The Arctic in China's Subnational 14th Five-Year Plans

Heilongjiang Exhibit at the Expo 2010 Shanghai China. Photo: Gary Todd

The Arctic Institute China Series 2023

• Chinese Perspective on the Arctic and its Implication for Nordic Countries
• China and the Arctic: Reflections in 2023
• China’s Polar Silk Road: Long Game or Failed Strategy?
• The Arctic for China’s Green Energy Transition
• Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine: Impacts on China’s Climate Responsibility in the Arctic
• What the 14th Five-Year Plan says about China’s Arctic Interests
• The Arctic in China’s Subnational 14th Five-Year Plans
• Polar Expertise in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan
• China and the Arctic in 2023: Final Remarks

Adopted in March 2021, China’s 14th Five-Year Plan is the country’s first five-year plan to explicitly include the Arctic region. Looking toward 2025, the plan states that China will “participate in practical cooperation in the Arctic and build the Polar Silk Road”.¹⁾Eiterjord T (2023) What the 14th Five-Year Plan says about China’s Arctic Interests. The Arctic Institute, November 23, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/14th-five-year-plan-chinas-arctic-interests/. Accessed 23 November 2023 But the national five-year plan signed into effect at the People’s Congress two years ago was only the beginning. Following the drafting and adoption of the national plan, provincial governments, ministries, industries, and other subnational actors have gone on to draw up their own plans. Smaller in scope, these documents are often more detailed in their objectives. They are also more likely to reflect local interests to a greater degree than the national plan.

Mapping these plans can also help give a sense of how the Arctic region, and particularly the Polar Silk Road, is being interpreted outside of Beijing. In an effort to break open the black box that is foreign policymaking in China, scholars have turned to provincial governments, state-owned companies, and other subnational actors to try and understand how actors shape foreign policy emanating from the capital.²⁾Kossa M, Lomaeva M and Saunavaara J (2021) East Asian subnational government involvement in the Arctic: a case for paradiplomacy?. The Pacific Review, 34(4), pp.664-695. Special attention has been given to provinces on the country’s periphery, which at times play outsized roles in informing foreign policy due to their geopolitical positions, local expertise, and cross-border linkages.³⁾Wong A (2018) More than peripheral: How provinces influence China’s foreign policy. The China Quarterly, 235, pp.735-757. This subnational focus has also emerged as a corrective to the notion that China is a monolithic actor internationally. Research has pointed out the often open-ended and fragmented nature of Chinese policymaking.⁴⁾Jones L and Hameiri S (2021) Fractured China. Cambridge University Press. As policies trickle through the state apparatus and down to the local level, the room that subnational actors have to interpret and implement them widens. Scholars of Chinese foreign policy have argued for how large-scale strategies such as the Belt and Road Initiative should be seen less as coherent projects and more as policy slogans.⁵⁾Zeng J (2020) Slogan politics: Understanding Chinese foreign policy concepts. Springer Nature. As a consequence, local actors might invoke certain foreign policy slogans opportunistically in a bid to access political capital. Conversely, policy slogans may be performatively included in local planning documents to appease higher-ups in Beijing.

Subnational plans began trickling out following the National Congress in early 2021. Several provinces have included the Arctic in their most recent five-year plans. Going through them is an initial proxy for assessing how interests and approaches to the Arctic region differ across the country, at least on paper. Provinces are not situated equally. Their geographic connections to—and economic interests in—the Arctic differ substantially. Coastal provinces are naturally better positioned to take part in maritime initiatives such as the Polar Silk Road. The country’s northernmost provinces, although mostly landlocked, can claim a degree of near-Arctic-ness.⁶⁾Xu, L., 2023. The ‘awkward’ geopolitics of tourism in China’s ‘Arctic’ village. Tourism Geographies, pp.1-18.

For this latter reason it makes sense to begin in the north, with China’s northeastern provinces—Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning. Often dubbed the country’s rust belt, these provinces have historically been dominated by state-owned extractive and heavy industries. As China began moving away from a command economy and toward greater privatization in the 1980s, however, these provinces fell behind. Guangdong, Zhejiang, and other, more southern provinces better connected to global trade flows have seen immense growth from the country’s increasingly export-oriented economy. The relatively isolated northeastern provinces—although an important source of grains, lumber, oil, and other natural resources—have remained economically depressed. When regional development of the northern provinces is discussed today, “revitalization” is the word most often used.⁷⁾Xinhua News Agency (2023) Xi Jinping hosts forum on promoting comprehensive revitalization of Northeast China in the new era, stresses: firmly grasp the important mission of Northeast China and strive to write a new chapter of comprehensive revitalization of Northeast China [习近平主持召开新时代推动东北全面振兴座谈会强调：牢牢把握东北的重要使命 奋力谱写东北全面振兴新篇章]. September 9, https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202309/content_6903072.htm. Accessed 23 November 2023.

Heilongjiang

Heilongjiang, China’s northernmost province, which derives its name from the Amur River that forms the border between the province and Russia, includes in its provincial five-year plan the Polar Silk Road alongside several other connectivity projects as part of the province’s “opening-up” strategy.⁸⁾Heilongjiang Provincial People’s Government (2021) Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of Heilongjiang Province and Long-range Objectives Through the Year 2035 [黑龙江省国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要]. The Polar Silk Road also appears in the landlocked province’s five-year plan for its transport sector, which sets out the ambiguous goal of “forming a comprehensive international transportation channel connecting [the province] with the sea and the Polar Silk Road”.⁹⁾Heilongjiang Provincial People’s Government (2021) Comprehensive Transportation System Development Plan for Heilongjiang Province in the 14th Five-Year Plan Period [黑龙江省“十四五”综合交通运输体系发展规划]. At a press conference in connection with the plan’s launch, a senior official explained that Heilongjiang would focus on the Polar Silk Road and other “development strategies” in order to “promote the transformation [of the province] from being ‘peripheral’ to becoming a ‘Northeast Asian hub’”.¹⁰⁾Ministry of Transport (2022) Introduction to the 14th Five-Year Plan for Comprehensive Transportation Development in Heilongjiang Province [《黑龙江省“十四五”综合交通运输发展规划》介绍]. April 15, https://www.mot.gov.cn/zxft2022/fzhgh_hlj/. Accessed 18 July 2023.

Owing to its geography, any provincial opening-up strategy inevitably means an opening up northward.¹¹⁾Xu Q (2023) Building a new high ground for opening up to the north and writing a new chapter for the revitalization of Longjiang [打造向北开放新高地 谱写龙江振兴新篇章]. April 11, http://www.news.cn/mrdx/2023-04/11/c_1310709941.htm. Accessed 18 July 2023. Cross-border trade with Russia has long been a priority, manifested in various connectivity projects, such as the Blagoveshchensk-Heihe bridge which opened for traffic in 2022. Moreover, the province plays an important role in the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor, a central leg of the Belt and Road Initiative. More recently, a transport route connecting industries in the province with ports in the Russian Far East and South Korea has been established. At the heart of these efforts are the cities that dot the China-Russian border, such as Suifenhe, a city located less than 200 kilometers from Vladivostok. In its most recent five-year plan, the city lists “developing new [transport] channels to the Arctic Ocean and building the ‘Polar Silk Road’” as one of its major transportation projects.¹²⁾Suifenhe Municipal People’s Government (2021) Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of Suifenhe City and Long-range Objectives Through the Year 2035 [绥芬河市国民经济和社会发展第十四个 五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要].

Technologies with Arctic applications are found in the provincial plan as well. Designing nuclear-powered icebreakers, equipment for underwater operations in polar waters, and developing polar search and rescue capabilities are named as priority projects.¹³⁾Heilongjiang Provincial People’s Government (2021) Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of Heilongjiang Province and Long-range Objectives Through the Year 2035 [黑龙江省国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要]. Local research cooperation with Russia on polar technologies is highlighted too. Harbin Engineering University in the province’s capital hosts the China-Russia Belt and Road Joint Laboratory for Polar Technology and Equipment, which was opened last year.¹⁴⁾Heilongjiang Provincial People’s Government (2021) Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of Heilongjiang Province and Long-range Objectives Through the Year 2035 [黑龙江省国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要]. The university is also looking to develop facilities for “polar environment simulation and testing,” according to the same document.¹⁵⁾Heilongjiang Provincial People’s Government (2021) Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of Heilongjiang Province and Long-range Objectives Through the Year 2035 [黑龙江省国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要].

Jilin

Things are similar in neighboring Jilin province. Also landlocked, the province borders both Russia and North Korea. In its newest five-year plan, it states that:

Facing neighboring countries in Northeast Asia, [Jilin province will take] the initiative to participate in international cooperation and [the international] division of labor, promote economic and technical cooperation, mainly with Japan and South Korea, and resource development and border trade cooperation mainly with Russia, and jointly build the Polar Silk Road.¹⁶⁾Jilin Province People’s Government (2021) Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of Jilin Province and Long-range Objectives Through the Year 2035 [吉林省国民经济和社会发展第十四个 五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要].

In addition, the plan helpfully includes a policy glossary which defines the Polar Silk Road as “the shipping route that crosses the Arctic Circle to connect the economic centers of North America, East Asia, and Western Europe”.¹⁷⁾Jilin Province People’s Government (2021) Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of Jilin Province and Long-range Objectives Through the Year 2035 [吉林省国民经济和社会发展第十四个 五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要]. Similarly, in the national five-year plan, Chapter 41 (“Deepening the implementation of regional coordinated development strategies”) outlines a strategy to build the Chang-Ji-Tu Development and Opening-up Pilot Area, a collection of projects aimed at connecting Jilin with rail networks across Eurasia, seaports in the Russian Far East, such as Zarubino and Vladivostok, and the Sea of Japan via the Tumen River.¹⁸⁾State Council (2021) The 14th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development and Long-range Objectives Through the Year 2035 of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要].

Jilin is in a peculiar position, geographically speaking. As with Heilongjiang, its outer borders are a result of nineteenth-century treaties between China’s then war-weakened Qing rulers and European colonial powers. The 1858 Treaty of Aigun ceded most of the Amur River basin to tsarist Russia. The Treaty of Beijing, signed two years later, transferred to Russia vast stretches of coastline facing the Sea of Japan, from where the Amur River empties into the Sea of Okhotsk in the north, to Vladivostok in the south—what today makes up the Primorsky and southern Khabarovsk krais. This hand-over included the mouth of the Tumen River. The river, which today draws part of the border between Jilin and North Korea, flows into the Sea of Japan. The last 16 kilometers before it reaches the sea, however, forms the border between Russia and North Korea, sealing off the province’s access to the Sea of Japan.¹⁹⁾Cotton, J. (1996) China and Tumen River cooperation: Jilin’s coastal development strategy. Asian Survey, 36(11), pp.1086-1101.

Beginning in the 1990s, a series of multilateral initiatives have been launched in an effort to develop the Tumen River and the surrounding economic area. In more recent years, China and Russia have established so-called “dry port” arrangements that circumvent the river, taking minerals, agricultural products, and manufactured goods overland from Jilin across the border to Zarubino and other Russian ports, to be shipped south to ports along China’s eastern seaboard.²⁰⁾Zhang W and Zhang Y (2021) Borrowing port to go out to sea, linkage and opening up—Hunchun City vigorously promotes the development and opening up of writing [借港出海 联动开放—珲春市大力推动开发开放走笔]. Jilin Ribao, August 8, https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20210808A02MLN00. Accessed 14 November 2023.

The emergence of the Polar Silk Road has not gone unnoticed by promoters of these initiatives. In 2017, already before the release of China’s first Arctic policy, the president of the Tumen River International Cooperation Society wrote an opinion piece discussing how developing the river could support the Polar Silk Road. He argued that:

The Sea of Japan is critical for connecting the Polar Silk Road. The Tumen River is the only strategic channel for [China] to enter the Sea of Japan, and this is also the coastal area closest to Arctic shipping routes.²¹⁾Li T (2018) Using the Tumen River mechanism to promote the construction of the Polar Silk Road [用图们江机制促进“冰上丝绸之路”建设]. Tumen Jiang Hezuo, December 18, http://tmjhz.org/index.php/zjjt/555-2018-01-04-07-21-32. Accessed 19 July 2023.

The idea of connecting the Tumen River with the Arctic, however far-fetched, is not new and has been discussed in the academic literature since at least 2012.²²⁾Dou B (2012) Arctic Ocean Navigation and the Strategy of Tumen River as a Sea Gate [北冰洋通航与中国图们江出海战略探讨]. Dongbeiya Luntan, 21(3), pp.113-120. With the Polar Silk Road entering the country’s foreign policy canon in 2018, more op-eds and scholarly articles have come out that place the Tumen River in the context of the Polar Silk Road, Arctic shipping, and, by extension, China’s claim to being a near-Arctic state.²³⁾Chen M (2021) On the Participation of China Tumen River Area in the Construction of the “Ice Silk Road” [中国图们江地区参与“冰上丝绸之路”建设探析]. Dongbeiya Jingji Yanjiu, 5(5), pp.64-82. Vladivostok and other Far Eastern ports, such as Zarubino, are also seen as integral to this strategy. Even the North Korean port of Rajin has been considered as a potential node in the Polar Silk Road network.²⁴⁾Li Z and Deng Z (2019) Participation in the “Silk Road on Ice”: North Korea’s Situation and Strategies [.参与“冰上丝绸之路”：朝鲜的条件和策略]. Dongbei Jingji Yanjiu, 3(4), pp.5-17.

This vision is repeated in Jilin’s five-year plan for its transport sector, which states that the province will continue to expand shipping cooperation with Russia and “prepare to participate in Arctic shipping.²⁵⁾Jilin Provincial People’s Government (2022) The 14th Five-Year Plan for Comprehensive Transportation Development in Jilin Province [吉林省综合交通运输发展”十四五”规划]. The city of Hunchun, an industrial center in the China-Russia-North Korea tri-border area, situated a few hours from Vladivostok, states in its plan that it will take part in the Polar Silk Road and establish a “Northeast Asia ‘Polar Silk Road’ industrial development fund”.²⁶⁾Hunchun Municipal People’s Government (2022) Hunchun Municipal People’s Government on the issuance of the 14th Five-Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of Hunchun City and Long-range Objectives Toward 2035 [珲春市人民政府关于印发珲春市国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要的通知].

Provincial interest in the Arctic can also be seen in the many institutions and events that have proliferated under the Polar Silk Road banner. The Changbaishan Polar Silk Road Research Institute—named after a local mountain chain—was inaugurated in December 2018 and has since 2020 been holding annual Polar Silk Road conferences. A second institute was opened in 2020, the Northeast Pacific Ocean Development Research Center, which carries the alternate name Jilin Polar Silk Road Research Center. It, too, has started hosting annual conferences on the Arctic. The provincial government announced in 2019 that it would launch a “Polar Silk Road Index” to monitor developments in Arctic shipping.²⁷⁾Xinhua Finance (2019) Research and Development of Polar Silk Road Index Series Officially Launched [冰上丝绸之路系列指数研发工作正式启动]. November 7, https://www.cnfin.com/news-xh08/a/20191107/1896607.shtml. Accessed 18 July 2023.

Liaoning

Liaoning, the last of the three northeastern provinces, is decidedly better positioned to play a part in Beijing’s Arctic strategy. The province’s southern border curves around Liaodong Bay, the northmost section of the Bohai Sea, and it faces the Yellow Sea to the east. In one of the province’s five-year plans, under a section on boosting China’s influence in international maritime affairs, it states that it will support research on the legal, technical, navigational, as well as other dimensions of Arctic shipping, including the creation of a provincial “polar marine technology innovation center”.²⁸⁾Liaoning Provincial People’s Government (2022) The 14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Marine Economy in Liaoning [辽宁省“十四五”海洋经济发展规划]. It moreover urges closer cooperation with South Korea, Japan, and Russia on issues such as polar policymaking, and calls for “strengthening cooperation with Russia’s Far East when it comes to infrastructure, investment, and resource development, and to jointly build a land and sea development belt along the Polar Silk Road”.²⁹⁾Liaoning Provincial People’s Government (2022) The 14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Marine Economy in Liaoning [辽宁省“十四五”海洋经济发展规划].

Elsewhere, the provincial government states that it aims to turn the “Liaoning-Europe” route into an “internationally recognized ‘Polar Silk Road’ brand”.³⁰⁾Liaoning Provincial People’s Government (2022) The 14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Marine Economy in Liaoning [辽宁省“十四五”海洋经济发展规划]. This refers to the shipping route that runs from ports in the province, through the Arctic, to destinations in Europe. In 2013, Yong Sheng, a cargo carrier operated by the Chinese shipping giant COSCO, sailed from Liaoning to Rotterdam via the Northern Sea Route, making it the first Chinese commercial voyage to transit the Arctic to reach Europe. This strategy can in some ways be seen as a precursor to the maritime-centered Polar Silk Road which launched half a decade later.

The province’s favorable position vis-á-vis the Arctic comes from its ports. The Yong Sheng set out from Dalian, the province’s second-largest city, which sits strategically at the southern tip of the Liaodong peninsula, facing the Yellow Sea. Its port is the largest in northern China. It is also a shipbuilding center, and the site of a People’s Liberation Army Navy base. The Dalian Maritime University is active across most facets of polar and Arctic research. The national five-year plan singles out Dalian as the international shipping center in the country’s northeast.³¹⁾Liaoning Provincial People’s Government (2022) The 14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Marine Economy in Liaoning [辽宁省“十四五”海洋经济发展规划]. The city’s own five-year plan calls for integrating into the Polar Silk Road network and “establishing [itself] as a homeport for Arctic shipping”.³²⁾Dalian Municipal People’s Government (2021) Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of Dalian and Long-range Objectives Toward 2035 [大连市国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要]. The five-year plan for its maritime economy moreover states that “’the Polar Silk Road’ is bringing new opportunities for promoting connectivity and regional cooperation between Arctic and near-Arctic regions.” The plan goes on to note that “Dalian is an important nodal city and [that] prospects are bright for establishing it as an ‘Arctic shipping homeport.’”

What emerges from these documents is an interpretation of the Polar Silk Road as a regional initiative centered on Northeast Asia. Grand geopolitical visions of lumbering tankers and cargo carriers plying the Arctic Ocean are mostly absent. Understandably so, as these plans are presumably written to reflect the interest of local governments. Instead, the Arctic and the Polar Silk Road are threaded into an at times bewildering array of already existing infrastructure corridors, economic zones, and other development initiatives. For Heilongjiang and Jilin, the Polar Silk Road is framed as a future stage of their cross-border cooperation with Russia. Moreover, both provinces see their (future) connection to the Arctic as a way to reposition themselves regionally. Liaoning, through the Port of Dalian, emphasizes its position as a gateway province. Another thing to note is the anticipatory language used: Jilin and Heilongjiang are “preparing” for Arctic shipping. Liaoning points to its “prospects” as an Arctic gateway province. Although these documents may seem overly optimistic in terms of the near-term prospects of Arctic shipping or overstate the potential impact trans-Arctic trade will have in Northeast Asia, they represent perspectives on the country’s foreign policy from outside of Beijing. In the Tumen River case, it shows how foreign policy concepts radiating out from the capital are harnessed toward more local ends.

Shandong

Across the Bohai Strait from Liaoning lies Shandong province. Under a subsection on participating in global maritime governance, the province states it will “explore the development of Arctic shipping and take part in building ‘the Polar Silk Road’”,³³⁾Shandong Provincial People’s Government (2021) Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of Shandong and Long-range Objectives Toward 2035 [山东省国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要]. as well as promote cooperation in developing fisheries, mining, oil, and other polar resources.³⁴⁾Shandong Provincial People’s Government (2021) Shandong Province 14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of Marine Economy [山东省“十四五”海洋经济发展规划]. Polar research and polar technologies, including icebreakers, ice-going cargo carriers, and ice-resistant oil platforms, have also made it in. The five-year plan for the province’s shipping industry contains subsections dedicated to polar shipbuilding and the development of hydrocarbons in polar waters.³⁵⁾Shandong Provincial People’s Government (2021) Shandong Province Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering Equipment Industry Development 14th Five-Year Plan [山东省船舶与海洋工程装备产业发展“十四五”规划]. Qingdao, the province’s largest city, is an important seaport and naval base. The city has already made efforts to position itself as a gateway for China’s Arctic activities.³⁶⁾Bennett M (2018) Qingdao: China’s iron gateway to the Arctic. Cryopolitics, May 4, https://www.cryopolitics.com/2018/05/04/qingdao-china-arctic-gateway/. Accessed 17 July 2023. Local fabrication yards have built modules for liquefaction plants in Russia’s Yamal region. The city is also home to the Ocean University of China and the First Institute of Oceanography, both with large polar research portfolios.³⁷⁾Devyatkin P (2023) China and the Arctic: Reflections in 2023. The Arctic Institute, November 9. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/china-arctic-reflections-2023/ For the current five-year plan period, the city includes the Polar Silk Road as part of its internationalization strategy, vowing to participate in the Polar Silk Road as part of a larger effort in establishing itself as a “maritime community with a shared future pilot area”,³⁸⁾Bandao (2021) Qingdao publishes its 14th Five-Year Plan—Chengyang will be “upgraded” to a main urban area [青岛公布“十四五”规划 城阳将“升级”为主城区]. Bandao Wang, March 2, https://news.bandao.cn/a/470110.html. Accessed 27 November 2023. referencing another policy slogan launched by Xi Jinping in 2019 for China’s vision of global ocean governance.³⁹⁾Xu, Q. and Tan, Z., 2023. Building a maritime community with a shared future: Scholarly reflections on China’s new ocean vision. Marine Policy, 149, p.105508. Relatedly, the current plan calls for cementing the city’s position as a “global maritime center” and lists Arctic shipping governance among the projects for doing this.⁴⁰⁾Qingdao Municipal People’s Government (2021) The 14th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of Qingdao City and Long-range Objectives Toward 2035 [青岛市国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要]. Its five-year plan covers the full spectrum of Arctic-related issues, from polar research and resource extraction, to regional governance and Arctic legal research.

Southern provinces

Mentions of the Arctic become fewer and farther between as we move further south. Polar science and technology dominate these plans. The coastal province of Zhejiang, for example, plans to accelerate the development of ice-strengthened vessels.⁴¹⁾Zhejiang Province Economic and Information Technology Department (2021) Zhejiang Province High-end Equipment Manufacturing Industry Development 14th Five-Year Plan [浙江省高端装备制造业发展“十四五”规划]. Shanghai, the country’s main hub for polar research and logistics, has included polar research and a slew of polar technologies in its five-year plan, noting that it will build polar-going vessels and boost China’s capacity to develop polar technologies.⁴²⁾Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (2021) The 14th Five-Year Plan of Shanghai Municipality for Building a Scientific and Technological Innovation Center with Global Influence [上海市建设具有全球影响力的科技创新中心“十四五”规划]. September 29, https://www.shanghai.gov.cn/nw12344/20210928/5020e5fdf5ac4c6fb4b219da6bb4b889.html. Accessed 2 April 2021. The megacity’s five-year plan for its strategic industries likewise includes icebreakers in a list of marine technologies to pursue.⁴³⁾Shanghai Municipal People’s Government (2021) Shanghai Strategic Emerging Industries and Pilot Industries Development 14th Five-Year Plan [上海市战略性新兴产业和先导产业发展“十四五”规划]. Neighboring Jiangsu also mentions polar technologies,⁴⁴⁾Jiangsu Natural Resources Department (2021) The 14th Five-Year Plan for Marine Economic Development in Jiangsu Province [江苏省“十四五”海洋经济发展规划]. while Guangdong, whose shipbuilders have been involved in launching several polar-going vessels, includes “key polar technologies and equipment” as well technologies for polar observation in a section on maritime governance.⁴⁵⁾Guangdong Provincial People’s Government (2021) The 14th Five-Year Plan for Development of the Marine Economy in Guangdong Province [广东省海洋经济发展 “十四五” 规划]. Sun Yat-sen University, the province’s largest public university, became earlier this year the first university in the country to operate its own polar research vessel. The island province of Hainan plans to establish a “national-level far seas test site,” in order to support, among other things, the country’s polar strategy, according to its newest five-year plan.⁴⁶⁾Hainan Department of Natural Resources and Planning (2021) The 14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Marine Economy in Hainan Province [海南省海洋经济发展“十四五”规划].

Traces of the polar regions grow even more faint once we head inland. Shanxi,⁴⁷⁾Shanxi Provincial People’s Government (2021) Shanxi Province 14th Five-Year Plan for Future Industrial Development [山西省“十四五”未来产业发展规划]. Shaanxi,⁴⁸⁾Shaanxi Provincial People’s Government (2021) The 14th Five-Year Plan for High-quality Development Plan in the Manufacturing Industry [陕西省“十四五”制造业高质量发展规划]. Hunan,⁴⁹⁾Industry and Information Department of Hunan Province (2022) The 14th Five-Year Plan Plan for the Development of the Equipment Manufacturing Industry in Hunan [湖南省装备制造业“十四五”发展规划]. and Guizhou provinces,⁵⁰⁾Guizhou Provincial People’s Government (2022) The 14th Five-Year Plan for Industrial Development in Guizhou [贵州省“十四五”工业发展规划]. all briefly mention polar technologies and equipment for polar research. Hubei province states in one of its five-year plans that it will strengthen its polar surveying and mapping facilities.⁵¹⁾Hubei Department of Natural Research (2021) The 14th Five-Year Plan for the Protection and Development of Natural Resources in Hubei Province [湖北省自然资源保护与开发“十四五”规划]. Slightly more left field is Sichuan’s five-year plan. The province, which borders Tibet in southwestern China, is closer to being a “Third Pole” province than an Arctic one. Still, its current five-year plan encourages its companies to participate in the Polar Silk Road.⁵²⁾Sichuan Provincial People’s Government (2021) Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan and for the Economic and Social Development of Sichuan Province and Long-range Objectives Toward 2035 [四川省国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要]. Local state enterprises have previously been involved in infrastructure projects in the High North, with Sichuan Road and Bridge, a state-owned engineering company headquartered in the province, having built the Hålogaland and Beitstadsund bridges in northern Norway, which opened for traffic in 2018 and 2020, respectively.⁵³⁾Strand S (2020) Nå åpner Beitstadsundbrua—lyser ut ny strekning [Beitstadsundbrua is now open—new route announced]. Byggindustrien, April 1, https://www.bygg.no/na-apner-beitstadsundbrua-lyser-ut-ny-strekning/1429224!/. Accessed 27 November 2023.

Conclusion

Subnational five-year plans offer a more granular perspective on local interests in the Arctic. They help give a sense of the division of Arctic labor among subnational actors across China, and highlight the differing interests and aspirations of various provinces and even individual cities. Thinking about policies and projects such as the Polar Silk Road in terms of policy slogans rather than coherent and centrally coordinated strategies also helps us move past overly alarmist views of Chinese activities in the Arctic. Although not an exhaustive survey, this overview should provide a starting point for digging deeper into the geopolitical economy behind different provinces’ and subnational actors’ relationship to the Arctic, how Arctic foreign policy becomes entangled with local politics, especially on the country’s periphery, and, finally, how these actors might act to influence foreign policy-making in Beijing.