying the proper degree of deference to the sovereign rights of Arctic states. He reminds attendees of this by pointing out that China is located 900 miles away. 

He also borrows from the narrative’s implied power dynamic, characterizing China as a destructive, imperialistic power set on ensnaring Arctic communities, extracting resources, and leaving a “crumbling and dangerous” region. Local populations, “Arctic nations broadly” and “indigenous communities specifically” are characterized as vulnerable and helpless targets of this abuse. Ultimately, in his view, Chinese intervention in the Arctic will transform the Arctic Ocean into a “new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims.” Thus, it threatens the free and utopian society that the U.S. seeks to protect. Spencer’s statement dovetails with Pompeo’s line of reasoning:

 “From the Arctic to the South China Sea, we’re seeing increases in the challenges to Freedom of Navigation and Law of the Sea. These kinds of changes are increasingly defining our age: aggressive behavior that remains in the grey zone just below kinetic activity. And this is different for us. We used to be expecting blow by blow. The blows might not come in this level of threat. It will be a continual threat on a lower basis. And we must be prepared for that, but also prepared to go fully kinetic. ‘Cause why do we have the militaries we have? It’s so our state departments can do what they do best. And we buy them one more day, one more week, one more month, to avoid kinetic activity. For our part, the U.S. Department of Defense is committed to ensuring that the rest of the government has that option. One more day, one more week. But I will tell you, with firm resolve, we are ready to act tonight and deliver the fight if so called. I want to make it very clear that this room is a table for all nations that benefit from a rules-based, international order if they so by agree by it.”¹⁸⁾Spencer R (2019) Halifax Address. Halifax International Security Forum, 23 November, https://halifaxtheforum.org/agenda/saturday-november-23/. Accessed on 7 January 2020

Spencer sees the threat of attack as imminent, as subversive forces are on a perpetual mission to destroy the peaceful adherents to this “rules-based, international order.” His reasoning suggests that the U.S. and its allies maintain a superior moral code, inherently making them peaceful, military power is only employed defensively to protect “rules-based” channels. Thus, the presence of aggressive entities keeps the region in a “grey zone just below kinetic activity.” Spencer then reassures attendees, insisting “with firm resolve” that the U.S. is prepared to “deliver the fight” should things go “fully kinetic.” 

Both officials believe Chinese aggression as an irrepressible characteristic of the Chinese state, and anticipate a military conflict in any arena in which China is involved. As a result, current Chinese activities in the Arctic are seen as a means to an end—destruction. Their assumptions dismiss the reality that conquest is on longer the dominant form for amassing regional influence and power. Also, conquest and war are incredibly destructive. If China does seek to extract value from the Arctic, then it would not make sense to launch a destructive and costly attack, especially if Chinese investors are funding large-scale infrastructure and other projects. 

Considering a Better Path Forward

In a well-functioning national security apparatus, strategy drives the foreign policy narrative—as was the case when the Monroe Doctrine was originally delivered in 1823. The narrative offered a simple but compelling rationale that not only provided for military defense, but also the protection of economic and other interests. But the current U.S. fixation on inevitable war in the Arctic, despite evidence to the contrary, suggests that the narrative is driving strategy. Unchecked, it has blinded U.S. leaders to the true nature of this particular national security threat. 

While there is still debate over the ultimate ends that China is pursuing in the Arctic, the means are clear. It is leveraging all opportunities to ingrain itself into the social, political, and economic fabric of the Arctic. China’s lack of sovereignty claims in the Arctic make it quite vulnerable to being “locked out,” so the Chinese government has every interest abiding by the general Arctic code of conduct. China has closely adhered to the Arctic Council’s utopian vision to build a region of peace, tailoring its language and efforts to echo values of cooperation, peace and sustainability. 

But the Chinese government’s behavior is limited by its degree of influence in the Arctic. The more that China integrates itself, the more powerful an actor it becomes in the region and the more liberties its government may be willing to take in pushing boundaries and pursuing more selfish interests. At the moment, U.S. leaders cling to a belief that threats and projections of military power can vanquish China from the Arctic. This belief is misguided. The U.S. view that it deserves a heightened degree of deference in the Arctic is also outdated and superseded by international law. Appeals to that narrative and the expectation of deference only make the U.S. appear aggressive. 

For now, the most strategic defensive action that the United States can undertake to limit Chinese influence is by competing for it. The United States has a strong economy, a robust R&D infrastructure, and vast non-military and military capabilities. It should be engaging in the Arctic on all of these levels, and more. The private and public sectors in the U.S. could easily step up their engagement in mutually beneficial, long-term relationships that carry the added benefit of a heightened sense of regional stability in the Arctic.