Exploring Nine Years of US-Russian Rivalry: Has Russia's 2022-War Made the High North Less Stable?
Troll A offshore natural gas platform off the west coast of Norway. Photo: NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the US-Russian tension in Europe has become increasingly profound. The political and military stand-off between the world’s two largest nuclear powers also has ramifications for stability in the High North, as both Russia and the United States have substantial interests in the region. Being a gateway to the Pacific and North Atlantic Oceans, it is crucial to maintain a strong civilian and military presence, partly to secure trade routes and partly to secure strategic sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the region. The Arctic also possesses vast quantities of valuable natural resources – such as untouched oil and gas fields, minerals, and abundant fish stocks. This article therefore explores the changing character of the High North’s security environment following Russia’s Crimea-annexation in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
First, US and Russian security measures are described in the High North. Based on the two rivals’ responses to each other’s security concerns, the paper thereafter discusses how the rivalry has affected the region’s military tension. The discussion uses Russia’s northern rim-state Norway as a case to examine how a small NATO-member balances between contradictory security interests, using confidence-building measures as its primary tool. The paper argues that Russia’s 2022 war has induced a more cautious stance among US and Russian forces operating in the sensitive waters outside Russia’s Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula. This is because all states, large and small, have a common interest in not escalating the Ukraine-war into the Arctic region. The paper concludes that Russia’s 2022-war has transformed the High North into a region of crisis stability: a situation where both parties have an incentive to strike first, although they ultimately benefit from the status quo.1) Western forces are well aware of Russia’s contemporary vulnerabilities from the ongoing Ukraine war. This leads Western forces to reassure Russia, i.e., by adopting a slightly more cautious force posture, effectively reducing the risks of misunderstandings and misperceptions. Less restraints may otherwise lead to greater unpredictability, which again may spark uncontrollable chains of events that risk US and NATO forces binding themselves in yet another theatre for many years to come.
US-Russian Rivalry in the High North, 2014-2022
The High North rivalry between the two nuclear powers can be described as a tit-for-tat strategy within Game Theory.2) The United States responded to Russia’s 2014-annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in three ways. First, the US Navy re-evoked its Second Fleet in 2018, earmarked for naval strike operations in the North Atlantic. After assessing the security environment in September 2011, the Obama-administration decided to deactivate the fleet due to a diminished Russian threat. Russia’s 2014 Crimean-annexation reversed this decision, inducing “A fourth battle of the Atlantic”.3) Effectively, the re-evoked fleet means enhanced reinforcement of the region, in addition to providing capable and credible deterrent effects through an increased number of high-quality vessels. Forward deterrence and controlling the transatlantic SLOCs once again became vital US security concerns.
Second, the United States initiated its European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) only three months after the Crimea-annexation. The programme sought to increase US presence in Europe, consequently enhancing its ability, presence, and readiness to deter further Russian aggressiveness.4) By investing heavily in European military infrastructure – particularly in Russian rim-states like Norway, Poland, and the Baltic states – the US forces aimed to deter the Putin regime while simultaneously reassuring NATO-members. The EDI programme, which peaked in 2019 with 6,5 billion dollars, allowed for a significant increase in US military forces in Europe, including the rotational deployment of an Armoured Brigade Combat Team in Eastern- and Central European States, as well as the rotational deployment of the United States Marine Corps in Northern Norway.5) The increased presence facilitated a more robust and credible deterrence as the capacity increased due to enhanced military prepositioning, improved infrastructure, and more multinational exercises with nuclear and conventional forces.6)
Third, and more recently, is the US Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement (SDCA) between the United States on the one hand, and Norway (2021), Finland, and Sweden (2023) on the other. Invoked in Norway in 2021, the agreement allows US forces to establish four military strongholds on Norwegian soil. Aiming to increase force readiness by reducing the reaction time, the US posture in Northern Europe signifies a shorter strategic warning time between US and Russian forces in a potential stand-off, crisis, or armed conflict. As the US is the Nordic States’ – and the rest of Europe’s – undisputed principal security guarantor, American presence is vital for credible deterrence towards the East. Evidently, at the beginning of June 2023, the USS Gerald Ford docked in Oslo before sailing North and entering the Arctic Circle.7) This major aircraft carrier symbolised two things: regional reassurance to Russian rim-states in the High North, and deterrence of Russia’s Northern Fleet.
Strategic deterrence is nevertheless rarely a straightforward policy. Any force deployment is likely to be interpreted differently in Washington, D.C., Moscow, and Oslo. Norwegian efforts to sustain a regional low tension policy in the Barents Sea, close to Russia’s nuclear forces on the Kola Peninsula, can be hampered. Based upon empirical evidence from the region, Russia responded as US forces increased their military presence in the High North. First, Russia deployed its Bastion Defence K-300P in 2016.8) The mobile coastal defence system is designed to engage belligerent navies, including carrier groups, convoys, as well as landing crafts. In response to the advancement of US military forces in Europe, the Russian Northern Fleet – its main force in the High North – received support from the increased number of new Bastion anti-ship missiles in 2015 to deny access to the contested Northern Sea Route.9) Subsequently, to counter American warships in the Black Sea, Russia deployed a silo-based missile complex in Crimea in 2020.10) The Russian perimeter defence aims to serve as a counter-strike system towards foreign navies, yet, coupled with a strategic warning system, it improves the naval force’s structure. Coupled with new ships and submarines with technologically advanced long-range strike capabilities, the multi-layered Bastion defence provides the Russian Kola Peninsula and the doubtful Arctic areas with credible deterrence mechanisms vis-à-vis US and other NATO-forces operating in the region.11)
Second, President Putin also approved the new 2022 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Here, Russia communicates its’ interests and objectives at sea, cumulating in the aspiration of becoming “a great maritime power”.12) Following this doctrine, the Russians perceive the NATO alliance, and especially the United States, as its main challenge to national security in the High North.13) An extension of great power rivalry and increased military activity in the High North is likely to happen, as the Russian focus on “sustainable socio-economic development” is mainly attained through the development of maritime activities and opportunities in the Arctic.14) Therefore, the Kremlin further nuanced its naval priorities in comparison with its previous naval doctrine by ranking the Arctic as priority number one, downgrading the operational space in the North Atlantic to the third priority – after the Pacific Ocean.15) Promising to strengthen the Northern Fleet in response to the challenging regional security environment, this supports the assumption that the Arctic region will grow increasingly significant in the years to come. The relative centralisation of power in the High North is a deliberate prioritisation by the Russian Navy signalling commitment vis-à-vis the West. What the military lacks in deep-blue navy capabilities is attemptedly compensated for by enhanced green-water capabilities.16) A strong coastal navy combined with an advanced long-range missile system from both submarines and land-based facilities significantly improves Russia’s deterrence credibility. This is especially so as the capabilities are armed with both conventional and non-conventional warheads that may reach European and US cities on short notice in a stand-off situation with US forces.
Third, Russia has also invested in numerous new or upgraded bases, allowing the military forces to increase their leverage in the High North. This is partly due to new airfields on Franz Joesf’s Land, and partly because of its new naval facilities. Combined, Russian forces ought to project air defence systems and naval power further into international waters. In sum, the investments in military infrastructure signify a more proactive Russian posture that can more easily provide strategic depth around its nuclear submarines and thus control crucial SLOCs for both commercial and military purposes.
Due to increased military activity and enhanced presence from both parts, the High North has become a prominent theatre for a geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the US. For instance, the US National Defence Strategy of 2018 states that to counter Russia’s long-term strategic competition, it is necessary to build a more lethal force.17) As both rivals attempt to establish dominance in the High North to improve their power projection and increase their regional influence, complex and contentious security situations may arise. As is the case with deterrence and security dilemmas, increased military activity and poor bilateral communication in the region have raised concerns regarding the potential for severe miscalculations – just as with the Norwegian Rocket Incident in 1995. Russian officials misinterpreted a scientific rocket launch for a nuclear strike, despite the tensions between the United States and Russia being at an all-time low.18) Undoubtedly, there is an ongoing Arctic security dilemma as NATO reassures its member states, thereby leaving Russia’s considerations unattended. A massive cycle of rearmament and countermeasures further escalates tensions in the High North.
Norway’s Response to the Great Power Rivalry in the High North
Norway has an important role in balancing the contradictory interests of the United States and Russia. On the one hand, there is a need to accommodate the US and the NATO allies’ expectations, primarily concerning base facilities aimed at improving a sustainable NATO presence in the High Seas and airspace within the Barents Sea region. During the SDCA-negotiations in 2020, the Pentagon wanted 20 bases across Norwegian territory, although the conservative Solberg-II Government only allowed four. Additionally, due to its strategic location close to Russia’s first- and second-strike capabilities and advanced US-financed radar systems at Vardø, Norway also serves as an early-warning outpost for the US Strategic Command.19) On the other hand, Russia must be reassured that Norwegian territory will not be used as a stepping stone for offensive US operations towards Putin’s most vital second-strike capabilities in the Northern Fleet. Many of Russia’s nuclear capabilities are located at the Kola Peninsula, only 40 to 120 kilometres from Norway, at NATO’s northern border. This dilemma reflects a longstanding strategy where Norway, as a staunch NATO ally and a cautious Russia-neighbour balances between adversary great powers – credible deterrence versus transparent and predictable reassurance.
Currently, the Norwegian Armed Forces are incapable of efficiently navigating both the domestic and international spheres.20) Without a comprehensive restructuring of the national, and the overarching Nordic, defences, American forces on Norwegian soil are essential for any security operation that exceeds peace time engagements. Nonetheless, with Finland, and likely Sweden, joining the transatlantic Alliance, enhanced Nordic cooperation can substitute for a hefty American presence, thereby increasing reassurance towards Russia. Such a development may give the Nordic states improved leverage in times of crisis, and it may ultimately facilitate higher levels of predictability and stability. In March 2023, the commanders of the Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, and Finnish airforces agreed upon a plan to link their combined 250 aircrafts together under one single command structure in a joint Nordic airforce.21) Moscow does not fear middle powers like Norway, Sweden, and Finland. What Russia dislikes is these states becoming strategic springboards for US-forces directed from Washington in a potential stand-off with Russia during an international crisis. Nonetheless, the United States would not abandon the region. On the contrary, as the 2023-SDCA with Sweden illustrates, 20 new US-strongholds on Swedish territory signify a more proactive US presence in the High North, with four of these in Northern Sweden.22) The broad SDCA-network of US strongholds in Norway, Sweden, and Finland may,one the one hand, reduce Russia’s strategic warning time and its strategic depth in crisis. On the other hand, it may provide a more credible deterrent force towards rapid deployment from the US or Europe, thereby stabilising an otherwise escalating situation. Effectively, the availability of bases inside like-minded allies’ territory allows US forces to operate more freely rather than being geographically restricted to one region. Following, US forces may thereby also deploy to Poland, the Middle East, or the Indo-Pacific region. Consequently, Russia may opt to de-escalate in the High North, and reallocate its resources. However, the necessary precondition is that the Nordic countries prioritise building sustainable and efficient co-operational forces capable of planning, coordinating, and engaging in joint operations, in addition to efficient information sharing with Brussels and Washington.
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, there has been a reduction in confidence-building measures (CBM) in the High North.23) CBMs were widely used during the Cold War era, yet few are retained today. Early announcement of military exercises with participating observers, extensive information sharing, and even limits on capability deployment and operational activities are all CBMs intended to significantly reduce fear, uncertainty, and suspicion. Through transparency, communication, constraint, and verification, tensions can be averted, and again, the driving actors for such measures have mainly been smaller and non-aligned states, as they usually would end up being caught in the crossfire.24) This was further emphasised by the Norwegian Prime Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, when he visited Biden in January 2022. Despite Norway and Russia pursuing contradictory interests, Støre told Biden that engagement in CBMs and mutual reassurance have been possible also after the Cold War.25) Notwithstanding a decrease in CBMs today, Norway maintains various measures seeking to lower tensions in the High North. Through mutual search and rescue operations for both Norwegian and Russian fishing vessels, a common fishery management regime, and a military hotline between Bodø and Severomorsk – the main administrative base of the Northern Fleet – CBMs are attempted maintained despite the tense security environment. Moreover, the self-imposed restraints on Norway’s NATO-membership in peace time, i.e., the abandonment of US bases, nuclear weapons, or US exercises in Finnmark, are also major CBMs that allow Russia’s Northern Fleet to benefit from strategic warning and improved survivability in the contemporary situation.26)
However, balancing the contradictory great power considerations of the United States and Russia is not straightforward for the mediating states. The Norwegians seek predictability, whereas the Americans seek unpredictability to maximise their deterrent threats. Therefore, US Dynamic Force Employment emphasises strategic predictability yet operational unpredictability to efficiently obtain this position.27) As the potential spillovers from great power conflict in the High North would severely impact every state in the region, the smaller Arctic actors have a mutual interest in avoiding escalation given the war in Europe. So far, there have not been any unnecessary provocations by Washington or Moscow. However, there have not been many thoughtful initiatives engaged in either. Despite a US-Russian hotline, most dialogue is maintained on a working level among civil servants, and there is no significant political cooperation concerning the militarisation of the High North. Through the facilitation of bi- and multilateral communication and CBMs, the challenging interplay between the US and Russia ought to be stabilised in the Northern areas.
A Reassessed Approach to Stability
Nevertheless, there is evidence that Russia’s limited results in Ukraine have resulted in a more stable, nonetheless tense, High North. Prior to the invasion, Washington attempted to solidify its dominance in the Arctic – partly through NATO’s large scale 2018 exercise Trident Juncture, and partly through deployments of B-52s and Naval Strike Groups into the High North and into Russia’s economic zone in 2020. The Trident Juncture exercise, testing the allies’ ability of dynamic force employment, was the largest of its kind conducted in Norway since the 1980s, and it proceeded all the way North to the Norwegian city of Tromsø – further North than during the Cold War. The aircraft carrier USS Harry Truman and its battle group were the first of their kind to partake in the exercise, showcasing their ability – and willingness – to safeguard the Arctic Circle.
In response, Moscow issued a series of Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) to Norwegian authorities, reporting multiple missile launches and various military activities in international waters and airspace closely adjacent to Norwegian territories, indirectly signalling discontent with the comprehensive multinational exercise.28) Furthermore, Russia reported a NOTAM around critical Norwegian gas and oil installations off the western coast of Møre during the 2018 Trident Juncture.29) However, no missiles were launched. A few days later, another NOTAM was reported, this time in the Barents Sea. Among the participants was the largest Russian warship, the nuclear-driven battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy, intended to demonstrate resistance against the USS Truman.30) These provocations were reciprocated by the United States in May 2020, when four American and one British ship conducted maritime security operations deep within the Russian exclusive economic zone for the first time in 40 years.31) Sailing close to the Russian second-strike capabilities unsurprisingly led to Russian retaliation. The Northern Fleet quickly returned close to the Norwegian-Russian border, only a few days after the bilateral exercise ended.32) This cycle of mutual distrust and an increasing show of capabilities pose a critical threat to the stability and security of the High North. As evidence shows, when actors become vulnerable, misunderstandings, technical accidents, and misinterpretations are more likely. In March 2023, a Russian SU-27 Flanker Jet crashed into an American Reaper Drone in the Black Sea, and following the accident, US General Erik Kurilla claimed this incident joined a trend characterised by “unprofessional and unsafe behaviour” from the Russian Air Force.33) Similarly, in September 2022, a British surveillance plane was nearly shot down by a Russian fighter jet off the coast of Crimea in what was later described as a “technical malfunction”.34) Evidently, in the High North, the security margins have increased significantly, as there is a mutual interest to avoid unnecessary escalation in the region. Because of Russian “paranoia” originating in the many unsuccessful military campaigns in Eastern Europe, both NATO and Russia act carefully. The West does not want to provoke an aggressive, unpredictable, and thereby dangerous Putin, and Putin himself cannot afford an escalation of the situation in the areas close to his valuable Northern Fleet and its critical second-strike missiles.
The abovementioned examples may indicate that NATO allies have carefully considered their military responses after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The USS Gerald Ford only went as far North as the Lofoten archipelago, compared to the USS Truman’s 2018 mission to Tromsø, which was unprecedentedly far North.35) Furthermore, no Western battleships or aircrafts have recently been within the Russian EEZ, as happened in May and September 2020. Recently, however, there has been a resurge in port calls by Western nuclear submarines.36) Arguably, the situation of crisis stability is slowly returning to normal alongside Western states’ signalling towards Moscow; the port calls are intended to “ensure stability in the Arctic region”, according to the US embassy to Norway.37) Russia has also exercised caution, considering its war effort. The Northern Fleet held an anti-submarine exercise in the Barents Sea simultaneously as the American aircraft carrier group exercised with NATO forces in June 2023.38) The Fleet signalled austerity by avoiding provocative drills in the NATO forces’ close proximity. Despite a recent trend of increasing naval exercises – eleven only in May 2023 – the drills are mainly conducted in the Barents and the White Seas.39) These stand opposed to Russia’s pre-2022 provocative maneuvres conducted by naval and airborne capabilities towards parts of Norway’s northern areas, usually coupled with a series of NOTAMs.40) Therefore, it can be argued that both sides have drastically re-evaluated the situation in the High North. Because of Russia’s ongoing offensive in Ukraine, no close-calls, misunderstandings, nor provocative behaviour have occurred in the North recently, thereby averting a regional great power stand-off. This pattern is moreover consistent with the strategic guidelines codified in the 2022 US National Defence Strategy: to avoid miscalculations or misperceptions, the Cold War concept of crisis stability is again used to avoid an unintended escalation of any situation.41)
Conclusion
With Russia’s increasing militarisation in the Arctic and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the security environment in the High North has grown increasingly challenging. Additionally, and consequently, regional security has become one of NATO’s leading priorities. With mutual rearmament in the area, it is imperative to remember that a security dilemma between the two greatest nuclear powers in the world is not a zero-sum game. A negative cycle resulting in significant tensions and eventual conflict is not unlikely in such cases. Nonetheless, due to an increase in safety margins as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the various actors seem increasingly cautious when navigating the High North. Russian paranoia has greatly altered the course of action on the Western side. In the wake of the Cold War, with a unipolar world order, CBMs were less prominent than earlier, and consequently, tensions arose during the last three decades. After 2022, however, there have been relatively few shows of force. Russia is fighting a war of attrition in Ukraine and aims to efficiently balance its economy, manpower, capabilities, and resources to conduct effective operations and deterrence in the High North. Nonetheless, more military bases have been opened in the Arctic since the outbreak of the war, thereby signaling the continued importance of the region.42) This development illustrates the region’s significance considering the heavy toll the war in Ukraine has on the Russian state apparatus. However, in line with the running argument of heightened regional awareness, the United States and its European allies exert increased caution to avoid the unnecessary provocation of an anxious and challenged Russia and thereby aim to contain the War to Ukraine and facilitate crisis stability. Ultimately, the US seeks to relocate and prioritise its military capabilities to the South China Sea, not in the Northern areas. Through accommodation and reassurance, Arctic states such as Norway attempt to balance the contradictory interests of the two great powers. By largely replacing US forces, the Nordic countries can conduct military activities in the High North and act as NATO’s northern flank themselves. Russian interests can, to a greater extent, be accommodated and hopefully contribute to lowering the regional – and global – tensions and avoiding a spillover of the Ukrainian War.
Erlend Heier is an undergraduate student in War Studies and History at King’s College London.
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