Shifting Ties: Navigating the Complexities of Russia-South Korea Relations and the New Arctic Geopolitics
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol at the 2nd Summit for Democracy held in Seoul in March 2023. Photo: Republic of Korea
In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the global geopolitical landscape has undergone seismic changes with ramifications extending far beyond the European theatre. While the immediate consequences were felt most acutely in Europe, in other words, the puripple effects have now reached distant regions such as Africa, where the Kremlin has been actively complementing its support for anti-status quo armed groups1) by running large scale disinformation campaigns,2) and Asia Pacific. These actions have, understandably, sparked concerns and speculations leading to a reevaluation of global alliances and diplomatic ties. Amidst these shifting dynamics, one particularly critical development is the fast warming of ties between Russia and North Korea and the subsequent deterioration of bilateral relations between Moscow and Seoul.3)
The motivations behind Russia’s actions are multifaceted, driven by a combination of necessity, strategic maneuvering, and a desire to unsettle its adversaries and/or state support of Ukraine. To this end, one notable development is Russia’s strategic approach of forging partnerships centered on what appears to be the outsourcing4) of its defence industrial complex production; a tactic that not only enhances Russia’s diplomatic leverage and influence in key regions but also serves as a workaround to remedy labour shortages and reduce the production cost of ammunition and missiles.
It is against this evolving context of emergent partnership dynamics that some analysts have started to warn against the potentially destabilising effects of a strategic divide around the Korean Peninsula; one that could allegedly reverberate across global geopolitical fault-lines by pitting the U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance against a China-North Korea-Russia axis.5) This deterioration of traditional alliances could potentially reshape geopolitical dynamics in regions far from East Asia, including the Arctic where South Korea and Russia have, until very recently, been collaborating in a number of sectors including shipping and energy.6)
As South Korea grapples with the ramifications of its worsening ties with Moscow, therefore, it is timely to inquire about the trajectory of its Arctic engagement in the broader context of Moscow Seoul relations. The strategic implications of these developments warrant careful consideration simply because they have the potential to reshape the Arctic landscape and impact international interests beyond the Korean Peninsula.
Russia South Korea Relations since the Invasion of Ukraine: An Overview
Since the outbreak of the Ukraine war, Russia and South Korea relations have been on a downward trajectory. South Korea’s alignment with U.S.-led sanctions against Russia, including a consequential ban on the sale of advanced semiconductors,7) promoted the Kremlin to add Seoul to its list of “unfriendly” states; an unfortunate state of affairs which reached its climax with the arrest of a South Korean national on spying charges.8)
Further exacerbating the situation, South Korea’s softening stance on supplying arms to Ukraine met with strong opposition from Russia. President Yeol’s tentative openness to such deliveries prompted warnings from Moscow that Seoul risked becoming directly involved in the conflict9) while Russian commentators began to express skepticism about South Korea’s sovereignty and its decision-making autonomy.10)
Most concerning, Moscow has revived its military cooperation with Pyongyang,11) further straining relations. This renewed collaboration, marked by suspected exchange of military assistance and technological transfer, has raised alarms in South Korea and Japan regarding the potential proliferation of sophisticated weaponry and its implications for regional stability.12) Consequently, both countries are now entrenched in their respective interests, and that neither is displaying a genuine appetite for a diplomatic compromise.
South Korea’s Arctic Strategy: What Role for Russia?
While defence and security considerations appear to have been deliberately excluded, South Korea’s Arctic strategy underscores its ambitious vision to seize economic opportunities and establish itself as a key player in shaping the region’s future.13) The Republic of Korea has outlined a comprehensive framework focusing on economic cooperation, constructive participation in decision making processes within multilateral and international forums like the Arctic Council and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), and scientific/technological contributions to address various Arctic related environmental and societal challenges.14)
Most importantly, however, South Korea’s Arctic strategy is intricately intertwined with its robust cooperation with Russia which constitutes the central pillar of its approach to the region.15) This partnership, in turn, is underpinned by the coincidental convergence of their Arctic priorities spanning from transport and logistics development to hydrocarbon extraction and shipbuilding endeavours.
At the heart of their Arctic ‘voyage’ is the utilisation of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the advancement of transport and logistics systems.16) Eyeing the NSR as a lucrative avenue to reduce shipping costs from East Asia to Europe, Seoul has actively sought to expand maritime navigation in the Arctic coastal zone. Notably, Korea’s National Logistics Master Plan 2016-2025 emphasises cooperation with Russia, particularly in supporting Korean companies involved in exporting crude oil from Yamal Island.17) One example of this collaboration is the Yamal LNG project where Novatek and KOGAS confirmed a memorandum of understanding in 2018 signalling South Korea’s potential involvement in the project.18)
Uncomfortable with its heavy reliance on the Middle Eastern crude,19) South Korea has a keen interest in increasing the supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia’s Arctic;20) an interest that fits well with Moscow’s own ambition to turn the Arctic into a major global energy producing region.21) Once again, the cooperation with Yamal LNG serves as a prime example of this synergy with South Korea offering its high-tech expertise in the production and transportation of hydrocarbons in return for access to Arctic resources and consolidation of its position as a key player in the global energy transport market.To achieve these objective, successive South Korea governments, liberal and conservative, have sough to bolster cooperation in the manufacture of gas transport containers and various vessels for oil and gas transportation.
Given the above, it ought not to be surprising that the partnership between Russia and South Korea extends to shipbuilding where both side seek to leverage each other’s strengths to enhance shuttle tanker construction.22) South Korea’s proficiency in LNG tanker construction complements Russia’s strong engineering heritage leading to fruitful collaborations in designing and building shuttle tankers. Samsung Heavy Industries and Daewoo, two of major South Korea’s chaebol, play a pivotal role in this cooperation by, amongst other things, agreeing to transfer their knowhow in shuttle tanker design to their Russian counterparts. Such endeavours highlight the prevalence of pragmatism on the Korean side as well as the mutual benefits derived from combining Russia’s engineering prowess with South Korea’s manufacturing excellence.
Glazing into the Future
Due to the largely complementary nature of their Arctic cooperation, the emergent deterioration of bilateral ties between Moscow and Seoul is likely to pose challenges for both South Korea’s engagement in the Arctic as well as Russia’s ability to fulfil its ambitious goals in the region. As Russia increasingly aligns with North Korea, South Korea faces obstacles in maintaining collaborative ventures in the Arctic. In particular, disruptions in energy cooperation, such as LNG supply from the Arctic, could impact South Korea’s long term energy security strategy by further deepening its reliance on the Middle Eastern crude and hit the balance sheet of its major shipbuilders which have had to cancel large orders due to sanctions.23) For Russia too, loss of South Korea, and indeed Japan, as an energy partner in the Arctic does not bode well for the attainment of its long terms objective of maximising the share of its Arctic resources in the global energy markets. Not only this means a loss of potential revenue but it also means the loss of a potential partner with the required knowhow for cleaner extraction of the region’s vast gas resources.
With prospects of reviving Arctic cooperation between Russia and South Korea appearing bleak, and the Arctic Council, once “a key platform” for South Korea to engage with Arctic affairs,24) still largely dysfunctional25) in spite of the resumption of some of its working groups activities,26) governance represent yet another challenge for Seoul, Moscow, and indeed the remaining Arctic seven.
Faced with an institutional vacuum for policy discussions, Seoul is likely to seek alternative avenues to participate in Arctic governance in order to secure its regional interests.27) It may for instance turn its attention towards closer collaboration with other Asian nations, particularly Japan and Singapore which share its interest in the Arctic affairs and could serve as valuable partners in shaping regional governance mechanisms. By aligning with Japan and Singapore, thus, South Korea could aim to form a more cohesive Asian bloc within the Arctic governance landscape thereby avoid being sidelined on policy discussions in sectors where it has a national interest.28) To complement this, Seoul may also seek to enhance its participation in and engagement with international organisations such as the United Nations and IMO. By leveraging multilateral platforms, South Korea can amplify its voice and influence in Arctic governance discussions.
Placing a greater emphasis on collaboration with regional Asian partners as well as engaging more actively with international organisations, however, poses a challenge to both Russia and the Western Arctic states, albeit in different ways. Concerned about its potential isolation by the remaining members of the Arctic Council and in urgent need of foreign capital and technology to realise its long-term developmental goals in the Arctic, Russia, in a sharp departure from its past preference, has been highly receptive to the presence and involvement of non-Arctic states, especially Asian countries, in Arctic affairs.29) In doing so, Russia has attempted to strike a delicate balance between its cooperation with China on one hand and with India, Japan, and South Korea on the other, aiming to avoid over-dependence on Beijing.
With India’s commitment to a full partnership with Russia in the Arctic remaining an open question, not to mention its resource limitations, it seems likely that Seoul’s, and Tokyo’s, ongoing efforts to distance themselves from Russia will have a daunting impact on Moscow’s balancing strategy; that is, it most likely further Russia’s over-dependence on Beijing. For the Arctic seven, on the other end of the spectrum, Seoul’s anticipated attempts will directly translate into diminished prospects of retaining the notion of exclusivity in governance. This is because they soon must not only fend off the potential consequences of Russian attempts at inviting more non-Arctic states to the table but also those of other non-Arctic nations such as Korea who are determined to avoid being sidelined on governance issues. To follow the spirit of the Secretary of State Antony Blinken recent comment, if non-Arctic states are invited to the table, they can no longer be treated as simple items on the menu.
Amidst these tensions, however, there also lies an opportunity for South Korea to realign its Arctic shipping strategies by forging stronger partnerships with like minded Arctic nations such as Finland and Sweden. Firstly, collaboration between South Korea, Finland, and Sweden in eco-friendly shipping solutions aligns with their shared environmental objectives. Recognising that shipping stands as a significant contributor to environmental distress, these nations have prioritised mitigating pollution from increased maritime activity.30) Finland and Sweden have demonstrated commitment to environmental protection, while South Korea’s Green New Deal emphasises clean fuel technologies and sustainable practices. By leveraging their collective expertise, they can develop innovative solutions to address environmental concerns associated with Arctic shipping.
Furthermore, South Korea shares common interests with Finland and Sweden in the development of autonomous, eco-friendly maritime technologies. Finland and Sweden, renowned for their innovation in maritime technology, can collaborate with South Korea to accelerate the development and adoption of these technologies, thereby bolstering their respective positions in key sectors and driving economic growth (ibid). The prospect of such collaborations also has the added, and indeed critical, advantage of facilitating future defence-industrial collaborations between these three small powers thereby contributing to Seoul’s grand objective of becoming a global pivotal state. Put differently, existing initiatives between the trio, such as MIRAI 2.0 between Japan and Sweden and the Green Economy cooperation agreement between Finland and Korea, as well as Seoul’s recent success in selling advanced weaponry systems to Norway, Estonia and Poland,31) provide a foundation for collaborative endeavours in both decarbonising Arctic shipping and, perhaps more importantly, enhanced maritime security in the Arctic. By building upon these initiatives, for instance, these three democracies could further enhance their cooperation in developing AI-powered navigational systems and modern icebreakers, essential for safe navigation in the Arctic.
References