The Increasing Security Focus in China’s Arctic Policy

The Chinese icebreaking research vessel Xue Long – or Ice Dragon – has played a key part in Chinese capacity building in the Arctic since the 1990s. Photo: dracophylla

Two decades ago, China’s political leadership determined that developing the ability to access and exploit the Arctic is a diplomatic, economic, and security imperative. Beijing’s interest in the Arctic has increased quickly in the last decade, with the polar regions included in China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan (FYP) in 2011, the publication of China’s Arctic Policy in 2018, and the incorporation of the Polar Silk Road as part of President Xi Jinping’s signature One Belt, One Road (OBOR) program.¹⁾The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2018) China’s Arctic Policy. Commercial development appears to be China’s primary goal at this stage, and China has been steadily increasing its diplomatic and scientific efforts to support this aspiration in the Arctic since 2006. This article contends that China has, since at least 2014, been building its capacity to defend its interests in the Arctic region through military means.

There are concerns about China’s Arctic strategy internationally, and it is often perceived alongside Russian militarization of the Arctic as a dual threat to the established international order. In a recent report, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) names China as a threat to American interests in the Arctic, labeling it—together with Russia— a challenge “to the rules-based international order around the globe [causing] concern of similar infringement to the continued peaceful stability of the Arctic region”, drawing parallels to Chinese conduct in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS).²⁾United States Coast Guard (2019) United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook. United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently stated that the Arctic has “become an arena of global power and competition”, drawing similar parallels to China’s actions in its regional waters: “China’s pattern of aggressive behavior elsewhere will inform how it treats the Arctic”.³⁾Sengupta S (2019) United States Rattles Arctic Talks With a Sharp Warning to China and Russia. New York Times, 6 May, www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/climate/pompeo-arctic-china-russia.html?module=inline. Accessed on 21 May 2019. The United States recently published its updated Arctic policy, building on these points and stating that China and Russia “are […] pursuing activities and capabilities in the Arctic that may present risks to the homeland”, and that these risks may constrain the United States Department of Defense’s “ability to flow forces globally, and more broadly to affect U.S. strategic objectives related to competition with China and Russia in the Indo-Pacific and Europe”, going so far as to state that PRC and Russia causes the Arctic to be “vulnerable to ‘strategic spillover’ from tensions, competition, or conflict arising in […] other regions.”⁴⁾United States Department of Defense (2019) Department of Defense Arctic Strategy.

Furthermore, Japan – a permanent observer member of the Arctic Council, the principal multilateral forum for Arctic governance – has similarly identified China as a threat to the rules-based order governing the Arctic.⁵⁾When discussing Chinese ships entering the Arctic through the Bering Strait, China’s commercial interests in the region and China’s legal stance on the Arctic, the Ministry of Defense of Japan states that “focus will be on whether or not such activities would have any relation to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s future advancements into the Arctic Ocean”, see Ministry of Defense Japan (2018) Defense of Japan 2018. Arctic nations such as Denmark,⁶⁾Denmark has expressed concern over China’s plans for investments in the Danish-controlled Arctic island of Greenland, see Office of the United States Secretary of Defense (2019) Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China and Andersson P & Zeuthen J & Kalvig P (2018) Chinese Mining in Greenland: Arctic Access or Access to Minerals? Arctic Yearbook 2018: 1-15. Sweden⁷⁾Members of Swedish defense community have raised some concerns about China’s Arctic-related activities in Sweden. The “Swedish Defense Research Agency” (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut – FOI) – which is a part of the Swedish Ministry of Defense – in January 2019 warned that Chinese investments in, and cooperation on, Swedish satellite technology could have military uses in the Arctic, see Wicklén J & Jåma S & Olofsson D (2019) FOI varnar för svenskt rymdsamarbete med Kina. SVT, 13 January, www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/foi-varnar-for-svenskt-rymdsamarbete-med-kina?cmpid=del:tw:20190113:foi-varnar-for-svenskt-rymdsamarbete-med-kina:nyh:lp. Accessed on 31 January 2019. The Chinese Arctic strategy – and its threats to Swedish interests – have been discussed in Riksdagen, Sweden’s parliament, see Sveriges Riksdag (2017) En ny Arktisstrategi. These discussions included raising concerns about Chinese military buildup manifesting in the Arctic and its potential to create conflict in the region. Furthermore, the FOI concerns on deliberations on Chinese military threats, as well as Sweden’s foreign minister highlighting Chinese interests in Chinese trade and research in the Arctic were echoed, see Sveriges Riksdag (2017) En ny Arktisstrategi. and Norway⁸⁾Norway’s Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide supported the remarks from US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo regarding China in the Arctic, see Tømmerbakke S (2019) Norwegian Foreign Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide: – Not an unexpected outcome. High North News, 8 May, www.highnorthnews.com/en/not-unexpected-outcome. Accessed on 24 May 2019. have supported the US position or singled China out unilaterally as a potential threat in the Arctic. Despite Russia being a potential strategic partner for China in the Arctic, it is reportedly another one of the Arctic countries expressing concern about Chinese military buildup in the region.⁹⁾The “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019” claims that “Arctic border countries have raised concerns about China’s expanding capabilities and interest in the region. Civilian research could support a strengthened Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean, which could include deploying submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear attacks.” It further outlines Russian opposition to foreign, including Chinese, icebreakers in the northern sea route that could cause potential Sino-Russian “friction over the Northern Sea Route”, see Office of the United States Secretary of Defense (2019) Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. In a recent white paper, an analyst from USEUCOM Strategy Division & Russia Strategic Initiative states that mutual Sino-Russian scepticism in the Arctic can, and should, be used by the United States to “counter what appears to be a growing alignment of Chinese and Russian strategic interests”.¹⁰⁾Werchan J (2019) Required US Capabilities for Combatting Russian Activities Abroad. Russian Strategic Intentions: 135-137.

Chinese academics reacted to the criticism posed by Pompeo by pointing to China’s goals of developing its interests and building its ties to Arctic nations – especially Russia – through established multilateral forums and adherence to international law.¹¹⁾Tømmerbakke S (2019) Strong Chinese Reactions to Pompeo’s Speech. High North News, 16 May, www.highnorthnews.com/en/strong-chinese-reactions-pompeos-speech. Accessed on 21 May 2019.

This article finds that the reality is a middle ground between how China describes its own Arctic strategy and the most critical Western analyses. There is currently little available evidence to suggest that China will pursue a military course in the Arctic similar to, or aligning with, Russia. Commercial development appears to be China’s main goal, but it is evident that China is building its capacity to enforce its perceived rights and protect its interests through an increasingly security-focused Arctic strategy that is backed up by the military.

This article examines publicly available data and documents from international organizations; Chinese bureaucracy, organizations and academic journals; media; various national governments of Arctic Countries; and Chinese academic output on Arctic issues to analyze China’s evolving approach on the Arctic. The article is divided into three parts. First, it explains China’s evolving view of the Arctic, shifting from a focus on research to considering its presence in the region as a commercial, diplomatic and security imperative. Second, the article provides an in-depth analysis of Chinese official planning documents and research by key Chinese security stakeholders to illuminate the increasing security focus in China’s Arctic strategy. Third, it discusses interpretations of legal frameworks in the Arctic and its impact on China’s role in the region. China will have to balance its own stated adherence to mainstream interpretations of international law in the Arctic with its revisionist interpretations of the same legal framework in its regional waters.

The Imperative behind China’s Growing Physical and Diplomatic Presence in the Arctic

After articulating its interests in the Arctic in official statements and documents—namely the commercial development of resources and trade routes—China used commercial ties to Arctic states, multilateral diplomatic channels, and scientific studies to justify its presence in the region, asserting its rights to commercial development and navigation as a non-Arctic state. In the Arctic Council, Beijing contended its Arctic policy was first conceived in 2015.¹²⁾Xiaoning Y (2016) China’s 2016 Observer Activities Report. Arctic Council Open Access Repository. However, there are clear signs that the Chinese efforts to establish itself as a key player in the Arctic began much earlier, through scientific efforts in the 1990s and through diplomatic channels from at least 2006. Mentions of the Arctic in state planning documents also preceded 2015. The Arctic was first mentioned in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Twelfth FYP in 2011,¹³⁾National Development and Reform Commission (2016) The 13th Five-Year Plan For Economic And Social Development of The People’s Republic of China (2016–2020). and the Arctic’s prominence in official documents has increased since then, culminating with the region being included in OBOR under the label “Polar Silk Road” in 2018.¹⁴⁾The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2018) China’s Arctic Policy.

China’s increasing focus on commercial opportunities in the Arctic¹⁵⁾China’s contemporary Arctic strategy evolved in response to a growing international consensus about potential consequences of climate change and warming Arctic temperatures. In the early 2000s, international academics posited that melting ice in the Arctic would lead to two major developments: the opening of new, more effective trading routes connecting East Asia to the Atlantic, see Østreng W & Eger K & Fløistad B & Jørgensen-Dahl A & Lothe L & Mejlænder-Larsen M & Wergeland T (2013) Shipping in Arctic Waters. Berlin: Springer and Arctic Council (2009) Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009; and the ability to exploit an estimated ten percent of the world’s known conventional petroleum resources, see U.S. Energy Information Administration (2012) Arctic oil and natural gas resources and U.S. Geological Survey (2008) Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle has grown in tandem with its efforts to contribute to the shaping of norms and rules in the region through multilateral forums.¹⁶⁾A 2017 Arctic paper published by the Ocean University of China stated that China’s had “shifted from a rule follower to a rule maker” in the Arctic, see Soukas J (2018) China eyes economic, strategic benefits in the Arctic. GB Times, 23 November, gbtimes.com/china-eyes-economic-strategic-benefits-in-the-arctic. Accessed on 27 May 2019. China has contributed to UN deliberations on carbon emissions in the Arctic, see International Maritime Organization (2013) Comments on the outcome of BLG 17. Marine Environment Protection Committee and Arctic shipping regulations, see International Maritime Organization (2015) Consideration And Adoption of Amendments to Mandatory Instruments – Comments on the draft International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters. Maritime Safety Committee, and joined a legally binding fisheries treaty, see European Commission (2019) Agreement to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean. As indicated in its official Arctic policy, China states that it wants to play, “a constructive part in the making, interpretation, application and development of international rules regarding the Arctic”.¹⁷⁾The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2018) China’s Arctic Policy. While China has contributed to other multilateral forums, the Arctic Council is the principal outlet for these efforts, where countries’ scientific and academic capacities in the Arctic play an important part.

Scientific output and collaborations are what gives countries a seat at the table in Arctic Council working groups.¹⁸⁾Working groups are subdivisions of the Arctic Council. China’s presence in the Arctic Council started in 2006, and discussions about Chinese ascension to Arctic Council permanent observer status coincided with a significant increase in Chinese activity in the council.¹⁹⁾Arctic Council (2007) Minutes (draft). Arctic Council Senior Arctic Officials meeting in Tromsø, Norway, April 12-13 2007. In China’s 2016 and 2018 Arctic Council observer reports it stated that it took part in most working groups²⁰⁾The Arctic Council is made up of six working groups. China is a part of the following: Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), Conservation of Arctic Flora & Fauna (CAFF), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) and the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP). China was in 2018 not a part of Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) or Emergency Prevention, Preparedness & Response (EPPR). Furthermore, China reported its partaking in, and funding of, the Arctic Council’s Indigenous Peoples Secretariat, see Xiaoning Y (2016) China’s 2016 Observer Activities Report. Arctic Council Open Access Repository.²¹⁾Linlin L (2018) China’s 2018 Observer Activities Report. Arctic Council Open Access Repository. and that it took part in every Arctic Council meeting possible.²²⁾Xiaoning Y (2016) China’s 2016 Observer Activities Report. Arctic Council Open Access Repository; Linlin L (2018) China’s 2018 Observer Activities Report. Arctic Council Open Access Repository. China’s efforts to lead in Arctic science is reflected in a steady increase of publications since 2006. According to a 2016 pilot study, China was “by far the nation with the highest relative growth (260 per-cent increase)” since then, ranking 7th in terms of Arctic scientific publications.²³⁾Aksnes D & Osipov I & Moskaleva O & Kullerud L (2016) Arctic Research Publication Trends: A Pilot Study. UArctic Statistics from the China National Knowledge Infrastructure database indicates that this trend has continued since then (see Figure 1.).

Central staples of Chinese science diplomacy are Arctic expeditions, substantial investment in knowledge accumulation, and technical capacity supported by dual use high-end equipment.²⁴⁾Grieger G (2018) China’s Arctic policy: How China aligns rights and interests. Briefing, Brussels: European Parliament: 5-6. This approach is evidenced by its Arctic Council activities. In its observer reports, China has stated its intent to increase Arctic expeditions, create nautical maps of the Arctic for open use and take part in international meteorological efforts to map Arctic ice levels and monitor the region from space in 2018.²⁵⁾Xiaoning Y (2016) China’s 2016 Observer Activities Report. Arctic Council Open Access Repository; Linlin L (2018) China’s 2018 Observer Activities Report. Arctic Council Open Access Repository.

A scientific presence in the Arctic not only provides China with legitimate access to the region’s waters, but also the technical capabilities to map, survey and monitor the region.²⁶⁾China has worked extensively on Arctic monitoring through its involvement in the Arctic Council and other channels. In 2015, China and Russia agreed to increase cooperation on – among other issues – monitoring in the Arctic, see Yang J (2018) An Interpretation of China’s Arctic Policy. Pacific Journal. China is a member of the Arctic Council Pacific Arctic Group (PAG), working on monitoring the Arctic ecosystem and environment, including ice levels, see Arctic Council (2009) Circumpolar Marine Biodiversity Monitoring Plan Background Paper. Since 2010 China, as a part of PAG, worked on documenting biological changes associated with the rapid sea ice loss and warming due to climate change in the Arctic, see Arctic Council (2017) International Science and Policy Conference: Ecosystem Approach to Management: Status of Implementation. From 2012 onwards, China took part in establishing coordinated monitoring in different areas of the Arctic Ocean, see Arctic Council (2013) Arctic Marine Biodiversity Monitoring Plan Annual Report 2012; Arctic Council (2014) Arctic Marine Biodiversity Monitoring Plan Annual Report 2013; CAFF International Secretariat (2015) Annual Report on the Implementation of the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program’s Arctic Marine Biodiversity Monitoring Plan. The “Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean”, of which China is a signatory, includes a commitment to establish a joint program of scientific research and monitoring of the Arctic, see European Comission (2019) Agreement to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean. Furthermore, China currently has two research stations in the Arctic; one in Iceland, which opened in 2018, and one in the Norwegian Arctic archipelago of Svalbard, which has been in operation since 2003. These research activities therefore have the potential to support both Chinese commercial and military activities in the Arctic. For example, the marine research voyage of the Chinese icebreaker, ‘Xue Long’, westward through the Arctic in 2017, provided the Chinese with valuable information on the viability of future trade through the region.²⁷⁾Fife R & Chase R (2017) China used research mission to test trade route through Canada’s Northwest Passage. The Globe and Mail, 10 September, www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/china-used-research-mission-to-test-trade-route-through-canadas-northwest-passage/article36223673/. Accessed on 20 May 2019 Similarly, the Annual U.S. Department of Defense report to Congress regarding China argues that: “Civilian research could support a strengthened Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean, which could include deploying submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear attacks”.²⁸⁾Office of the United States Secretary of Defense (2019) Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. China’s increasing civilian focus on mapping, surveying, and navigation in the Arctic Council could be seen in the same context.

China’s increasingly Security-Focused Arctic Policy

Since 2014, the Chinese government entities overseeing military and maritime policy have been accumulating knowledge and capacities for navigating and monitoring the Arctic. Furthermore, the region has gained an increasingly prominent place in official planning documents.

Five-Year Plans (FYP)

The Twelfth FYP from 2011 marked the first mention of the polar regions in a CCP strategic planning document. In the plan, the Arctic is connected to the broader theme of maritime management, security, and resource exploration. The Thirteenth FYP, from 2016, expanded on the Arctic strategy and directed the commitment of greater government resources, outlining plans to build new icebreakers, contribute to international research and energy exploration efforts and to taking “an active role in formulating international rules in … the polar regions”,²⁹⁾National Development and Reform Commission (2016) The 13th Five-Year Plan For Economic And Social Development of The People’s Republic of China (2016–2020). indicating a desire among the Chinese leadership to take part in the shaping of international norms and rules governing the Arctic, underscored by China’s scientific and diplomatic efforts since 2006.

2015 National Security Law

China’s 2015 National Security Law explicitly references exploration of the Arctic. This is one of the earliest mentions of the Arctic in a security context from the Chinese government. Article 32 of the law presents arguments similar to those laid out in the white paper on Arctic policy, of the right to exploration and use of the Arctic.³⁰⁾The National Security law states: “The State adheres to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, the international seabed region, and the polar regions, enhances the ability of safe access, scientific investigation, development and utilization, strengthens international cooperation and safeguards our activities in outer space, the international seabed region and the polar regions”, see Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China (2017) National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China (2015).

Research conducted by the now-defunct State Oceanic Administration (SOA)³¹⁾The State Oceanic Administration (SOA) was replaced during a government restructuring process in March 2018, placing its responsibilities under the auspices of the newly-formed Ministry of Natural Resources, see The State Council of The People’s Republic of China (2018) China’s actions and goals for ecological advancement. is one way of shedding light on Chinese strategic thinking on the Arctic in connection with the National Security Law. SOA’s functions, supervising work connected to China’s maritime rights, research and environmental protection,³²⁾State Oceanic Administration (2009) State Oceanic Administration (Archived from Wayback Machine). are now placed under the new Ministry of Natural Resources, which has the responsibility for the development and protection.

The First Institute of Oceanography, under the auspices of SOA, posited in a 2018 paper, for example, that the 2015 National Security Law “expounds China’s interests in new territories like the Arctic areas”, including “geostrategy and military security, asset and personnel security, climate and environment security and resource- and energy security”.³³⁾Liu F & Liu D (2018) Security of the North Pole and China’s National Security Interests from the perspective of the New National Security Law. China Soft Science (中国软科学). The paper proposes the deployment of Chinese military forces to protect its interests in the Arctic, specifically to protect Chinese ships passing through the region and to safeguard construction projects connected to the Polar Silk Road. The authors view the Arctic as a region which could potentially become an arena for a “new Cold War” between NATO countries and Russia, which may hinder the development of China’s economic interests in the area.

The analysis presented underscores the argument that China has identified areas of interest in the Arctic that it aims to protect, with military means if necessary. However, China sees peace and stability as key requirements for the successful development of its commercial interests, as indicated in its official Arctic policy, where China states that it wants to play an active role in Arctic governance and the shaping of rules and norms in the region, with the end goal of maintaining peace and security.³⁴⁾The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2018) China’s Arctic Policy Avoiding conflicts in the region can thus be seen as the principal motivation for China’s involvement in Arctic governance. The acknowledgement of the potential for conflict in the region precipitates the need for increased Chinese military capacity in the Arctic.

PLA Strategy and Capacity Building

China’s military has invested resources in studying the military importance of the Arctic, resulting in numerous publications. One military scholar sums up the security priorities of China in the Arctic, stating that, “the military has made knowledge accumulation and institutional improvement for the Arctic governance” a priority.³⁵⁾Yang J (2018) An Interpretation of China’s Arctic Policy. Pacific Journal Knowledge accumulation is presented as the key to strengthening China’s capacity to safeguard its interests in building up dual military-civilian capacities on navigation and meteorology for the Arctic. For example, the state-owned China General Nuclear Power Group just completed their bidding process for the construction of a nuclear-powered ice-breaker, which will be China’s first nuclear-powered surface vessel if completed.³⁶⁾Zhen L (2019) Could China’s ‘experimental’ ship be the world’s biggest nuclear-powered icebreaker?. South China Morning Post, 20 March, www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3002455/china-build-30000-tonne-nuclear-powered-ship-described. Accessed on 29 June 2019

Our analysis of published research from China provides an insight into some of the strategic thinking within the PLA on Arctic issues.

Navigation and Satellite Technology

Research conducted by PLA, both unilaterally and in cooperation with civilian stakeholders, indicates that Arctic navigation and satellite surveillance technology has been identified as a priority by China’s military establishment. These knowledge and capacity-building efforts have been identified as a security threat in the Arctic by the US in its latest Arctic policy.³⁷⁾The document states that civilian research efforts “could support a strengthened, future Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean, potentially including deployment of submarines to the region”, see Office of the United States Secretary of Defense (2019) Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.

In 2015, researchers from PLA and the China Ship Development and Design Center published an article on maneuverability of ships in the region³⁸⁾Hu X & Cai J (2015) Analysis on the requirement of maneuverability for ships navigating through Arctic passage. Chinese Journal of Ship Research. In 2016, The PLA University of Science and Technology completed research on climate change and weather in the Arctic.³⁹⁾Chunyan L & Xiying L & Tonggui B & Wei Y (2016) Influence of cumulus parameterization scheme on climate simulation in the Arctic region. Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences: 210-213. Navigation is not explicitly mentioned in the paper, but both Arctic climate change and weather conditions are key elements of navigational possibilities in the region.

A joint paper by researchers from the PLA and the National Ocean Satellite Application Center (NSOAS)⁴⁰⁾NSOAS was at the time of publication, in 2015, an agency under the jurisdiction of the now-defunct SOA and has been moved to the Ministry of Land and Resources. NSOAS is the agency responsible for building up the HY-series of satellites, developed to monitor global oceans, see National Satellite Oceanic Application Center (2012) Satellites, www1.nsoas.org.cn/NSOAS_En/Satellites/index.html. Accessed on 12 July 2019. in 2015 about ice levels, melting and the impact on ship navigation in the Arctic concluded that global warming is decreasing ice levels to such an extent that navigating Arctic waterways will become possible as global temperatures rise (Shili, et al., 2015). In 2014, the PLA undertook a joint research effort with NSOAS and Shanghai Ocean University that confirmed that data provided by the HY-2 satellite, developed by NSOAS in 2011, could be used for “operational sea services” in the Arctic.⁴¹⁾Shili J & Wang Q & Zou B & Shi Y & Jiao M (2014) Arctic sea ice concentration retrieval using HY-2 Radiometer Data. Chinese Journal of Polar Research. These research undertakings provide early signs of PLA interest in Arctic ship navigation and the usage of military-civilian cooperation on building up Chinese naval capacities in the Arctic. Satellite data has, indeed, been identified as having military uses in the Arctic, underscored by the recent warnings from The Swedish Defense Research Agency, an affiliate of the Swedish Army and Ministry of Defense, that Chinese investments in, and cooperation on, Swedish satellite technology could have military uses in the Arctic.⁴²⁾Wicklén J & Jåma S & Olofsson D (2019) FOI varnar för svenskt rymdsamarbete med Kina. SVT, 13 January, www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/foi-varnar-for-svenskt-rymdsamarbete-med-kina?cmpid=del:tw:20190113:foi-varnar-for-svenskt-rymdsamarbete-med-kina:nyh:lp. Accessed on 31 January 2019. The PLA has reportedly been building up its Arctic navigational capabilities since these research projects were undertaken.⁴³⁾Gady F (2018) China Launches First Domestically Built Polar Icebreaker. The Diplomat, 11 September, thediplomat.com/2018/09/china-launches-first-domestically-built-polar-icebreaker/. Accessed on 1 February 2019.

Strategic Implications of a Chinese Arctic Presence

Beyond the technical aspects of navigation and monitoring the Arctic, the strategic implications of a Chinese naval presence in the Arctic have also been the subject of PLA-affiliated research.

In 2014, a joint research effort between the PLA Dalian Naval Academy and two other Chinese universities detailed relations with – and challenges concerning – Arctic countries’ interests and activities in the region.⁴⁴⁾Li J & Zhan L & Ma P (2014) The Strategic Vision of China’s Developing the Northern Sea Route. Journal of Dongbei University of Finance and Economics. It describes the Arctic as a budding arena for great powers to jostle for influence over trade routes and resources “In view of the (…) enormous shipping potential, the Arctic Circle countries have been taking measures to get more Arctic dominion, control the Arctic route [and] occupy all of the Arctic resources (…). Therefore coastal states around the Arctic compete intensely”.⁴⁵⁾Li J & Zhan L & Ma P (2014) The Strategic Vision of China’s Developing the Northern Sea Route. Journal of Dongbei University of Finance and Economics. This competition for resources and influence could cause “difficulties” for China’s “development and utilization” of the Arctic region, according to the authors. Such an analysis from PLA-affiliated research further signals the identification of Chinese interests in the Arctic, and the developing prerogative among China’s military establishment to secure and protect China’s interests in the Arctic.

China has previously shown an inclination towards aligning itself with the US on Arctic issues, sharing the goal of open trade routes in the region and harboring similar concerns about the militarization of the Arctic. PLA scholars noted in 2016 that there were two main “camps” in the future of the Arctic, namely Russia and the US.⁴⁶⁾Wang W & Jing D & Jin P & Zhang Y & Ding X & Huang J & Changgang R (2016) Military Use of the Marine Environment in the Arctic Region and Its Strategic Thinking. Doc88, www.doc88.com/p-3505234381275.html. Accessed on 19 January 2019. They speculated that China was more likely to align with the US on Arctic issues due to skepticism towards Russian militarization in the Arctic and optimism towards the US stance on open access to shipping routes through the region. Public statements from the US, however, indicates a lack of interest in commercial opportunities in the Arctic, reducing the scope for commercial cooperation with China.⁴⁷⁾Admiral James Foggo, the commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa and Joint Forces Command Naples, recently stated that the US does not have an interest in sailing along the so-called “Polar Silk Road” due to the size and nature of US ships. He did, however, underline the US perception of China trying to seize opportunities in the Arctic, stating that “the Chinese have a host of different varieties of vessels that can transit across the Arctic so they want to make sure that they have a stake” in the region and reiterated the US position supporting freedom of access to the Arctic, see Gehrke J (2019) ‘It’s nobody’s lake’: US admiral warns China and Russia over Arctic. Washington Examiner, 20 February, www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/its-nobodys-lake-us-admiral-warns-china-and-russia-over-arctic. Accessed on 22 May 2019. The same paper argued that China can, and should, play a part in the ongoing international resource grab in the Arctic. The paper, written by researchers from five PLA entities, and a meteorological lab under the auspices of the Chinese Ministry of Education, concludes that “countries around the world are grabbing the Arctic resources through alliances, domestic legislation and military exercises. China should, and can, play a part”. The paper especially views the increasing scientific consensus about the coming availability of hydrocarbons as the Arctic ice melts: “the dependence of the world’s economic growth on energy, especially on oil and gas, has made military and political leaders in many countries aware of the need to formulate political relations about the Arctic as soon as possible and to coordinate all important areas from the North Pole, scientific research in the waters, peaceful use of the Arctic Ocean and to carry out large-scale military operations and (…) to promote national interests in the Arctic region.” The paper highlights dangers surrounding the militarization of the Arctic, noting that “the pace of military training in the region is accelerated. The Arctic may become the tipping point of new wars.”

The identification of potential military threats to China’s interests in the Arctic indicates China’s increased awareness of the security implications of its Arctic presence, and the need to devote resources to address them. However, such a shift does not directly translate into China becoming an aggressive player in the Arctic. Much of China’s naval capabilities remain tied to the South China Sea, and China does not claim sovereignty over any parts of the Arctic. Rather, the Chinese military will likely support Beijing’s trade and commercial ambitions in the region—which remains dependent on cooperation with other countries. Military prerogatives thus operate in a fine balancing act alongside commercial goals.

Looking Ahead: Contending Claims in the Arctic – A Chinese Balancing Act

To cement China’s role in Arctic governance, balance its interests and implement its strategies in High North, China will be required to navigate the contending legal claims posited by the different Arctic nations. However, this represents a potential double-edged sword for Beijing, particularly regarding its own stated policies on other bodies of water closer to home. China’s interpretation of international law proposes that coastal states should have increased discretion to hinder foreign activity within their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).⁴⁸⁾PRC maintains this minority-held interpretation of UNCLOS, put forth by Chinese legal scholars in the early 2000’s. PRC claims that the difference in current military technology and capability, compared to when UNCLOS was signed in 1982, makes military navigation and reconnaissance activities an infringement of the coastal country’s national security and “can be considered a use of force or a threat to use force”, see Xizhong C & Xiaofeng R (2005) A Chinese Perspective. Marine Policy 29(2): 139–146. Currently, Russia claims that the North-East Passage, the Arctic sea route eastward from the Atlantic to Asian shores, belongs to its waters,⁴⁹⁾Lalonde S & Lasserre F (2013) The Position of the United States on the Northwest Passage: Is the Fear of Creating a Precedent Warranted?. Ocean Development & International Law 44(1): 28-72. whereas Canada contends that the North-West Passage, the opposite route, is within its internal waters.⁵⁰⁾Byers M & Lodge E (2019) China and the Northwest Passage. Chinese Journal of International Law 18(1): 57-90.⁵¹⁾United States Department of State (2019) Remarks With Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland Before Their Meeting. The United States and, to a lesser extent, the European Union (EU) posit that the passages are international waters open to navigation by all nations.

For China, its legal perspective on the Arctic is founded on two primary legal documents; The 1920 Svalbard Treaty and the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Though no public statement has been made, Beijing has hinted that it has the right to freedom of navigation in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the Arctic coastal states and high seas, a right to fishing and seabed mining and the right to innocent passage in the territorial waters of Arctic states.⁵²⁾Sun Y (2018) The Intricacy of China’s Arctic Policy. Stimson Centre. This viewpoint was clearly stated by Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, in comments relayed by the official China News Service: “The Arctic belongs to all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it”.⁵³⁾Chang G (2010) China’s Arctic Play. The Diplomat, 9 March, thediplomat.com/2010/03/chinas-arctic-play/. Accessed on 20 January 2019.

Seen from Beijing, accepting the Canadian or Russian claims could push for an international precedent in favor of Beijing’s own claims regarding the Qiongzhou Strait, between southern China and the island of Hainan, connecting the Gulf of Tonkin to the South China Sea. Such a political move would also likely set the stage for maritime cooperation between Russia and Canada on one side and China on the other, helping to ensure the development of the “Polar Silk Road”, and providing Chinese access to infrastructure such as fueling stations and search and rescue services in the region.⁵⁴⁾Byers M & Lodge E (2019) China and the Northwest Passage. Chinese Journal of International Law 18(1): 57-90. Indeed, it is important to note that control over internal waters is in general not contradictory to trade and shipping. However, as a growing maritime power, China is increasingly dependent on free waterways, and the precedent of countries bilaterally establishing agreements for the governing of straits could have ramifications in key areas such as the Malacca Strait, where Malaysia and Indonesia jointly claim sovereign rights, or Hormuz Strait, where Iranian sovereignty claims risks conflict with Oman.⁵⁵⁾Lalonde S & Lasserre F (2013) The Position of the United States on the Northwest Passage: Is the Fear of Creating a Precedent Warranted?. Ocean Development & International Law 44(1): 28-72.; Leifer M & Nelson D (1973) Conflict of Interest in the Straits of Malacca. International Affairs 49(2): 190-203. Both of these straits are vital waterways, and potential chokepoints, for international commerce in general, and especially concerning oil transport to Asia. China’s decision on Arctic claims is therefore linked to geopolitical dynamics and legal claims beyond the Arctic. In other words, the Arctic issue does not operate in a vacuum for Chinese policymakers, but forms part of a bigger rhetorical and legal puzzle as Beijing stakes its claims within and beyond its immediate boundaries.

Conclusion

China’s Arctic strategy is focused on achieving two main goals: ensuring access to commercial opportunities in the Arctic and building capabilities to enforce its perceived rights and claims in the region. Commercial development seems to be China’s main goal, and China has been increasing its diplomatic and scientific efforts to support this aspiration in the Arctic since 2006. It is evident that China has, since at least 2014, been building its capacity to defend its interests in the region through an increasingly security-focused Arctic policy that is supported by the military.

Looking ahead, the Arctic presents China with important legal challenges. China’s legal stance on the Arctic, where it adheres to the majority-held interpretation of UNCLOS, contradicts its own stance in the SCS and ECS, where it maintains a minority-held interpretation of the same legal framework to claim maritime territories. This contradiction could become a double-edged sword weakening China’s legal arguments in both the Arctic and in its regional waters.

Increasing skepticism from Arctic nations makes deepening ties to them more challenging for China. Furthermore, China has to balance the wish for increased cooperation with Russia—a potential strategic partner—with its own skepticism of Russia’s militarization of the Arctic.

China’s future actions in the Arctic will provide valuable insight into how Beijing balances its role in international governance with its wider strategic interests, both within and beyond its immediate boundaries, as it increases its presence on the world stage.

Heljar Havnes is a Master’s in International Affairs graduate from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.

Johan Martin Seland is a Master’s in Public Policy graduate from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.

The authors would like to thank Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Drew Thompson, for his helpful guidance.