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China, Circumpolar Indigenous People and the Colonial Past of the Arctic

By | Article
November 1, 2022
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Reindeer pulling a sleigh on a snowy farm in Russia

Among the goods traded for centuries between Chinese and Nomadic Arctic Indigenous Peoples is the velvet antler or male reindeer for traditional Chinese medicine. Photo: Elen Schurova

Indigenous peoples have inhabited the Arctic since time immemorial, establishing rich regional cultures and governance systems long before the introduction of modern borders. The Arctic Institute’s 2022 Colonialism Series explores the colonial histories of Arctic nations and the still-evolving relationships between settler governments and Arctic Indigenous peoples in a time of renewed Arctic exploration and development.

The Arctic Institute Colonialism Series 2022

Throughout its recent and brief history in the Arctic, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) actors have encountered Circumpolar Indigenous Peoples (CIPs), their communities and livelihoods.

Chinese interactions, behaviors, and stances towards Indigenous Peoples tend to reflect the image of a newcomer, whose first expedition in the region only dates back to 1999, and who has only been accepted as an Observer of the main inter-governmental forum, the Arctic Council (AC), in 2013. Nevertheless, wider trends can be identified through salient interactions between Indigenous communities and Chinese actors emerged in the last two decades.

Moreover, while the Chinese policy and initiatives in the Arctic have been vastly scrutinized by both academic literature and media coverage, the attention to Chinese engagement with Circumpolar Indigenous Peoples study is largely underdeveloped. Few publications focus directly on the matter,1) and most of the time the topic is treated only tangentially.2) As such, this article can be considered as a first exploration of the matter, and a call for further research by proposing relevant and promising directions.

This article first proposes an overview of the evolution of the Chinese approach to the Indigenous people within its Arctic policy over the last three decades. Second, it gives an analysis of Chinese speech and posture towards Indigenous affairs both domestically and internationally, notably its historical support for these matters in the UN institutions. Third the article will finally examine the international posture of China towards imperialism and colonialism, and how it unfolds with the current practices of Chinese actors in relation with Indigenous People worldwide and in the Arctic. The main argument this article tries to make, is to show that China only reluctantly and recently took interest in Indigenous matters in the Arctic, and this, only in a few cases and countries. Furthermore, despite a relatively strong rhetorical advocacy for the defense of Indigenous interests on the global stage, China’s acts show only little consideration about Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic.

Historical overview of Chinese engagement in the Arctic

Ignorance and reluctance to engage institutionally despite ancient and continuous people-to-people exchanges

In Russian Siberia, the Nenets Peoples in Siberia were engaged in commercial exchanges with Chinese traders for centuries. “Some Chinese merchants traded with Nenets reindeer herders for a very long time, providing velvet antler” explains anthropologist Florian Stammler. The velvet antler is known in Chinese as lù róng (鹿茸) and is still, to this day, sold in China and South-East Asia as an ingredient of traditional medicine. On the other side of Siberia, in the vastness of the Peoples composing Russia, Yakuts Peoples are forming the majority of the population in the Sakha Republic. “Relations between China and Yakuts are more elaborated because they are geographically closer to Asia,” details Florian Stammler. “After the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been a Chinese immigration wave to Yakutsk.” Those immigrants opened businesses and have created a Chinese market, which provides Yakuts with Asian products. They often speak Yakut rather Russian.3)

Although China has been a signatory of the Svalbard Treaty since 1925, as a state, its attention to the Arctic and the region’s affairs, has only emerged in the late 1980s with the creation of scientific institutions dedicated to polar regions. The Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC), was founded in this context in 1989, and followed by the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) in 1996.4) In 1996 several PRC’s research institutions entered the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC). In 1999, the very first Arctic expedition, aboard the still serving Xuě Lóng(雪龙 or Snow Dragon), was conducted by the CAA. The icebreaker crossed the Arctic Ocean to finally reach the Canadian waters, and berth in Tuktoyaktuk, an Inuit village, off the north coast of the North-West Territories.5)

During this period, mostly dedicated to scientific exploration on the official side, little, if not no, attention has been paid to Circumpolar Indigenous People in the Arctic. Despite this unawareness, China was in the meantime supporting the development of international frameworks, notably in the UN institutions in favor of the Indigenous Peoples globally. Among the landmark international legal texts foundational for Indigenous Peoples rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 is the first that recognizes the need to protect Indigenous groups. China, at the time represented in the UN by the Republic of China (Taiwan), voted in favor of the Declaration. More specifically, the first international convention supporting and shaping Indigenous rights was the International Labor Organization Convention (ILO) No. 107 of 1957. This convention affirmed states’ obligations to respect the Indigenous way of life. However, the Convention 107’s approach was heavily criticized as “integrationist” with the aim of promoting the “modernization” and integration of such groups into existing societies.6) However, China never ratified this convention, nor its replacing, No. 169 in 1989. In 1971, work began on the first UN study concerning discrimination against Indigenous Peoples. Later on, in 1993 the Draft Declaration further established the role of Indigenous rights under international law.7) More concretely, for example, China voted Yes in 1994, for the adopted resolution A/RES/49/151 on the ‘Importance of the universal realization of the right of Peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and Peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights’.8) China also contributes to the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), the coordinating body for matters relating to the concerns and rights of the world’s Indigenous Peoples. For the mandate 2020-2022, China has appointed one expert to be member of the Permanent Member, as part of the 8 government appointees, and working alongside 8 Indigenous organizations nominees.9)

Additionally, China also ratified different human rights conventions, which by their universal scope, apply to Indigenous Peoples rights. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has been signed by China in 1998, yet not ratified. Furthermore, The Republic of China (Taiwan) ratified in 1967, and the PRC in 2001, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Both of these international conventions apply to Indigenous rights, as part of universal human rights, but present the weakness of not containing any articles specifically on Indigenous Peoples. China’s signature to these texts remains however notable.

Slow learner and delayed interest for Arctic Indigenous matters

During the period between 2004 and 2013, China appears to follow a learning curve about particular features of the Arctic’s governance, and, in parallel, about the existence of resources and potential geopolitical interests.10) The following part will outline the most significant features of this slow learning efforts that China seem to have undertaken during this period.

During the 2011 Nuuk Ministerial Meeting were introduced new Observers rules of the AC. Those new rules mainly formalized regulations and set clear criteria and expectations for admissions and renewal of the Observer status.11) These expectations include strong and continuous adhesion to the rules and norms of the AC, including recognition of the sovereignty of the Arctic states in the region, as well as respect of CIPs rights, to integrate the Arctic club.12) Observer status only continues so long as consensus exists among the Council’s ministers, and any observer that acts to violate the provisions set out in the Ottawa Declaration or Rules of Procedure may have their Observer status terminated. Observer states are encouraged to make relevant contributions, particularly within the working groups of the Council. Relevant contributions include participation in working group projects through knowledge sharing or financial support.13)

Beyond this, it is an interesting strategy for Observers such as China, to engage with Permanent Participants (PPs) — the name of Indigenous Peoples representatives in the Arctic Council — as it allows Observers to indirectly play on the agenda-setting of the AC’s activities.14) This is due to the role gained by PPs in the Council, thanks to their initial engagement for the foundation of the institution. Following the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, Indigenous organizations gained equal participation in the discussion, although not in decision-making.15) The formal positioning of PPs in the Council is thus much stronger than of Observer states. This prominent role of Indigenous organizations is explained by the Council’s consensual decision-making. If all PPs are firmly against a decision, it is very likely that one Arctic state, or more, will support the Indigenous standpoint. Moreover, to be accepted by the Council, projects must earn the support of the most possible actors, and Permanent Participants can then become a key leverage in negotiations. As Adam Stepien writes, it constitutes an opportunity “of particular importance for the Observers, who can [then] propose projects either through the voice of an Arctic state or a Permanent Participant, but also need to acquire broad support in the Council in order to see it eventually accepted.“16)

During this phase, however, contacts between Chinese officials and Permanent Participants stayed scarce if non-existent. This is likely an explanatory factor of the three unsuccessful applications of China to an Observer status in 2007, 2009, and 2011.17) One could argue that China could have been engaging with PPs earlier in its utmost interest, because of the required demonstration of the commitment to the AC’s rules and norms, including the adhesion to the special importance of Indigenous Peoples in the region. Collaboration with and financial support of Indigenous representatives in the activities of the AC is positively perceived, as a credible signal of this commitment.

Some Observers seem to have understood this quicker and better than China. For example, the proactive positions of Singapore and South Korea, show stark contrast with Chinese rare contacts and engagement with PPs. This is particularly striking as Singapore and South Korea have considerably more limited resources than China.18)

Globally, and despite this continued disinterest in Indigenous affairs in the Arctic, China voted in favor of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). This is evidence that China was showing international support for the advancements of frameworks supporting the Indigenous Peoples movement that has been pushing in regional and UN institutions. It has to be noted, however, that this text, because produced by the UN General Assembly, is not binding and do not contain enforcing instruments to sanction violations of the Declaration. The Declaration has nonetheless become the UN’s benchmark for assessing the attitude of states towards Indigenous Peoples. China expressed support for the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples, too.19)

The emergence of a more proactive approach to the economic dimension of Indigenous issues

The clarification of the requirements for successful application as an Observer to the Arctic Council was made in 2011. This was also the year of the last unsuccessful Chinese application. Since 2013 and its acceptance as an Observer within the Arctic Council, China as undertaken a growing phase in its Arctic approach, where it also paid more attention to Indigenous matters.20)

It was only from 2011 that Chinese officials initiated contacts with representative bodies of CIPs, such as the Sámi Council (one of the PPs), the Sámi parliaments and the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat, as well as sometimes during AC’s meetings, and within some Working Groups.21) Notably, no contact has been established with the Inuit Circumpolar Council at this time, despite being the most influential of all PPs in the AC.22) It thus seems reasonable to see these efforts to engage more with Indigenous representatives as a contributing factor of the eventual granting of the status to China, during the 2013 Kiruna Ministerial Meeting.

Plausible explanations of this reluctant and delayed interest and engagement with Indigenous Peoples are a slow socialization process with AC’s norms, values and practices; and the effects of China’s growing status on the international stage.

The first explanation is corroborated by the fact that Chinese policymakers and scholars argued that before any actions are taken or proposals made, there was a need to gain more knowledge on the matter.23) This approach to first better understand Arctic Indigenous perspectives, is further confirmed by a project on Arctic Indigenous Peoples conducted by China Institute for Marine Affairs following a request from Chinese officials.24) This offers a better understanding of sometimes inconsistency between Chinese intentions, actions and declarations.25) It could also explain China’s low attendance and low submissions rates of reports, to the Working Groups.26)

Another plausible explanation lies in the entanglement of China’s international status and its long-standing rhetoric advocating for the respect of territorial sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. Because of this, Chinese officials might be uncomfortable to engage with non-state actors. This would indeed be equivalent to acknowledging the possibility of post-sovereignty diplomacy outside the narrow state-to-state track.27)

However, during this period, the PRC ratified the International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean. This agreement entered into force on June 25th, 2021, after China ratified the document. By abiding by this text, China proves itself a responsible stakeholder in an unprecedented multilateral framework, because of its prevention of fishing before enough data has been collected through scientific research. In addition to the prohibition on commercial fishing, the agreement also creates a scientific research and monitoring program. And this treaty is mandating Indigenous knowledge and participation in the scientific program. This is a long-awaited mechanism that PPs have been asking for and requiring in AC’s statements and activities. This is the first known occurrence of the implementation of such a mechanism by China.28)

A contradiction between Chinese discourse and actions

In light of Chinese official discourse and its international historical posture toward imperialism and colonialism, a contradiction seems to occur with the current practices in the Arctic involving CIPs.

On the ground, how does the discourse translate into concrete engagement?

So far, most of Chinese involvement in the Arctic is in extractive and infrastructure projects. But there is an apparent lack of systematic consultations and involvement of Indigenous communities to set up and run those projects.

In the rare few cases where Chinese actors entered in contact with locals, the proposed projects then endured setbacks or cancellations under the pressure of national authorities, under more or less hidden national security concerns, in recent years. While the setbacks can hardly be blamed on Chinese actors, their clumsiness however display concerning patterns of behaviors for Indigenous communities who do not hold the same weight as state actors in international relations. Here, can be mentioned examples, in Greenland and Canada that directly concerned local Indigenous communities. For example, Chinese mining company Shandong Gold Mining had negotiated to buy the Doris North gold mine from TMAC Resources in Hope Bay, western Nunavut, Canada.29) But such a transaction is subject to the Canada Investment Act regulating foreign takeovers of Canadian companies. In December 2020, the federal government rejected the transaction, citing national security risks. Shandong Gold Mining is indeed a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE, 国有企业). While national sovereignty and security were cited as factors to write down the deal, the review also mentionned risks for Indigenous communities and a lack of division of revenue via the employment of locals and royalties.30)

Concerning the Kvanefjeld mining project, which planned to extract rare earth minerals as well as uranium, Greenland Minerals Limited, partly owned by Shanghe Ressources Holding, a Chinese state-owned company. However, the April 2021 anticipated elections in Greenland, brought to power the Inuit Ataqatigiit party, which campaigned against the project. On the wake of its success, the new government announced an indefinite ban on the project and other extractive project in Greenland.31) Another example of concerns regarding the impact of Chinese extractive projects have been raised in the notable case of Isua mining project. The iron ore deposit of Isua is located in the Qeqqata area of south-western Greenland and was discovered in 1965. After multiple setbacks, the exploration license was transferred to the Chinese company General Nice Group.32) While the current Chinese company, “must submit an exploitation and closure-plan as well as document the mine’s financial capacity by the end of 2021 and start mining operations by the end of 2025”,33) a social impact assessment (SIA) rendered worrying conclusions. These concerns touch on “the division of labor between local and international workers and impacts on hunting and fishing practices in the area of Isukasia and in the Nuuk Fjord, which are extremely relevant for the environmental, social and cultural life of locals.”34)

In Russia, for a long time Indigenous Peoples encountered the same opportunities, and the same dangers followed. Local exchanges between Chinese merchants and Indigenous populations have existed for a long time, as mentionned above. However, the growing Sino-Russian partnership35) in the Arctic is not bringing much positive outcomes to Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Arctic.

Whereas employment of Indigenous local communities’ lands where the extractive mining take place in Canada and in Greenland, this type of consideration is completely absent for Russian Arctic Indigenous communities. For example, the Nenets notably live onin the Yamal peninsula. The peninsula is well-known for the most widely promoted Russian Arctic energy project: Yamal LNG. In the peninsula, huge quantities of gas and oil are extracted from the peninsula since 2017. The gas is then carried by pipelines or by ice-resistant carriers ships to China, or by ice-resistant carriers ships.36) Anthropologist Florian Stammler explains that there is indeed an increasing maritime traffic, with the supertankers doing more back-and-forth trips on the Northern Sea Route. But the fuels and sound pollution are the same, whether the ships are sailing to China or to other countries. Additionally, on the employment dimension, Florian Stammler details that there “are important economic assets for Chinese in Nenets lands, but these are not Indigenous who lead. Chinese companies are settled on the field and undertake extractive mining, but this is a partnership between Russia and China, which does not really have any economic outcomes for Indigenous. Very few Nenets are working in those factories.“37)

In Russia, China therefore appears not to put any efforts into the traditions and cultures of Arctic Indigenous Peoples. To China’s discharge, it is important to note, this happens in the Russian national context, where national and regional autorities greatly disregard Indigenous communities and their rights.38)

Critical analysis of the discourse of support and adherence to Arctic governance principle regarding Indigenous People

Global support, domestic denial

One of the foremost elements highlighted by the literature on Chinese approach to Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic, is a double-face posture. This ambivalent positioning is one of support in international institutions, while considering that there are no Indigenous groups within the Chinese national population. This domestic denial is due to the legal definition of Indigenous Peoples, both internationally or in China.

Chinese Legal Conception of ethnic minority groups

China holds a particular conception of nationhood, that historically is not rooted in ethnicity nor language. Rather, the belonging to the Chinese nation, whether ethnically Han or not, depended on imperial and cultural (rituals, socials norms and customs…) rulings, radiating from the empire’s centre.

The Chinese Communist Party considers that, other than the majority ethnic Han group, 55 different ethnic minority groups (少数民族: shǎo shù mín zú) inhabit Chinese territory, and thus part of the Chinese nation. According to the latest data from the official 2020 national census, the ethnic minority groups population was 125.47 million, accounting for 8.89%. Compared with 2010, the population of the Han ethnic group grew by 4.93%, while that of the ethnic minorities increased by 10.26%, and the share of the ethnic minorities increased by 0.40 percentage points.39)

But, and in spite of China voted in favor of the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) along with other unrecognized nations, these shǎo shù mín zú are not conceptualized as “Indigenous”. Moreover, the government has not implemented the UNDRIP plan. The rejection by the Chinese Communist Party of the legal validity of Indigenousness and Indigenous rights mainly draws from two reasons.

First, China thus considers the legal emergence of Indigenousness, the legal category and the subsequent rights, as a consequence of European imperialism and colonization.40) This legal opinion is one visible consequence of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) historiography, which saw China ‘semi-colonized’ and victimized by Europeans, US and Japanese powers during the 19th century, the so-called “Century of Humiliation”.41) Chinese authorities considers that it cannot be the home of minorities bearing specific rights attached to Indigenousness, because consider the Chinese nation (and thus Han and the 55 other ethnic minorities as a whole) as victims of colonization and imperialism. In Chinese legal thinking, it is Western powers which created this category both by their past actions and then by recognising these actions and by granting rights in order to repair and protect. Thus, China is not bound by recognition and respect of these specific rights.

Second, the non-ethnic conceptualization of nationhood shifted as the Communist Party took power in 1949. The CCP, inspired by Soviet conceptions of ethnic nationalities, established ethnic autonomous zones. Were then created the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (1955), the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (1958), the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (1958), the Tibet Autonomous Region (1965), as well as the pre-existing Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (1947). In 1984, the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) granted these regions special provisions to self-governance. But in reality, this reform only gave nominal sovereignty to the different groups they applied to. Ultimately, it served to maintain Han political and economic hegemony, as the article 7 of the REAL clearly define that “Institutions of self-government in ethnic autonomous areas shall place the interests of the state as a whole above all else and actively fulfill all tasks assigned by state institutions at higher levels.”

An internal contradiction

Mounting evidence are gathering to say that Chinese activities in the Arctic are likely to proceed through neo-colonial behaviors by developing projects at the detriment of CIPs’. This is alas a rather common conflict of interest between the need for raw material within the constraints of economic benefits, and the respect and preservation of a fragile population with considerably less voice and power in agenda-setting and political leverage. China is doing so in spite of denouncing European past colonialism and the West’s neocolonialist policies in the regions. While those latter are evidently problematic and needs to stop and be addressed urgently, it is overly ironical that China denounces these particular aspects, and bluntly reproduces them in its actions abroad.

In January 2018, China released its comprehensive official policy in the Arctic,42) which mentions the Indigenous Peoples seven times. It insists that China seeks to develop the region, in cooperation with Arctic states “while respecting the traditions and cultures of Arctic residents, including Indigenous Peoples and while conserving their natural environment.” But while “China respects the sovereign rights of Arctic and non-Arctic states,” Mia Bennett point out that it only acknowledges “the more vaguely defined tradition and cultures of Indigenous Peoples rather than their authority or rights“43)

The Chinese legal understanding of Indigenous Peoples appears to constrain the ability to recognize the collective rights attached to the Indigenousness of these groups. For instance, the White Paper states that “China maintains that all activities to explore and utilize the Arctic should abide by [international and national laws] and proceed in a sustainable way on the condition of properly protecting the environment of the Arctic and respecting the interests and concerns of the Indigenous Peoples in the region.” This a particularly concerning issue, as it combines with views and perceptions that do not hold Indigenous communities alongside non-recognized nations in high esteem, because of their ‘backwardness’ contrasting with modernity and progress that the CCP is bringing to them. These views, while it is difficult to assess how widespread they might be among Chinese political elites and authorities, have surfaced during events involving the Evenki People. This nomadic people are living between China and Russia. It is worth noting that is counted among the 55 ethnic minority groups officially identified by the Chinese authorities. This group is also recognized as a ‘small-numbered Indigenous people of the North’ by the Russian Federation. The Evenki herders in China are notably members of the Association of World Reindeer Herders, which connects 20 Indigenous reindeer herding Peoples and 100,000 reindeer herders, as well as holding Observer status in the Arctic Council.44) This type of wording and rhetorical structure very often paves the way to relativity of the latter (here, ‘Indigenous interests and concerns‘, ‘protection of the environment‘), at the benefits of the former (here, ‘all activities to explore and utilize’).

However, reports of Chinese authorities forcibly resettling one subgroup of Evenki in 2003, and officials aim to “end the nomadic way of life for all herdsmen by the end of the century“, have shed light on some old colonial and civilisational conceptions of Indigenous and nomadic way of life regarded as “backwards”.45) This also shows the artificiality of frontiers and borders for nomadic lifestyles, and a contradiction in the Chinese rhetoric of respect and consideration for Indigenous People of the Arctic region and, which contrasts with the comparable and linked communities living on Chinese territory or abroad.

Imperial past and neocolonial practices

This colonial vision of nomadic and Indigenous lifestyle, like in Western countries just a few decades ago, is originated in ethnocentrism and a sense of entitlement rooted in racial conceptions of the world. Like other historical empires, China developed doctrines, theories and world-views that can be qualified as ethnocentric, at the very to the least. Among them, the Tianxia (天下), “all under heaven” or “everything under the same sky”) is an ancient complex political philosophy. It expresses the idea of a hierarchical order of the world, with China at its center. It informs us about “the Chinese representation of the external world. This facet of the concept tells us about “the Chinese representation of the outside world”. In reality, this vision of the world opposed the “inside”, “civilization” sedentary ethnic Han and assimilated ( 内 nèi), to the “outside”, “barbaric”, “non-Chinese” and often nomadic tribes (外 wài).

Since the late 1990s, this philosophy is reactivated by influential nationalistic scholars and intellectuals, who seek to justify a hierarchical order of the world, with China at its center. Concretely and politically, the contemporary re-conceptualization of the ancient term ‘Tianxia’ was reflected, for example, in a speech by Xi Jinping on 23 October 2014. In this context, Chishen Chang uses a critical analysis that concludes that “It is a world philosophy which is, however, not an end in itself but a means by which the superiority of China’s traditional political philosophy is advanced, which in itself defeats that philosophy.“46)

Regarding Indigenous Peoples, and especially CIPs, this is particularly concerning because of the historical disdain and dehumanization of nomadic Peoples. This dehumanization of nomadic livelihoods probably occurred in reaction to frequent and confrontational interactions with steppes’ nomadic Peoples. Such a doctrine would then justify collective and state mobilization to fight and push back what were then existential threats to the sedentary and ‘civilized’ Chinese empire.47)

 Finally, as mentioned above, China’s conception of Indigenousness is close to a certain form of colonialism, which could open doors for solidarity with Indigenous People who like the Chinese, suffered colonial, imperial and racist violence from external powers. But China was and is reportedly committing serious human rights abuses on minority populations within its territory. China’s central authorities are thus accused of ‘internal colonialism’, in China’s regions that have historical and cultural distinct identities, such as Tibet or East Turkestan (Xinjiang).48) The violent repressive campaigns endured by those populations, are also manifestations of anxiety facing ontological security threat,49) by secessionists revolting against the homogeneous conception of the Chinese population. To some extent, these violent relationships between central and peripheral groups over vast and rich territories are not so dissimilar to ones in Arctic countries where the states violently attempted to assimilate or eliminate Indigenous Peoples.

Directions for further research

In its approach to the Northernmost region of Earth, China have noticed and considered one specific dimension, crucial for its deeper engagement: the Indigenous People of the Arctic. In this article was proposed an overview of the evolution of the Chinese approach to the Indigenous People within its Arctic policy over the last three decades. Subsequently, an analysis of Chinese rhetoric and actions towards Indigenous affairs found out internal contradiction. While China displays a relatively supportive rhetoric for Indigenous Peoples movement in the UN institutions, in the few occurrences where China encountered Indigenous Peoples, mostly for extractive projects a lack of consultation and alleviation of pollution are nearly nonexistent. Finally, the article provided historical and cultural perspective to understand Chinese approach to minority groups who still live in traditional ways.

After exploring the current state of research on the topic of the relations between Chinese Arctic policy and Indigenous Peoples, it is possible to formulate certain directions and suggest seemingly relevant following questions.

  1. First of all, it appears rather clear that a need for more empirical investigation and for dialogue with the broader literature on China and Neo-Colonialism could greatly benefit the existing studies on the topic.
  2. Second, further research investigating the different CIPs’ constraints and margins to tie links and relations through para-diplomatic and 1.5 diplomatic tracks with China (e.g. Greenlandic & Farœse governments opening representation offices in Shanghai & Beijing) would benefit the advancement of knowledge on both non-state actors practices and post-sovereignty diplomacy.
  3. Third, ontological and epistemological study of the Arctic social sciences in China related to CIPs, both could prove very interesting to understand further Chinese perceptions on the matter.

References[+]

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